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preface
This study has been a long time in prepara-
tion. We began in 2013 with the intention 
of looking at how the delivery of social ser-
vices was affected by violent conflict in four 
countries—Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan. We soon had to drop Sri Lanka 
because it proved difficult to get agreement 
to carry out research in the country. Still, in 
the three remaining countries the varying na-
ture of the conflict offered a good laboratory 
to better understand how differing patterns 
of violence and of the “political settlements” 
that form around conflict had affected or 
were still affecting service delivery. We were 
able to look at how different modes of ser-
vice delivery were able to adapt to and often 
surmount the challenges of violence. Our an-
alytical framework enabled us to explore how 
political settlements at different levels of the 
state and different forms of violence shaped 
service delivery. We were also able to examine 
the role that bargains among elites played in 
the way services were delivered. Finally, we 
explored how certain modes of delivery were 
more effective than others in violent contexts.
Given the sensitive nature of this field of en-
quiry, it is important to understand what this 
study is not. 
First, the case selection, and related research 
methodology, does not claim to be represen-
tative of the sectors or geographical regions in 
question. The research questions were devel-
oped to address important gaps in our under-
standing of how progress in service delivery 
happens in such difficult contexts. We recog-
nize our findings rest on the investigation of 
a restricted number of sectors and projects, 
but our hope is that the case studies and new 
framework will stimulate further research to 
corroborate our findings. Indeed, generating 
a statistically representative sample in such 
contexts, given the security and financial im-
plications, is a perennial challenge. 
Second, we are not trying to offer an exhaus-
tive view of all the possible factors that af-
fect service delivery. The focus on forms of 
settlement, violence, bargains, and service de-
livery modality does not mean that other fac-
tors (such as beneficiary participation, service 
provider incentives, and the technical quality 
of services, among others) are unimportant. 
Rather, based on gaps in the literature (which 
fails to explain observed progress), we are of-
fering a different perspective on why things 
work, or do not. As noted above, this should 
stimulate further debate. 
viii | Preface
Third, the study does not attempt to explore 
the impact of social service delivery on broader 
political dynamics such as peace-building 
and state-building. Our research focuses on 
the “how to” of delivering services on the 
ground when violence is present. In that re-
spect, the report explores the delivery of ser-
vices in their own right (to reduce poverty or 
for other humanitarian reasons) but does not 
address whether or how delivery may cause 
fragility or contribute to state-building. The 
link between social service delivery and state 
legitimacy is too indirect and too broad to 
provide granular, day-to-day guidance for 
policy makers and practitioners. 
Finally, this report does not endorse the ac-
tions of the insurgent groups it describes nor 
condone the observed corruption or collusion 
between these groups and service providers. 
Whatever views about armed groups are pre-
sented in the report come from key informant 
interviews, focus group discussions, and re-
lated literature. What the report does point to, 
however, is the need to accept that in many 
situations of violent conflict, “good gover-
nance” precepts are often an imperfect tem-
plate for providing services, and local bargains 
are sometimes necessary in order to deliver 
humanitarian and development assistance.
We believe the report will play a timely and 
important role in sparking new research, de-
bate, and practice in this critical, yet difficult, 
area.
Richard Hogg
Simon O’Meally
Jonathan Di John
May 2017
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This report provides the foundation for a 
new approach to service delivery in vio-
lence-affected contexts that is more sensitive 
to the actual forms of violence, politics, and 
bargaining encountered in many conflict-af-
fected states. The findings unearth sensitive 
issues about how development organizations 
should approach service delivery in contested 
settings. As many countries today are riven by 
conflict and internal division, some familiar 
rules of the game may be inadequate to deal 
with the mounting humanitarian and devel-
opment challenges posed by complex conflict 
situations, particularly where affected people 
need access to social services. This raises di-
lemmas about the ethical and political judg-
ments and trade-offs that development actors 
frequently have to make. A key challenge is 
whether development actors can adapt their 
procedures and ways of working to the flu-
idity, uncertainties, and risk taking that the 
new, conflict-riven landscape demands while 
preserving financial accountability, doing no 
harm, and ensuring aid effectiveness. This 
challenge cannot be ignored, as progress in 
basic service delivery in violence-affected 
contexts will make or break global efforts to 
end poverty and increase shared prosperity 
over the coming decades. 
study Rationale and objectives
About 2 billion people live in countries where 
fragility, conflict, and violence make it diffi-
cult to achieve development outcomes. These 
countries have made the slowest progress 
toward the Millennium Development Goals. 
On average, the poverty rate of a country that 
experienced major violence between 1981 
and 2005 is 21 percentage points higher than 
that of a country that saw no violence (World 
Bank 2011). By 2030 about 50 percent of the 
world’s poor will live in countries affected by 
fragility and violence (World Bank 2016b).
Violent conflict also has major effects that 
spill over national borders, as the refugee cri-
sis affecting parts of Europe, the Middle East, 
and North Africa shows. 
Delivering basic services in these settings 
is extremely challenging. Only one-fifth of 
fragile states are on track to achieve univer-
sal primary schooling (compared with nearly 
half of nonfragile developing countries) 
(OECD 2015); and, only 28 percent are on 
track to halve the number of their citizens 
who lack access to safe water (61 percent of 
nonfragile countries have reached this target) 
(OECD 2015).
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In response to these issues, the international 
community has committed to improving 
development assistance in so-called fragile 
contexts. In September 2015, world leaders 
adopted the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). Goal 16 is to “promote peaceful 
and inclusive societies for sustainable devel-
opment, provide access to justice for all and 
build effective, accountable and inclusive in-
stitutions at all levels” (UN 2015). They also 
agreed to SDGs focused on improving access 
to and the quality of services. In addition, 
the World Bank Group committed to doing 
more and better in violence-affected contexts 
under the International Development Asso-
ciation’s 18th funding replenishment, which 
spans the years 2017–20. Finally, there is a 
growing consensus in the international com-
munity—as argued in the 2017 World De-
velopment Report (World Bank 2016 )—that 
governance and institutional factors can make 
or break development and service delivery 
progress in violent contexts. 
These ambitious global development goals 
are, however, unlikely to be achieved until 
critical knowledge gaps are filled and prac-
tice on the ground improves. This report ad-
dresses four critical gaps: 
• It is not clear why some service delivery 
interventions in violence-affected contexts 
make progress and others fail.
• It is widely recognized that political econ-
omy dynamics matter for service delivery, 
but there is limited evidence on how such 
dynamics influence daily programming, 
especially in violence-affected contexts.
• Ground-level research in violence-affected 
areas is rare; most studies are based on sec-
ondary literature reviews or, at best, inter-
views with key informants in capital cities.
• There is a consensus that practice on the 
ground urgently needs to become more 
differentiated, context specific, and sys-
tematically tailored to political economy 
and violence risks. 
To address these gaps, the report synthesizes 
and builds on field research in Afghanistan, 
Nepal, and Pakistan on the delivery of health, 
education, and rural infrastructure services. 
This research inductively piloted a new re-
search framework in order to answer the fol-
lowing questions:
• How and why do political economy fac-
tors and forms of violence shape the 
implementation and outcomes of social 
service delivery (SSD) in violence-affected 
contexts?
• What explains the varying success rates of 
service delivery within, and between, vio-
lence-affected contexts?
• What lessons can be learned from what 
worked, and what did not?
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main findings
According to this research, four key interre-
lated elements—political settlements, forms 
of violence, elite bargains, and modalities of 
service delivery—help explain variations in 
success and results. 
political settlements 
Political settlements set the broad, often in-
formal, rules of the game and create con-
straints, spaces, and opportunities for SSD. 
They provide a map of the ruling coalition: 
who the power brokers are; the balance of 
power between them; and what interests 
and norms they are defending or promoting 
in economics, politics, and service delivery. 
Settlements take different forms and can op-
erate at different levels of a polity. Four inter-
connected dimensions of the settlement are 
found to matter: 
• Primary (or national) settlements are 
power configurations at the central state 
level. They usually include elites from 
dominant groups that have traditionally 
held national political power. The stabil-
ity/lack of stability of the settlement and 
the extent to which power brokers within 
the ruling coalition are supportive of some 
form of SSD influences outcomes. 
• Sectoral settlements are linked to the 
national settlements but involve differing 
elite incentives, ideas, and power-sharing 
arrangements related to specific sec-
tors (such as health, education, and 
infrastructure).
• National-subnational linkages are re-
lationships between national and subna-
tional elites that influence service delivery 
by shaping the flow of sectoral resources 
to a locality and influencing the extent to 
which the state apparatus (and its public 
administration) can control insurgents and 
can influence the delivery of services at 
the subnational level.
• Subnational and village-level settle-
ments arguably play the most decisive 
role in explaining subnational variation in 
delivery. This relates to the extent to which 
the local elites’ balance of power is stable 
and oriented toward the delivery of social 
services, the incentives of local elites to-
ward service delivery, and the local elites’ 
negotiating power relative to insurgents. 
forms of and motivations  
behind Violence 
Violence takes different forms and is driven 
by different motivations, which affect the 
extent to which insurgents tolerate, seek to 
modify, or bargain over a service. In this re-
gard, three dimensions of violence are key: 
• The extent to which violent actors are 
organized, disciplined, and homog-
enous. This shapes whether insurgent 
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leaders can be identified for negotiating 
service delivery bargains, and whether 
such agreements can be upheld.
• The ideologies, incentives, and mo-
tivations behind violence. Specifically, 
the prospects for delivering services are 
influenced by the degree of alignment 
between insurgents’ objectives and the 
objectives of the service delivery interven-
tion, the extent to which insurgents (and 
their families and friends) need the service, 
and the extent to which insurgents can ex-
tract rents from the service.
• The degree of localization of vio-
lence. The degree to which insurgents are 
embedded in local communities and the 
extent to which they seek to secure local 
support shape their incentives to facilitate 
or block service delivery. As a general rule, 
the more fragmented, mobile, and ideo-
logically antagonistic the violent actors, 
the more difficult it will be to deliver ser-
vices and the more mitigation strategies 
will be needed.
elite Bargains
Linked to the political settlement and form 
of violence, elite bargains—sets of rolling 
negotiations and agreements between pow-
erful actors, armed or unarmed—are critical 
in explaining whether and how services get 
delivered. 
This report goes beyond broad statements 
like “elite bargains matter” to identify the ac-
tual processes through which bargains were 
achieved and reproduced. It identifies four 
overlapping forms of bargaining:
• Fostering dialogue and negotiations 
with armed elites and allied insur-
gents. This entailed persuading powerful 
gatekeepers to allow delivery, building 
trust between providers and insurgents, 
and, in some cases, the co-delivery of ser-
vices by providers and armed elites.
• Enlisting the support of influential 
nonarmed elites. Such elites helped 
mediate the relationship between armed 
elites and their allied insurgents and ser-
vice providers in order to allow for some 
degree of delivery.
• Striking concessions and compro-
mises. Various modifications were made 
in the way a service is delivered so as to 
make it more acceptable to insurgents and 
reduce the risk of violent backlash.
• Sharing rents and tolerating corrup-
tion. Certain rent-sharing practices were 
knowingly or unknowingly enabled to 
appease and buy off opposing armed and 
unarmed elites to sustain service delivery.
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Such bargains, or their absence, are critical in 
explaining whether progress occurs. But they 
involve not insignificant trade-offs, as noted 
below. 
strategies and modalities of delivery
Even the broader context of politics, violence, 
and bargaining does not, however, seem to 
simply determine outcomes. Progress in ser-
vice delivery is also shaped in diverse ways by 
different modalities and strategies of delivery. 
In terms of modalities, three main ways of 
delivering services were explored: state ver-
sus nonstate, centralized versus decentralized, 
and single sector versus multisector. Context 
influenced which modalities had greater pros-
pects of success. In terms of strategy, service 
delivery interventions made greater progress 
when they were: (1) violence sensitive: by an-
ticipating and mitigating some of the risks of 
violence; (2) politically sensitive: by reducing 
the influence of anti-service-delivery political 
coalitions; and (3) bargain sensitive: by creat-
ing space for and facilitating pro-service-de-
livery bargains, especially among subnational 
elites, armed and unarmed. These strategies 
helped foster progress in the cases presented 
in the report, but they were not magic solu-
tions and all presented trade-offs.
five policy takeaways
These findings have important implications 
for policy and practice, summarized here.
1. Better adapt to a new set of contex-
tual factors. Most practitioners recognize 
that “context matters” for service deliv-
ery, but there has been limited progress 
in understanding how. This report shows 
how contextual factors that remain un-
derexplored—the specific characteristics 
of political settlements at various levels, 
the different dimensions of violence, the 
processes and forms of bargaining and 
strategies of delivery—can make or break 
service delivery. This is especially true at 
the subnational level. Development actors 
have no choice but to take these aspects 
much more seriously.
2. Recognize that some forms of vio-
lence are less bad for service deliv-
ery. Mainstream approaches tend to view 
violence as simply bad for service deliv-
ery. But the research shows that different 
forms of and motivations for violence can 
be more or less amenable to SSD, and that 
these motivations can vary considerably 
within and between violence-affected 
contexts. There is therefore a need to go 
beyond overly simplistic classifications 
of violence, and to unpack how different 
forms of violence present different obsta-
cles to and opportunities for service deliv-
ery, particularly at the subnational level.
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3. Address the operational ways in 
which elites influence service delivery. 
Clearly, elites influence development prog-
ress. Yet, in many ways, this assertion has 
frustrated service delivery practitioners, as 
it tends to yield a long list of broad recom-
mendations and to present elites as actors 
who simply frustrate and subvert service 
delivery. Instead, this report suggests that 
the lens of elite bargaining offers a new 
frontier for social service policy design 
and implementation in violence-affected 
contexts. At least three policy insights are 
worth highlighting: (1) elites, armed and 
unarmed, are often (if not always) inti-
mately involved in shaping SSD in such 
fluid, informal, and contested contexts; (2) 
elite bargains are critical and such bargains 
can take a range of different forms, which 
need to be considered in the program de-
sign; and (3) elites can play a more or less 
positive role in violence-affected contexts, 
and the extent to which armed elites facil-
itate or undermine a service depends on 
their varied incentives and ideologies.
4. Rethink the function of service deliv-
ery: rents matter. A rethinking may well 
be needed of the widely held idea that 
service delivery is or should be a neutral 
intervention, and that rent-sharing must 
or can be entirely avoided in delivering 
services. This research points to a set of 
difficult and nuanced policy implications, 
which are: (1) service delivery generates 
rents, which can strengthen certain elites, 
armed or unarmed, affecting (for good 
or ill) the balance of power and politi-
cal order; (2) rents created or constrained 
by a SSD program may affect (for good 
or ill) the level of violence, because vio-
lence is often controlled by rent-sharing 
agreements in such contexts; and (3) rent 
appropriation of SSD resources by armed 
elites can in some cases be considered as a 
“cost of doing business” to ensure peace-
ful project implementation (the extent to 
which rent appropriation by armed elites 
is a cost worth bearing is as much a polit-
ical as a technical judgment). These issues 
need further attention in programming in 
violent contexts.
5. Be realistic about good governance. 
The report shows how governance, poli-
tics, and elites matter, but not in ways that 
are necessarily expected. The still-dom-
inant “good governance” paradigm—
centered on best-practice formal rules, 
liberal-democratic norms of transpar-
ency and accountability, and technocratic 
fixes—does not always emerge as a par-
ticularly useful guide to understanding 
progress in violent contexts. Instead, the 
report highlights two major policy im-
plications: (1) there are a wider range of 
options for progress in the midst of far-
from-perfect forms of governance than the 
good governance paradigm assumes; and 
(2) informal relationships, rent-sharing, 
far-from-perfect transparency or account-
ability, and deep politicization of service 
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delivery—through political parties or “un-
savory” powerful actors—played critical 
roles in the change process on the ground. 
In short, the report adds to growing calls 
for a new paradigm for the governance of 
service delivery. 
toward a new programming 
Approach
Building on the findings and policy impli-
cations outlined above, the report presents 
the foundations of an operational framework 
to help better tailor service delivery to con-
text-specific forms of politics, violence, and 
bargaining. It includes six mutually reinforc-
ing recommendations (see figure ES.1): 
1. Become better at diagnosing the real scope 
for progress.
2. Think and work more politically in vio-
lence-affected contexts.
3. Tailor interventions to different forms of 
violence.
4. Take bargaining dynamics more seriously.
5. Realign internal donor rules and incentives.
6. Explore new models of delivery and new 
research in this field.
figure es.1. proposed framework for strengthening service delivery in 
violence-affected contexts
2. Think and work politically 
3. Tailor approach to specific forms of violence 
4. Take bargaining seriously 
5. Reform donor rules and incentives 
6. Explore new frontiers of delivery and research 
1. Improve diagnostics for measuring the actual scope of progress
Understand relevant political 
settlements, who the relevant 
elites are, and how they matter
Map the relevant dimensions 
of violence in the program 
areas
Draw lessons from local 
service delivery and 
bargaining
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Recommendation 1: Better diagnose 
the Risks and scope for progress
Service delivery practitioners could more sys-
tematically assess the issues surfaced by this 
research. As such, the report provides a new 
diagnostic tool that can be applied in different 
contexts, consisting of three main modules. 
Module 1 includes submodules on the basic 
features of the national settlement, the nature 
of the sectoral settlement, the relationship be-
tween central and subnational elites, and the 
subnational settlement. Module 2 focuses on 
the drivers behind and the organization, ide-
ology, and localization of violence. Module 
3 draws lessons from the implementation of 
different strategies for service delivery and 
bargaining. Key points to keep in mind in ap-
plying this diagnostic include that:
• The tool seeks to complement, not re-
place, existing diagnostics. Its questions 
can be adapted and included in existing 
analytical tools.
• The diagnostic does not need to be exten-
sive but does require careful application. 
The process of ensuring organizational 
uptake of the findings is perhaps more im-
portant than the rigor of the diagnostic.
• The diagnostic is not a one-time exer-
cise: given the fluid nature of violent con-
texts, the diagnostic needs to be regularly 
updated. 
• Adequate organizational resources and in-
centives should be dedicated to address-
ing, and implementing, the findings.
Recommendation 2: think and  
Work politically in Violence-Affected 
Contexts
tailor social service delivery interventions 
to different types of political settlements 
Political settlements differ, particularly at the 
subnational and sectoral level. These differ-
ences have important implications for SSD. 
Table ES.1 briefly outlines the different types 
of settlements that can be found and their im-
plications for service delivery programming. 
Build coalitions for service delivery in  
very fluid contexts
Improving SSD is a technical challenge, but 
it is also a political one. Effective implemen-
tation requires the building of coalitions—
however limited, fluid, or localized—that 
enable some degree of service delivery im-
plementation. While development actors have 
limited tools to create and sustain coalitions, 
three golden rules on coalition-building 
emerge from the research: 
• Expect the unexpected. Fluid and un-
stable politics are the name of the game, so 
practitioners will need to adapt and keep 
an ear close to the ground.
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table es.1. types of political settlement in violence-affected contexts and implications 
for social service delivery 
type of subnational/sectoral 
settlement
example implications for social service delivery (ssd) 
programming
Relatively stable, with ruling coa-
lition that has some incentives to 
favor ssd 
Balkh Province, Afghanistan 
(organized around regional 
strongman with pro-ssd 
interests/incentives)
hill/mountain region of nepal 
after large-scale violent 
conflict (organized around 
pro-ssd political party)
Reasonably good prospects for ssd, as incentives 
align . stability in settlement potentially allows for 
planning over longer time horizon and the building of 
a pro-ssd coalition . however, ssd needs to align with 
the ruling factions’ preferred mode of delivery (given 
their relative power in setting the rules of the game) .
Moderately stable, with mixed 
ssd incentives (contested 
between state, disciplined armed 
insurgencies, and powerful tradi-
tional elites) 
Wardak Province, Afghanistan, 
particularly before 2008 
Medium prospects for ssd . Moderate stability allows 
for better planning and better coalition-building 
around ssd programs, but contestation can under-
mine delivery depending on the level of contestation 
at the front line of service delivery . Mechanisms of 
coordination between powerful elites may be needed .
Moderately unstable, but 
presence of pro-ssd incentives 
(contested between state and 
disciplined armed insurgency 
that favors ssd) 
nepal during large-scale 
violent conflict
Balochistan, Pakistan
some prospects for ssd, given pro-ssd ideology . 
however, active contestation between state and 
insurgent groups potentially undermines service de-
livery . efforts, compromises, and bargains likely to be 
needed to reach consensus among contesting groups 
on “ring-fencing” services (to a degree) .
Moderately to highly unstable, 
with some state penetration in 
areas controlled by relatively 
disciplined armed groups, with 
weak incentives for ssd 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan ssd is likely to be challenging . some state pene-
tration offers a modicum of stability that may help 
with service delivery, but weak incentives as well as 
antagonism can undermine service delivery .
highly unstable, with weak state 
penetration, less disciplined 
armed groups, and weak ssd 
incentives/ideology 
Federally Administered tribal 
Areas (Pakistan)
ssd is likely to be challenging . Weak ssd incentives 
as well as antagonism can undermine ssd .
highly unstable, with marked 
fragmentation of power (and no 
monopoly of violence) and weak 
incentives for ssd (weak polit-
ical organization and multiple 
centers of power controlled by 
armed criminal organizations) 
Badghis Province, Afghanistan
tarai region of nepal after 
large-scale violent conflict
ssd is likely to be very challenging . the lack of 
broadly agreed rules of the game as well as the 
presence of dominant ideology/incentives that seek 
short-term appropriation of ssd make progress 
difficult . delivery needs to be flexible; practitioners 
need to learn by doing and (most likely) accept that 
bargaining strategies must be built in .
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• Be realistic about the role of spoils 
and rents. Given that rents often play a 
role in sustaining coalitions, controlling 
violence, and allowing service provision 
to be functional, think carefully before at-
tempting to constrain or redirect them.
• Find “good enough” ways to support 
(or at least not undermine) pro–service 
delivery coalitions. This may include: 
(1) helping pro–service delivery elites co-
ordinate themselves and act collectively; 
(2) reducing information asymmetries 
between factions; (3) helping build trust 
across groups; and (4) increasing predict-
ability in such contexts to enable longer 
time horizons.
seek politically savvy modes of delivery
Different modes of delivery can help bypass, 
or reduce the power of, forces opposed to 
SSD. Depending on the local context, a multi-
tude of potential strategies can make delivery 
more politically savvy. Whatever the mode of 
delivery, programs are likely to face trade-offs 
rather than win-wins; these trade-offs need 
to be recognized and managed, not wished 
away. Key lessons include the following: 
• Semiautonomous delivery mechanisms 
may reduce the power of sectoral cli-
entelist networks, but sustainability is a 
challenge.
• Small-scale interventions may circum-
vent sectoral elite networks and spark a 
slow-burning political demonstration ef-
fect, but scaling can be elusive.
• Bundling delivery into a suite of services—
such as combining basic health services 
with access to other services—may increase 
the political feasibility of success by buying 
off and appeasing opposing elites, though 
implementation logistics are challenging.
• Decentralized multistakeholder approaches 
may create the space for, and facilitate, 
more inclusive delivery bargains at the local 
level, but this requires strong in-built mech-
anisms to reduce the prospects that local 
elites will entirely subvert service delivery.
Recommendation 3: tailor service 
delivery to different forms of 
Violence
In order to help practitioners better tai-
lor programs to the specificities of violence 
in their context, table ES.2 offers a stylized 
breakdown of the types of violence that 
emerged in this research, and the implications 
for SSD. The rule of thumb is that the more 
fragmented, mobile, and ideologically antag-
onistic the violent actors, the harder it will 
be to deliver services and the more mitigation 
strategies will be needed.
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table es.2. forms of violence and implications for service delivery
form of violence implications for delivery of social services
Well-organized, disciplined armed groups with 
incentives favoring social service delivery (ssd)
Example: dominant/organized strongman allied 
with ruling coalition, such as general Atta in Balkh, 
Afghanistan
Bargaining feasible (actors clear, incentives for 
service delivery aligned) . good prospects of direct 
state provision given alliance with ruling coalition . 
Resource transfer—from the center to the subna-
tional level—may be substantial to maintain alliance .
Well-organized, disciplined insurgent armed 
groups with incentives favoring ssd
Examples: organized insurgency resisting or trying to 
capture the state but wanting some services, such as 
Maoists (nepal), Balochistan (Pakistan)
Bargaining feasible (actors clear, incentive align-
ment) . But poor relationship with the state means 
strategies are needed to mitigate risks such as 
nonstate provision and dialogue with insurgents to 
ensure that delivery of social services is not per-
ceived as a proxy for state penetration .
somewhat organized/disciplined insurgent armed 
groups largely opposed to ssd
Example: relatively organized insurgents who want 
to undermine delivery, for example of polio inoc-
ulation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally 
Administered tribal Areas of Pakistan
high risks of violence targeting delivery . insurgent 
leaders relatively clear in their antiservice ideology 
driven by their poor relationship with the state . Mit-
igation strategies could include bundling of services 
to increase insurgent incentives not to undermine 
delivery .
somewhat organized/disciplined armed groups 
competing for regional power and legitimacy; 
positions favoring service delivery contested
Example: large parts of Wardak Province, 
Afghanistan
complex scenario . strategies for service delivery 
will depend on various factors: local contestation 
may lead to competition to improve services or to 
capture/undermine services . competition may also 
be over who is seen to deliver the service . 
disorganized/fragmented, mobile/roving  
insurgent armed groups with some local roots 
creating incentives for service delivery
Examples:fractionalized, uncoordinated armed 
groups with some incentives for service delivery as 
in parts of Badghis, Afghanistan
A more difficult context (compared to the four pre-
vious ones) . leaders fragmented, power contested, 
and violence less predictable, with the result that 
bargaining is less feasible . second-best solutions 
need to apply, such as using local implementers to 
increase safety and securitize delivery .
highly disorganized/fragmented, highly mobile/
roving armed groups with criminal (nonpolitical) 
motives
Examples: some parts of Badghis, Afghanistan; to a 
lesser extent, tarai, nepal, after large-scale violent 
conflict .
Most difficult context: leaders fragmented, power 
contested, and violence less predictable; incentives 
of violent actors are to undermine delivery of social 
services . second-best solutions will be required .
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Recommendation 4:  
take Bargaining seriously 
Building on the previous recommendations, 
three practical messages emerge from the 
findings on the role of bargaining in SSD:
1. We cannot simply ignore the role 
of bargaining. In all of the cases stud-
ied, forms of bargains with armed elites 
and allied insurgent groups were critical 
in enabling some progress in SSD. There 
was little evidence, however, that project 
implementers were aware of, or systemat-
ically considered, such dynamics. Making 
project choices without at least consid-
ering the role of bargains may put SSD 
at greater risk and lead to “shots in the 
dark.” Moreover, bargaining and compro-
mises may not be a “first-best” option, but 
they may be the only way to make prog-
ress in some contexts (see discussions on 
road construction in Nepal and education 
in Pakistan in the report).
2. Carefully consider the trade-offs of 
both traditional and bargain-sensitive 
approaches to service delivery. In such 
difficult, violent contexts, trade-offs tend 
to be prominent across the board:
• Trade-offs of  traditional programming: For 
example, a traditional program (that is, 
one that ignores the role of bargaining) 
might unknowingly create rents that 
sustain locally powerful elites and/or 
armed elites, or the provided services 
might be accessed by insurgents and 
their allies, indirectly sustaining them.
• Trade-offs of  bargain-sensitive program-
ming: For example, bargains might help 
short-term, localized progress of ser-
vice delivery, but little is known about 
if and how they might contribute to 
longer-term state or peace-building 
objectives. Using locally trusted actors 
and volunteers to deliver services may 
reduce the risks of attack and main-
tain service quantity, but such use may 
also hinder efforts to improve service 
quality (because volunteers may not be 
able to deliver complex services, for 
example). Also, service delivery may 
be maintained via bargaining, but re-
source flows may be diverted to areas 
and groups seen by powerful insur-
gents/elites as more important.
3. Think about what it would take to de-
velop a “bargain-sensitive” service de-
livery program. As noted, the question 
of whether bargaining with armed elites 
and allied insurgents to deliver services is 
better than slower or no progress must be 
answered case by case. The report offers 
some preliminary ideas on mainstream-
ing bargain-sensitivity in service delivery 
design, which includes mechanisms to: 
(1) facilitate dialogue and negotiations 
with armed elites and allied insurgents; 
(2) enlist the support of locally influential 
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nonarmed elites; (3) make deliberate con-
cessions and compromises in the way ser-
vices are delivered; and (4) facilitate (or 
at least not undermine) some degree of 
rent-sharing if it might produce more ser-
vice delivery benefits than costs.
Recommendation 5: Reform donor 
incentives and mind-sets
Many of this study’s implications challenge tra-
ditional approaches to the delivery of aid. In this 
regard, the report gives weight to the findings 
in the 2017 World Development Report (World 
Bank 2017), and adds a voice to two contem-
porary narratives around changing aid delivery: 
(1) advocacy for doing development differently and 
thinking and working politically,1 which includes 
adaptive programming;2 and (2) advocacy for a 
more context-specific approach in fragile set-
tings that systematically considers risks and 
draws on lessons about what really works on 
the ground (IEG 2016; Marc et al. 2016). 
This report goes further than these narratives 
by offering a more granular framework for 
addressing politics and violence in SSD op-
erations. Furthermore, it pinpoints some spe-
cific measures—and internal dilemmas and 
risks—in order to further align the aid system 
with realities on the ground. These measures 
include the following:
• Foster frank internal debate on elites 
and bargaining to change mind-sets. 
This may include setting aside internal 
budgets for the type of the diagnostics 
proposed here, and changing the vocab-
ulary of programming. Indeed, this re-
search suggests that bargaining issues are 
often unknown, brushed under the carpet, 
or painted in an overly simplistic light. 
Yet internal management culture may not 
always be conducive to discussing such 
challenges.
• Mainstream strategies for bargaining 
in delivery programs. Yet, fiduciary 
rules and financial accountability may 
run counter to this, and there are various 
trade-offs to manage.
• Integrate incentives for adapting pro-
grams to subnational variation and 
regularly adapt programs as they 
unfold. This would require improved 
incentives and systems for adapting to 
subnational variation and lessons learned 
along the way. Yet adaptation to subna-
tional variation can be costly and com-
plex, and linear results frameworks are 
often the dominant mode of planning and 
monitoring programs.
• Modify human resource practices to 
adapt to these realities. Steps could be 
taken to ensure that country offices have 
deep enough local, political knowledge, 
such as by recruiting and retaining knowl-
edgeable local staff, or reducing the high 
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turnover of international staff who may 
serve only one or two years. Yet, attracting 
and retaining people in violence-affected 
contexts can be extremely difficult.
Recommendation 6: pursue new 
frontiers for delivery and Research
Finally, the report offers the seeds of a new 
paradigm for SSD. There are different mod-
els for service delivery. This research is most 
aligned with an approach that views service 
delivery as profoundly embedded in, and 
shaped by, power politics. This differs from 
mainstream approaches to service delivery in 
the following ways:
• No one service delivery modality is 
privileged. Different models can be more 
or less effective depending on local polit-
ical settlements, the form of violence, and 
the opportunities for bargaining, as out-
lined in chapter 6. 
• New actors are brought into much 
sharper focus. The findings push us to 
analyze the central role, interests, and in-
centives of different elites in service deliv-
ery, such as landlords or warlords.
• Political economy is not just about 
material power; it is also about ideas. 
We show the important role of “ideas” 
(held by elites, armed or unarmed) in 
shaping the constraints and opportunities 
for SSD.
• Service delivery is rarely politically 
neutral. The research, by showing how 
SSD is a source of rents that differs by 
sector, undermines traditional approaches 
that suggest it can be technical, neutral, or 
ring-fenced from politics and power. 
• Bargains and trade-offs are part of the 
new normal. Bargains, trade-offs, and 
compromises are integral to service deliv-
ery—an element scarcely treated by other 
service delivery paradigms.
Finally, the report gives way to a set of 
future research questions, which include the 
following:
• How can this report’s typology of vio-
lence be deepened and further tested in 
other geographical areas to strengthen its 
generalizability and applicability?
• How do development interventions create 
and sustain new bargaining structures? Are 
there other examples of or lessons from 
SSD cases in which bargaining was inte-
grated and its risks effectively mitigated? 
• How can donor agencies reconcile their 
fiduciary requirements (accounting and 
procurement procedures) with the need 
for some flexibility and bargaining in 
SSD? What aid instruments might be most 
appropriate? 
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This report provides the foundation for a new 
approach to service delivery in violence-af-
fected contexts that is sensitive to the actual 
forms of violence, politics, and bargaining 
encountered in such polities. It raises sensi-
tive issues about how development organiza-
tions that work with recognized governments 
should approach service delivery in contested 
settings. As many countries today are riven by 
conflict and internal division, some familiar 
rules of the game may be inadequate to deal 
with the mounting humanitarian and devel-
opment challenges posed by complex conflict 
situations, particularly where affected people 
need access to social services. This raises di-
lemmas about the ethical and political judg-
ments and trade-offs that development actors 
may have to make. A key challenge is whether 
development actors can adapt their procedures 
and ways of working to the fluidity, uncertain-
ties, and risk taking that the new, conflict-riven 
landscape demands while preserving financial 
accountability, doing no harm, and ensuring 
aid effectiveness. This challenge cannot be ig-
nored, as progress in basic service delivery in 
violence-affected contexts will make or break 
global efforts to end poverty and increase 
shared prosperity over the coming decades. 
Community at discussion of water supply and sanitation. Kaski Nepal. Simone D. McCourtie/World Bank
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The report has three parts. The reader is en-
couraged to read them all, but may find cer-
tain parts or chapters of more relevance for 
their purposes. Part I presents the overall ap-
proach and key findings from this study. Part 
II, for the more interested reader, presents a 
more detailed and rich ethnography of the 
main findings presented in Part I, including 
some of the stories behind the big messages. 
Part III draws conclusions and policy im-
plications, and identifies avenues for further 
thought and research. 
Part I has two chapters. Drawing on the crit-
ical gaps in our knowledge about the obsta-
cles to social service delivery (SSD) in areas 
beset by violent conflict, chapter 1 presents 
a framework for research organized around 
four key elements, the interaction of which 
explains the success or failure of SSD: politi-
cal settlements (mainly at the subnational and 
local levels but also at the national level); the 
varied forms of and motivations for violence 
at the subnational level; the potential for 
forging elite bargains to allow some degree 
of service delivery; and the extent to which 
the mode of delivering services is sensitive to 
the first three concerns. Chapter 2 applies the 
framework to conflict-riven areas in Afghan-
istan, Nepal, and Pakistan; and outlines the 
main research puzzles and findings from the 
research.
Part II, which delves into the rich ethno-
graphic data, is divided into four chapters. 
Chapter 3 explores how political settlements 
at various levels shape the spaces, constraints, 
and opportunities for different forms of ser-
vice delivery. Chapter 4 focuses on violent 
actors—that is, armed elites, including insur-
gents and warlords—and explores how the 
varied forms, organizations, motivations, ide-
ologies, and levels of mobility among these 
actors affect SSD. Chapter 5 examines the 
ways that elite bargains are critical to mak-
ing or breaking SSD. The chapter explores 
how bargains occur and how they may per-
mit progress, albeit with trade-offs. Chapter 
6 concludes with an exploration of how cer-
tain modes of delivery seem to work better 
than others in navigating through regressive 
aspects of local politics and violence. 
Part III, in two chapters, presents a set of pol-
icy takeaways and recommendations. Chapter 
7 urges development practitioners to adapt to 
context, to recognize that not all forms of vi-
olence affect service delivery equally, to turn 
into action the knowledge that elites matter, 
and to be realistic about good governance. 
The six recommendations offered in chapter 
8 echo the policy implications sketched in the 
previous chapter. They are: to regularly mea-
sure the actual extent of progress, to think and 
work politically, to tailor service approaches 
to the specific forms of prevailing violence, 
to take bargaining seriously, to revise donor 
rules in light of research and experience, and 
to be open to new frontiers of service delivery 
and research. 
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part i.  
Research Approach and  
major findings
Afghan children look from the window of their shelter in the former Soviet embassy, a huge compound 
amid the destruction of west Kabul, November 27, 2001.  Damir Sagolj/Reuters
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1. Research Approach 
“Fragility, Conflict and Violence remain among the most pressing global policy  
issues today and constitute major obstacles to achieving development objectives.”  
(World Bank 2016b: 44) 
“We now have to admit that the paradigms and frameworks that have guided  
our perspective on fragility and conflict may be less relevant than we had hoped.” 
– Dr. Jim Kim, World Bank President, Fragility Forum opening remarks, March 2016.  
(World Bank 2016c)
Fragility, conflict, and violence are among 
the most urgent global policy challenges, 
representing significant barriers to achiev-
ing global development objectives. About 
2 billion people live in countries where de-
velopment outcomes are affected by fragil-
ity, conflict, and high levels of violence, and 
where there is a clear correlation between fra-
gility and poverty. These states have experi-
enced the slowest pace of progress toward any 
of the Millennium Development Goals. The 
average poverty rate among countries that ex-
perienced major violence between 1981 and 
2005 is 21 points higher than where there 
was no violence (World Bank 2011: 5). Over 
half of the population in these low-income 
violence-affected countries lives in extreme 
poverty, accounting for about 20 percent of 
the world’s extreme poor in 2012. By 2030, 
an estimated 50 percent of the world’s poor 
will live in a country affected by violence 
(World Bank 2016b). 
The impact of fragility and violence spills 
across borders. Violent conflict has resulted in 
major displacement and has contributed to the 
so-called refugee crisis that has recently en-
gulfed parts of the Middle East, North Africa, 
and Europe. According to the former Secre-
tary General of the United Nations (UN):
“The world today is witness to higher 
levels of conflict than a decade ago, 
and the highest level of forced dis-
placement since the Second World 
War . . . The drivers of violence and 
instability are more complex and more 
intractable than ever. Nothing empha-
sizes this reality more than the conflicts 
in the Middle East and North Africa. 
To address the scale and the nature of 
the conflicts, we need new approaches”
– Ban Ki Moon 
(UN Secretary General 2015).
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While the delivery of basic services in fragile 
and conflict-affected settings is critical, it is 
extremely difficult. For example: 
•	 A mere one-fifth of fragile states are on 
track to achieve universal primary school-
ing compared with nearly half of nonfrag-
ile developing countries (OECD 2015). 
•	 Only 28 percent of fragile states are on 
track to cut in half the number of citizens 
who do not have access to safe water com-
pared with 61 percent of nonfragile coun-
tries (OECD 2015). 
•	 A person living in a fragile or violent set-
ting is almost three times more likely to 
be undernourished (Bread for the World 
Institute 2016). 
Given that such services play a critical role 
in reducing poverty, it is no wonder that the 
development community is highly concerned. 
The international community has responded 
with commitments to improve governance 
and development assistance in such con-
texts. Goal 16 of the post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals is to: “promote peaceful 
and inclusive societies for sustainable devel-
opment, provide access to justice for all and 
build effective, accountable and inclusive in-
stitutions at all levels” (UN 2015). Many of 
the Sustainable Development Goals also focus 
on improving services such as agriculture, 
health care, education, water and sanitation, 
and infrastructure.
This report explores the challenge of de-
livering social services in violence-affected 
contexts.
Background case studies from Afghanistan, 
Nepal, and Pakistan are synthesized with the 
latest global evidence to chart both a concep-
tual and operational path forward.3 In chart-
ing that path, the report attempts to fill some 
important knowledge gaps and to pilot a new 
analytical framework to answer unresolved 
questions, as outlined in the next section.
1.1. knowledge gaps and 
practical Challenges 
The Sustainable Development Goals are 
unlikely to be achieved unless we address 
important knowledge gaps and improve 
practices on the ground. For the purposes 
of this report, eight interrelated gaps can be 
highlighted:4
1. Differential rates of success in deliv-
ering social services in violence-affected 
contexts have been poorly explained. 
Progress in social service delivery (SSD) has 
been achieved in some violence-affected con-
texts, but the knowledge base is limited in 
terms of explaining: 
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•	 Why some SSD interventions succeed 
while others fail in the same country, and 
•	 Why there is variation among violence-af-
fected countries. 
For example, World Bank–supported research 
has examined the nexus between conflict and 
development (World Bank 2011); explored the 
political dimensions of development in frag-
ile contexts (Bain, Porter, and Watts 2015); 
unpacked the societal dynamics of fragility 
(Marc et al. 2013); and shown how institutions 
take root and services get delivered in difficult 
contexts (Barma, Huybens, and Vinuela 2014; 
Brixi, Lust, and Woolcock 2015). However, 
none of these studies have focused systemati-
cally on SSD or have explained how and why 
SSD progress occurs within and among differ-
ent violence-affected contexts.
2. Prevailing technical approaches to ser-
vice delivery have had limited success. 
Failure to deliver basic social services in vio-
lence-affected countries is often attributed to 
technical deficits, such as weak capacity, lim-
ited resources, and a lack of expertise, but a 
body of evidence demonstrates that technical 
approaches tell only part of the story. Political 
economy dynamics also influence the function-
ing of service delivery agencies and underpin 
institutional capacity constraints (Mcloughlin 
and Batley 2012; Leftwich and Wheeler 2011; 
Levy and Walton 2013; Unsworth 2010; Wild 
et al. 2015).5 Most recently, the World Develop-
ment Report 2007: Governance and the Law (World 
Bank 2017) puts governance and politics front 
and center. It shows how policy is made and 
implemented in complex political and social 
settings in which individuals and groups of 
unequal power pursue conflicting interests ac-
cording to shifting rules. 
3. While there is a growing consensus 
that governance and politics matter for 
service delivery, the devil is in the details: 
•	 The consensus breaks down rather easily. Less 
agreement can be found regarding pre-
cisely how governance matters; what as-
pects of governance most affect SSD; and 
what can be done by development actors to 
influence governance. As one research con-
sortium puts it, “Almost everyone agrees 
that ‘politics matters’ for development, but 
there is little consensus about what this ac-
tually means” (ESID 2016). Similarly, it is 
widely recognized that “context matters,” 
but there is limited clarity on exactly how 
it matters in violence-affected situations. 
•	 The good governance paradigm continues to 
dominate our understanding of  what forms of  
politics matter. It focuses on promoting for-
mal rules; fostering liberal-democratic and 
best practice norms of transparency and 
accountability; and making technocratic 
fixes. Yet a growing number of observ-
ers question its utility in explaining the 
forms of governance that drive develop-
ment progress in a number of countries 
(Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2012). 
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•	 Alternative governance paradigms need to be 
fleshed out and mainstreamed. In light of 
the perceived failings of the good gov-
ernance paradigm, attempts have been 
made to develop new paradigms, such as 
“best fit” or “good enough governance” 
(Albrecht 2013; Levy 2014; World Bank 
2017: 11–12).6 However, these alternative 
approaches need to be fleshed out, main-
streamed, and operationalized.
•	 The evidence base is limited, especially in vio-
lence-affected contexts. Systematic evidence 
on the way governance and political 
economy factors impact service delivery 
is growing, but it remains quite limited, 
especially in violence-affected contexts.7 
As Mcloughlin and Batley (2012: 30–31) 
note: 
“Significant gaps in our understand-
ing remain . . . [service delivery] 
research needs to give special im-
portance to the point of implemen-
tation, where formal policies most 
often fail and where ‘real’ policies 
emerge from the interplay of inter-
ests and incentives . . . and adopt an 
essentially ‘bottom-up’ approach to 
the field research, working upwards 
in order to identify the key political 
factors that underpin [service deliv-
ery] performance. This would put 
the focus on those institutions, in-
centives and actors that are effective 
at the point of delivery—rather than 
on those that in the formal scheme of 
things are supposed to set the insti-
tutional and policy framework gov-
erning implementation.”
4. An analytical approach based on “po-
litical settlements” has helped move the 
debate forward, but its full promise has 
not yet been realized. The approach ex-
plores how the underlying balance of political 
power among contending elites and political 
coalitions, and the negotiations and bargains 
between them, are critical in explaining de-
velopment outcomes. However, there are at 
least two reasons why this approach has not 
fulfilled its practical potential. First, the ap-
proach can often fail to offer concrete policy 
recommendations. As Kelsall (2016: 1) notes: 
“despite its intuitive appeal, it seems diffi-
cult to use in practice.” Indeed, various aid 
agency officials believe it has strong poten-
tial but have complained that it does not offer 
enough granular detail to inform everyday 
programming.8 Second, there have been ex-
tremely few attempts to link political settle-
ment thinking to service delivery, especially 
in violence-affected contexts (Hickey 2013: 
11; Kelsall, Hart, and Laws 2016: 1). 
5. The terms “fragility” and “violence” 
have not been sufficiently defined, ana-
lyzed, and applied to service delivery. 
•	 Mainstream definitions of “fragility” have 
been found to be lacking. Fragile states are 
generally defined as those states without 
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the will or capacity to function in ways 
that reduce poverty, ensure development, 
or safeguard human rights. This definition 
does not distinguish between the particu-
lar conditions of “fragility” and the gen-
eral conditions of “underdevelopment.” 
Indeed, the label “state fragility” has been 
applied not only to poor, poverty-stricken 
countries that experience large-scale po-
litical violence and warfare, but also to 
poor, poverty-stricken countries that have 
achieved long periods of peace (Putzel 
and Di John 2012). As one piece sums up:
“… fragility is not a static condition, 
nor is it an all-or-nothing experience. 
Fragility can best be understood as a 
continuum: societies can experience 
extreme state failure and violent con-
flict at one end and varying degrees 
of fragility at other points along the 
continuum.” (Marc et al. 2013: 2)
•	 Fragile and violent contexts have too often been 
conflated. The specific challenges of deliv-
ering SSD in the context of large-scale 
political violence have not been dealt with 
explicitly in policy and academic circles. 
One of the reasons for this is that World 
Bank classification criteria for “fragile and 
conflict-affected states” are not based on 
an assessment of the prevalence of violent 
conflict or on estimates of political fragil-
ity—that is, the likelihood that the politi-
cal order will collapse (Moore 2014).9 
•	 Little is known about how different forms of  
violence impact SSD. We also know that “vi-
olence” takes different forms, but there are 
no attempts to understand how these dif-
ferent forms might have different impacts 
on SSD. Indeed, how and why political 
violence affects SSD is poorly understood 
(Putzel and Di John 2012). Moreover, 
many studies focus on the negative impact 
violence has on SSD. Only a few studies 
have partially sought to explain progress 
in SSD in the face of violence (for exam-
ple, Baird 2011; OECD 2015).10 
6. There is a limited understanding of 
how different strategies and modalities 
of SSD might make a difference in vio-
lence-affected contexts. Important debates 
continue around what modes of delivery are 
most appropriate in violence-affected con-
texts. Ideas range from those inspired by World 
Development Report 2004: Making Services Work 
for the Poor (World Bank 2003), to commu-
nity-driven development (World Bank 2011). 
Moreover, an important strand of literature 
on modes of delivery suggests that different 
sector characteristics—such as opportunities 
for rents and different ways of delivering 
services (for example, top-down versus bot-
tom-up)—present different constraints and 
opportunities for negotiating the politics of 
delivery (Harris, Mcloughlin, and Wild 2013). 
Yet this assumption has rarely been tested in 
violence-affected contexts. Further, focusing 
on a sector’s characteristics does not explain 
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why SSD can perform so differently in the 
same sector within and across less-developed 
countries in general and violence-affected 
countries in particular.
7. There is a paucity of firsthand, primary 
data from violence-affected contexts. Re-
search in violence-affected settings is more re-
stricted, costlier, and riskier. As a result, many 
studies are at worst based on secondary litera-
ture reviews or at best on interviews with key 
informants from capital cities. These sources 
provide only a partial picture of the on-the-
ground reality and a weak understanding of 
the dynamics of front-line delivery; and they 
fail to include perspectives of front-line service 
users, providers, and other stakeholders.
8. Improved policy and practice guid-
ance are urgently needed. There are global 
calls to develop an improved set of practical 
tools to address development challenges in 
these difficult contexts (World Bank 2016b). 
Recent reports have pointed to a number of 
critical needs:
•	 A differentiated approach. The World Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Group recom-
mends developing differentiated mecha-
nisms for assessing and classifying fragile, 
conflict, and violence-affected contexts; 
tailoring to country context more system-
atically; and adopting more realistic ap-
proaches (IEG 2013).
•	 Improvement in policy and operations in fragile 
and conflict-affected contexts. These include 
mainstreaming enhanced risk monitor-
ing and management; further identifying, 
building on, and integrating lessons about 
what works; and refining operational ef-
fectiveness and flexibility (World Bank 
2016b: 44–45). 
•	 A better understanding of  the actual mecha-
nisms through which political settlements affect 
SSD. A better grasp of this could lead to 
insights on what donors might do differ-
ently (DFID 2016).
1.2. scope and  
framework of study 
In order to address the above-mentioned 
gaps, this report addresses the following core 
questions:
•	 How and why do political economy fac-
tors and forms of violence shape the im-
plementation and outcomes of SSD in 
violence-affected contexts?
•	 What explains the variation of SSD prog-
ress within and between violence-affected 
contexts?
•	 What lessons can be taken from this to in-
form future analysis, policy, and practice?
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inductive Approach, Case selection, 
and methodology 
To answer these questions, the study induc-
tively developed and piloted a new approach 
to thinking about service delivery in vio-
lence-affected contexts. Inductive reasoning 
is based on learning from experience. Pat-
terns, resemblances, and regularities in ex-
perience (premises) are observed in order to 
reach conclusions (or to generate theory). As 
Bernard (2011: 7) puts it, inductive research 
“involves the search for pattern from observa-
tion and the development of explanations—
theories—for those patterns through series of 
hypotheses.” As such, an analytical framework 
was developed and applied inductively—the 
framework is described in the next section.11 
The research focuses on service delivery in 
the health and education sectors in Afghan-
istan and Pakistan and the health and rural 
infrastructure sectors in Nepal. The research 
includes six projects from these sectors. 
Subnational field research sites within each 
country were selected for in-depth study and 
comparative analysis. Each of the subnational 
areas are violence-affected, but have different 
characteristics, as outlined in chapter 2. 
The study methodology is qualitative and 
combines multiple methods. Main methods 
include a systematic meta-review of global 
evidence; a review of the country, sector, and 
intervention-related evidence; semistructured 
key informant interviews (KIIs), field visits, 
and focus group discussions (FGDs); a sys-
tematic analysis of interview transcripts; and 
multistakeholder consultations. Case studies 
were selected based on research puzzles de-
veloped from gaps in the literature (see ap-
pendix A for a more detailed discussion of 
the methodology).12 This, as with all research, 
carries certain caveats, as outlined in box 1.1.
the Analytical framework’s  
four key elements 
To address the above-mentioned knowledge 
gaps and research questions, an analytical 
framework was developed. The basic prem-
ise is that SSD in violence-affected settings 
is shaped by the interaction between political 
settlements, forms of violence, the nature of 
elite bargains, and modes of delivery (see fig-
ure 1.1).13 A brief outline of these terms and 
key typologies follows. 
political settlements 
A political settlement is a common under-
standing among elites that their best in-
terests—in terms of access to property 
rights and positions within and outside the 
state—are served by a specific way of orga-
nizing political power. It is the “distribution 
of power between contending social groups 
. . . on which any state [or social system] is 
based” (Di John and Putzel 2009). Political 
settlements involve a specific combination of 
institutions and set of norms as well as power- 
sharing agreements that help achieve the 
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Box 1.1. some research caveats
The case selection and research methodology do not claim to be representative: further 
research is required. This work can be considered a starting point. Research is based on a restricted 
number of projects and sectors. The case studies and research questions were developed inductively 
and aimed to address important gaps in the current understanding of how service delivery progress 
happens in the case study contexts (see chapter 2). The ultimate goal was to begin addressing these 
gaps and to identify patterns for further investigation and corroboration (see chapter 8). That said, the 
findings are triangulated with the national and global evidence base in order to increase the generaliz-
ability of the claims made. Indeed, generating a statistically representative (so-called “large N”) sample 
in such contexts, given the security and financial implications, is a perennial challenge.
The report does not claim to offer an exhaustive view of all the factors that affect progress 
in service delivery in violent contexts. The focus on forms of settlement, violence, bargains, and 
service delivery does not mean that other factors (such as beneficiary participation, service provider 
incentives, and the technical quality of services, among others) are unimportant. These four dimensions 
emerged as important for filling the gaps and inadequacies in the global and country literature. This 
offers a different perspective on why things work, or do not. As noted above, this should stimulate 
further debate.
The study does not explore the impact of SSD on peace- or state-building, or on the causes 
of fragility. The focus of this research is the “how to” of delivering services in the presence of vio-
lence, and it explores the delivery of services as a goal in its own right. It does not address the question 
of whether or how service delivery may contribute to, or undermine, state-building, peace-building, 
or conditions of fragility. As an aside, we think that the link between SSD and state legitimacy is too 
indirect and broad to provide granular, day-to-day guidance for policy makers and practitioners on the 
ground. The assumption that delivering basic services contributes to state-building outcomes appears 
with a striking degree of regularity in the literature even though on-the-ground empirical evidence 
supporting or undermining this link is very thin (Carpenter, Slater, and Mallett 2012; Haar and Ruben-
stein 2012).
The report does not endorse the studied armed elites nor does it necessarily condone the 
observed collusion between these groups and service providers. Whatever views about armed 
groups are presented in the report come from key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and 
related literature. What the report does point to, however, is the need to accept that local “unsavory” 
bargains are sometimes necessary to deliver humanitarian and development assistance in these contexts.
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minimum conditions needed for the society’s 
economic and political viability (Khan 2010). 
They exist at two levels: horizontal negotia-
tions between elites and vertical relations be-
tween elites and their followers. 
A political settlement is not a single, clearly 
articulated agreement, such as a financial, 
peace, or legal settlement. It is a rolling agree-
ment that is subject to continual renegotiation 
and contestation:
figure 1.1. study framework
SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY
Implementation and Outcomes
Political
settlements
Nature
of elite
bargains
Forms of
violence
Modes of
delivery
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“… governance, stability, and the qual-
ity and pace of development are viewed 
as the outcome of struggles and ensuing 
arrangements among powerful elites. 
These struggles largely involve informal 
processes of conflict, negotiation, and 
compromise.” (Parks and Cole 2010: 5) 
Political settlements are more unstable and 
fluid in violence-affected contexts than in 
nonviolent low-income contexts. The litera-
ture on elite bargains and political settlements 
attests that the outbreak of political violence 
represents a crisis—a situation in which at 
some level of the polity, the underlying elite 
bargain and broader political settlement is 
unable to manage social order or contain vi-
olent conflict (see Putzel and Di John 2012). 
In other words, this represents a breakdown 
of widely agreed-on formal and informal 
rules governing the allocation of resources 
and rents and the peaceful settlement of 
grievances, as well as often a challenge to the 
ruling coalition (North et al. 2007; North, 
Wallis, and Weingast 2009).14 
Levels of instability of the political settlement 
across regions and sectors may vary within 
violence-affected polities. Civil wars do not 
always challenge the ruling coalition at every 
level of the polity (Kalyvas 2003). These vari-
ations could affect SSD because the more un-
stable the political settlement, the shorter the 
time horizon that power brokers and ruling 
coalitions have for calculating the political 
and material benefits of any action. 
Political settlements in low-income and vi-
olence-affected contexts are likely to cre-
ate and/or sustain rents, rent-seeking, 
patron-client, and corruption networks. In 
contexts characterized by weak and unsta-
ble ruling coalitions and a poorly enforced 
rule of law—common to violence-affected 
polities—the creation of mostly informal 
rent-sharing agreements among elites as well 
as their maintenance through restrictions on 
economic and political competition may be 
prominent (Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003; 
North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Acemoglu 
and Johnson 2005; Khan 2010; Devarajan, 
Khemani, and Walton 2011). 
In sum, political settlements set the broad, 
often informal, rules of the game and cre-
ate constraints, spaces, and opportunities for 
SSD. They provide a map of the ruling coali-
tion: who the power brokers are; the balance 
of power between them; and what interests 
and norms they are defending or promoting 
in economics, politics, and service delivery.
In order to explore the relationship between 
political settlements and SSD, four interre-
lated “levels” of the settlement are identified 
in the framework (see figure 1.2):15
1. National settlement. The national set-
tlement is the configuration of power at 
the central state level. It usually includes 
elites from dominant groups who tradi-
tionally have access to political power at 
the national level. It can shape the overall 
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constraints and space for service delivery 
at the level of policy and implementation.
2. Sectoral settlement. Linked to but dis-
tinct from the national settlement, a sec-
toral settlement involves elite incentives 
and ideas related to particular sectors, such 
as health, education, and infrastructure, 
as well as the dominant norms of power 
sharing between elites within the sectors. 
Sectoral settlements may influence SSD in 
various ways, such as elite rent-sharing in 
the sector or the offer of various opportu-
nities for elite bargaining. 
3. The relationship between central 
and subnational elites. The linkages 
and relationships between ruling elites at 
the national and subnational levels may 
shape service delivery in numerous ways, 
including the degree of state penetration 
and control over insurgents, the flow of 
resources to localities, and the autonomy 
and control of subnational elites over ser-
vice delivery policy and implementation. 
4. Subnational settlement. Relating to the 
elite balance of power and the incentives, 
ideas, and power base among elites at the 
subnational (provincial/district and vil-
lage) level, this is important. Arrangements 
among powerful elites who control political 
competition and resource allocation at the 
subnational level do not necessarily align 
with national settlement arrangements.
At the same time, “settlements” at all the 
above-mentioned levels can have different 
cross-cutting characteristics. These key char-
acteristics are: 
SERVICE DELIVERY
National
(primary)
settlement
Sectoral
settlement
Relationship
between
national and
subnational
elites
Subnational
settlement
figure 1.2. dimensions of settlements that affect service delivery 
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•	 The degree of stability and contestation 
in the settlement; The degree to which 
there is a developmental and/or SSD ori-
entation (however limited) as part of the 
settlement; 
•	 The degree to which the settlement is ex-
clusionary or inclusive of the range of so-
cial or political groups; and
•	 The balance of power between un-
armed elites and armed elites and allied 
insurgents.16
Taken as a whole, this led us to develop a 
sixfold typology (table 1.1) that relates to our 
case studies. More is said on this in chapters 
2 and 4.
forms of violence 
The nature of a political settlement does not 
sufficiently explain how and why services are 
delivered in violence-affected contexts; forms 
of violence need also be considered. Violence 
can result from, as well as affect, the nature of a 
political settlement, and its influence is uncer-
tain and variable. As noted above, an outbreak 
table 1.1. types of political settlements in violence-affected contexts
type of subnational/sectoral settlement example from our case material
Relatively stable, with ruling coalition that has some 
incentives to favor social service delivery (ssd)
Balkh Province, Afghanistan (organized around  
regional strongman with pro-ssd interests/
incentives)
hill/mountain region of nepal after large-scale 
violent conflict (organized around pro-ssd  
political party)
Moderately stable, with mixed ssd incentives (con-
tested between state, disciplined armed insurgen-
cies, and powerful traditional elites) 
Wardak Province, Afghanistan, particularly before 
2008 
Moderately unstable, but presence of pro-ssd 
incentives (contested between state and disciplined 
armed insurgency that favors ssd) 
nepal during large-scale violent conflict
Balochistan, Pakistan
Moderately to highly unstable, with some state pene-
tration in areas controlled by relatively disciplined 
armed groups, with weak incentives for ssd 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan
highly unstable, with comparably weaker state pene-
tration, less disciplined armed groups, and weak 
ssd incentives/ideology 
Federally Administered tribal Areas (Pakistan)
highly unstable, with marked fragmentation of 
power (and no monopoly of violence) and weak 
incentives for ssd (weak political organization and 
multiple centers of power controlled by armed crimi-
nal organizations) 
Badghis Province, Afghanistan
tarai region of nepal after large-scale violent 
conflict
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of political violence can represent a crisis 
where contending groups making up a par-
ticular political settlement are unable to share 
power and resources in a way that secures so-
cial order. That is, factions within or outside 
the ruling coalition—“excluded elites”—de-
cide that it is in their interest to challenge the 
status quo through violence. This can occur at 
the national or subnational level.17 
People take up arms for different reasons in 
different contexts, with varying objectives 
and organizational structures and hierarchies. 
The literature on violence shows how it needs 
to be dissaggregated. For example, according 
to Kalyvas (2003), violent contestations at the 
regional or local level involve numerous dif-
fering agendas. Drawing inspiration from this 
and Olson’s (1993) discussion of banditry,18 
our research framework suggests that three 
key dimensions of violence are important for 
service providers to consider: (1) its organi-
zation; (2) its motivations, incentives, and 
ideology; and (3) its localization (figure 1.3). 
These dimensions are fluid, interrelated, and 
evolving.
Organization of Violence 
While important work has been done on how 
the nature of the political organizations pur-
suing violence affects a war’s duration, the 
durability of peace agreements, and prospects 
for postwar democratization (for example, 
Wood 2000), little is known about if and 
how differences in the organization of vi-
olence shape SSD. For the purposes of this 
study, the following dimensions of violence 
“organization” emerge as relevant:
SERVICE DELIVERY
Organization
Motivation,
incentives,
and
ideology
Localization
and
mobility
figure 1.3. dimensions of violence that affect social service delivery
18 | social service delivery in violent contexts: Achieving Results Against the Odds
• The degree to which violent actors are 
organized, so that leaders are identifiable 
and there is some recognised hierarchy of 
decision making.
• The degree to which which violent actors 
are disciplined, in the sense that decisions 
taken by the leaders can cascade down 
and be upheld.
• The degree to which violence is homog-
enous, as opposed to fragmented and 
contested.
Ideologies, Incentives, and Motivations  
behind Violence 
The second key dimension relates to the 
motivations and incentives for and the ide-
ologies behind violence. While violence cer-
tainly exacts large-scale costs, history is also 
replete with examples of political violence 
leading to improved developmental outcomes 
(Tilly 1990) and sometimes even more inclu-
sive, pro-poor outcomes (Putzel and Di John 
2012). As such, attention should be given to 
the motivations of organized armed insur-
gencies and to specific instances of political 
violence to determine if they might provide 
opportunities to reform SSD in more inclu-
sive or pro-poor ways. Understanding what 
is motivating violence could also be import-
ant when thinking about the political risks 
associated with delivering social services. For 
example, armed groups may allow SSD if it 
aligns with their agenda or if they directly 
benefit from it. However, if armed insurgents 
are resisting any or most types of central state 
penetration in peripheral/border territories, 
then determining who and how services 
should be delivered is a formidable challenge, 
and one that is not systematically examined 
in the literature.19 In sum, the specific dimen-
sions of “motivations” for violence that can 
play a role include the following: 
• The degree of alignment between the ob-
jectives and ideology of the armed elites 
and allied insurgents, and the logic, type, 
scope, and mode of the service being 
delivered. 
• The nature of armed elite and allied in-
surgents’ ideological “policy” or position 
toward certain services.
• Armed elites’ and allied insurgents’ per-
ception of service providers, that is, are 
they perceived as friend or foe? 
• The extent to which armed elites and al-
lied insurgents have an interest in main-
taining a service for their own use or for 
rent extraction. 
Localization and Mobility of Violence 
The extent to which armed groups are em-
bedded in local communities may affect the 
prospects of local bargaining around SSD 
during times of violent conflict. The degree 
of localization seems to depend on at least 
two factors: 
Part i . Research Approach and Major Findings | 19
• The degree of  reliance on local support. When 
armed elites rely on some degree of local 
support and the local constituents want 
the service, such elites may be more will-
ing to enable the service. 
• Extent of  localization or mobilization of  armed 
elites and their supporting armed insurgents. 
Stronger links to local communities may 
better enable local service delivery com-
pared with more mobile insurgents who 
move frequently across community bor-
ders and geographies. 
Taken as a whole, the elements of violence 
outlined above led us to identify, using our 
case studies, at least six main types of violence 
and their relation to SSD. These are outlined 
in table 1.2 and explored more in chapters 2 
and 5.
As a general rule, the more fragmented, mo-
bile, and ideologically antagonistic the vi-
olent actors, the more difficult it will be to 
deliver services and the more mitigation strat-
egies will be needed.
table 1.2. six types of violence
types of violence example from our case material
Well-organized, disciplined armed groups with 
incentives favoring social service delivery (ssd)
dominant/organized strongman allied with ruling 
coalition, such as general Atta in Balkh, Afghanistan
Well-organized, disciplined insurgent armed 
groups with incentives favoring ssd
Organized insurgency resisting or trying to capture 
the state but wanting some services, such as Maoists 
(nepal), Balochistan (Pakistan)
somewhat organized/disciplined insurgent armed 
groups largely opposed to ssd
somewhat organized insurgents who want to 
undermine the delivery of particular services, such 
as polio inoculation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the 
Federally Admininstered tribal Areas of Pakistan
somewhat organized/disciplined armed groups 
competing for regional power and legitimacy; 
positions favoring service delivery contested
large parts of Wardak Province, Afghanistan
disorganized/fragmented, mobile/roving  
insurgent armed groups with some local roots 
creating incentives for service delivery 
Fractionalized, uncoordinated armed groups with 
some incentives for service delivery as in parts of 
Badghis, Afghanistan
highly disorganized/fragmented, highly mobile/
roving armed groups with criminal (nonpolitical) 
motives 
some parts of Badghis, Afghanistan; tarai, nepal 
after large-scale violent conflict
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elite bargains 
Elite bargains, which are linked to but distinct 
from political settlements, are important in 
violence-affected contexts. They are the sets 
of rolling interactions and implicit or explicit 
agreements between powerful actors—armed 
or unarmed—that shape if and how things are 
done. Specifically, they involve the processes 
of conflict, negotiation, accommodation, com-
promise, and resource sharing that characterize 
governing (Parks and Cole 2010). Such bar-
gains are processes through which elite actors 
(that is, actors with the ability to directly influ-
ence outcomes within a given sector or issue) 
and the organizations that support them coor-
dinate and commit to one another to determine 
outcomes (World Bank 2017: 197). Political 
settlements describe the broad structure, but 
elite bargains involve agency, where national 
and local elites make deals according to the 
rules of the game, or they attempt to relax ex-
isting political constraints by persuading con-
tending elites to change their interests or views 
regarding policies (Rodrik 2014). In this way, 
elite bargains are central to any policy inno-
vations because they allow political agents to 
design their own strategies and policy spaces. 
As the 2017 World Development Report ar-
gues: “Policymaking and policy implementa-
tion involve bargaining among different actors 
(and their varying ability to influence others 
through control over resources, threat of vio-
lence, ideational persuasion, through existing 
rules)” (World Bank 2017: 7).
Bargains take different forms. It is difficult 
to know ahead of time what types of elite 
bargains will matter. At least four overlapping 
forms of bargain emerged as important for 
this research (figure 1.4): 
• Fostering dialogue and negotiations with 
armed elites and allied insurgents, 
• Enlisting the support of influential local 
nonarmed elites,
• Striking concessions and compromises, and
• Sharing rents and tolerating corruption. 
modes and strategies of delivery 
The final piece of the framework aims to ex-
plore how different strategies and modes of 
SSD might make a difference. While political 
settlements, forms of violence, and the ability 
to forge bargains are important drivers of or 
barriers to progress, service delivery strategies 
and implementation modalities also seem to 
matter (as the above literature review suggests).
There are different modes for delivering ser-
vices. Although this list is by no means ex-
haustive, three main modalities emerged in 
relation to the case material: 
• State versus nonstate, 
• Centralized versus decentralized, and 
• Single sector versus multisector. 
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In addition to the modality of delivery, ser-
vice delivery agents can undertake different 
strategies. Such strategies can be:
• More or less “violence sensitive”: by antic-
ipating and mitigating some of the risks 
of violence;
• More or less “politically sensitive”: by re-
ducing the influence of anti–service deliv-
ery political coalitions; and 
• More or less “bargain sensitive”: by creat-
ing space for and facilitating pro–service 
delivery bargains.
Chapters 2 and 6 explore these issues in more 
depth.
SERVICE DELIVERY
Fostering 
dialogue and 
negotiations 
with
armed elites
Enlisting 
support 
of influential 
local elites
Striking 
concessions 
and 
compromises
Sharing 
rents and 
tolerating 
corruption
figure 1.4. overlapping forms of bargaining to deliver services
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2. Applying the framework: puzzles and findings 
Following is an overview of the main find-
ings. It outlines the main research puzzles as 
well as a brief summary of how the frame-
work was applied to generate answers. Part 
II (chapters 3–6) as well as the background 
country reports (World Bank and Akram 
2016; World Bank and AREU 2016; World 
Bank and SSB 2016) provide a more thor-
ough treatment of these issues. For quick ref-
erence, tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 sum up the 
puzzles and findings.
map 1.1. map of south Asia
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2.1. Afghanistan 
Afghanistan (see map 2.2) has been a vio-
lence-affected country for almost 40 years, 
resulting in complex rivalries with a vari-
ety of actors, interests, and informal insti-
tutions. During the 1978–92 jihad period, 
there was a massive mobilization of actors, 
such as religious and political counterelites, 
who opposed the Soviet regime. With several 
competing insurgencies involved, the mobi-
lization was decentralized, with local fronts 
enjoying a high degree of political autonomy. 
This contributed to the emergence of a frag-
mented political and military landscape with 
power often centered around local warlords. 
By 1993, the country was sliding toward 
factional war, with various armed irregular 
forces competing for territorial control (Gi-
ustozzi and Ibrahimi 2013). The Taliban, 
which emerged as a serious contender for 
state control in 1994, came closest to reestab-
lishing a monopoly of violence. In 2001, the 
Taliban was ousted by the Northern Alliance 
map 2.2. map of Afghanistan
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supported by the United States, leading to the 
return of many of the factions that had bat-
tled for control of Kabul in the early 1990s. 
The signing of the Bonn Agreement for an 
interim power-sharing government in late 
2001 created a framework for a new political 
settlement and a new elite bargain, presided 
over by Hamid Karzai. The new government 
was heterogeneous, ethnically as well as ideo-
logically, complicating former President Kar-
zai’s goal of unifying the country. From 2002 
to 2013, a delicate balance of power was 
achieved between strong provincial actors, 
with the president at the center. The presi-
dent used access to major political or govern-
ment posts to buy off powerful, provincial, 
and local elites. Endemic corruption and elite 
impunity weakened the image of the govern-
ment and led to a resurgence of the Taliban in 
parts of the country after 2005.
Progress in the delivery of health and educa-
tion services in the country since 2002 has 
been mixed. External aid has played a prom-
inent role, and two major programs have been 
implemented: the Education Quality Improve-
ment Project (EQUIP) and Strengthening 
Health Activities for the Rural Poor (SHARP). 
Both are “on budget” national programs fi-
nanced by a combination of the Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund and International 
Development Association grants.
EQUIP represents the government’s main ed-
ucation program. The development objective 
of EQUIP I (2004–09) was to: 
“improve educational inputs and pro-
cesses as a foundation for a long-term 
strategy through: a) the strengthening 
of schools and teacher training initia-
tives in communities; b) investment in 
human resources as well as physical 
facilities; and c) institutional develop-
ment of schools, District Education 
Departments, Provincial Education 
Departments, and the Ministry of Edu-
cation.” (IEG 2010: 1) 
EQUIP II (2008–16) seeks “to increase access 
to quality basic education, especially for girls, 
through school grants, teacher training, and 
strengthened institutional capacity with the 
support of communities and private provid-
ers” (World Bank and AREU 2016: 1).
The SHARP program as well as its successor, 
the System Enhancement for Health Action 
in Transition (SEHAT), are the government’s 
main health programs, delivering basic health 
services. SHARP’s development objective was 
to support the government in achieving the 
goal of the Health and Nutrition Sector Strat-
egy 2009–13 to “contribute to improving the 
health and nutritional status of the people of 
Afghanistan, with a greater focus on women 
and children and underserved areas of the 
country” (World Bank 2014: 2). 
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puzzles 
From an aggregate national level, both EQUIP 
and SHARP have made progress. National 
health and education outcomes have improved 
since 2002, starting from a low base. One re-
port on SHARP noted that it “was highly rel-
evant for the development challenges of the 
Afghan health sector in 2009 and implemen-
tation was largely successful with minor chal-
lenges” (World Bank 2014: 19–20).
However, some important subnational vari-
ations should be noted. The education and 
health data, albeit patchy, suggests notable 
progress in certain provinces as well as vari-
ation between different provinces over time. 
This progress and variation is counterintuitive 
in the context of widespread violence and 
“dysfunctional” governance, but we found 
no systematic studies to explain this. The re-
search explored two key problems. 
Puzzle 1: How did health service delivery (and 
education until 2008) make solid progress in 
the violence-affected, insecure, and clientelistic 
political environment of Wardak Province?
The province of Wardak is characterized by 
high levels of insecurity, and yet it still man-
aged to make notable progress on certain 
health delivery indicators. The education sec-
tor also made some progress, especially up 
until 2008. From 2004 to 2012, for example, 
the health sector in Wardak was marked by an 
increase in the number of facilities, services, 
and medicines; and it also made progress on 
health outcomes such as child immunizations 
and access to skilled antenatal care, although 
progress in the latter area slowed after 2008 
(see figure 2.1).
Source: World Bank and AREU 2016.
figure 2.1. Access to skilled antenatal care, 2004–12
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Puzzle 2: In the face of similarities in the level of 
insecurity and incidence of “violence,” why was 
service delivery implementation in general and 
health-care delivery in particular much more 
challenging in Badghis compared with Wardak? 
What was it about Balkh that made service 
delivery easier to implement and allowed it to 
achieve relatively good health and education 
outcomes, especially when compared with either 
Wardak or Badghis?
Both Wardak and Badghis have been re-
peatedly affected by violence, yet there was 
differential performance in service delivery 
implementation and outcomes. In Badghis, it 
was more difficult to deliver and sustain ser-
vices, and its health outcome scores are no-
ticeably lower than those of Wardak. Service 
delivery in Balkh was more organized than 
Wardak and Badghis, and its performance on 
a number of indicators for both sectors is rel-
atively better than the others. 
findings 
Puzzle 1: How did health service delivery (and 
education until 2008) make solid progress in 
the violence-affected, insecure, and clientelistic 
political environment of Wardak Province?
One key driver of progress in Wardak was 
a series of diverse and rolling elite bargains. 
The bargains were struck and upheld because 
of a more organized form of violence—en-
abling bargaining points to be identified—
as well as a relatively strong local elite who 
were supportive of the health (and education) 
sectors and where the Taliban were relatively 
reliant on local support. Political networks 
and organizations were linked to national 
and sectoral elites in Kabul. One important 
trade-off to note is that while the local elite 
facilitated social service delivery (SSD) in ed-
ucation; they did so selectively. While boys’ 
attendance increased, girls’ attendance in pri-
mary and secondary school dropped in the 
post-2008 period, mostly because of an an-
tagonism to girls’ education among the local 
elite and armed groups, suggesting that the 
ideology of local elites matters as much as the 
balance of power.
Portrait of shop owner Abdul, Enjil District, 
Herat, Afghanistan  Graham Crouch/World Bank
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Puzzle 2: In the face of similarities in the level of 
insecurity and incidence of “violence,” why was 
service delivery implementation in general and 
health-care delivery in particular much more 
challenging in Badghis compared with Wardak? 
What was it about Balkh that made service 
delivery easier to implement and allowed it to 
achieve relatively good health and education 
outcomes, especially when compared with either 
Wardak or Badghis? 
In Badghis, compared with Wardak, highly 
fragmented and contested forms of violence 
as well as an unstable provincial settlement, 
led to fewer agreements and bargains and to 
the targeting of SSD for predatory appropria-
tion by roving groups.
In Balkh, the more organized and disciplined 
form of violence and the stable political set-
tlement—concentrated under General Atta 
Mohammed Noor, the governor of Balkh—
enabled smoother SSD implementation com-
pared with Wardak (where the violence was 
more fragmented, although still relatively or-
ganized) and Badghis (where politics and vio-
lence were highly fragmented and contested). 
The fact that General Atta was a strong ally of 
the national ruling coalition likely facilitated 
elite bargains around securing resource flows 
to both health care and education in Balkh. 
The greater economic prosperity and therefore 
higher median household income in Balkh 
also contributed to greater SSD progress. The 
political settlement, characterized by a domi-
nant, organized strongman, made governance 
more predictable, also likely contributing to 
economic progress in the province.
2.2. nepal 
Since the 1990s, Nepal (see map 2.3) has un-
dergone significant sociopolitical upheavals. 
The most significant was the “People’s War,” 
launched by the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) in 1996, affecting the country for 
a decade. The Maoist insurgency is widely 
considered to have had a negative impact 
on SSD: health-care facilities, schools, com-
munity centers, and local government offices 
were burned, while transportation within and 
between districts slowed down or was signifi-
cantly reduced due to frequent checkpoints 
and curfews (Thapa and Sijapati 2005). 
A peace settlement was reached in 2006, but 
the so-called postconflict period was marked 
by fluid and unstable political settlements 
and acts of violence. The mobilization of the 
Madhesis, for example, known as the “Mad-
hesi Movement,” called for the fulfillment of 
certain rights and greater integration into the 
political mainstream. Elements of popular 
movements in the eastern and central Tarai 
evolved into different armed groups with 
political demands; some resorted to various 
forms of violence and criminality. 
The health sector in Nepal has been sup-
ported by various donors both during and 
since the violent conflict. During the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the government of Nepal 
supported health through the World Bank–
supported Population and Family Health 
Project (1994–2000) as well as subsectoral 
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projects supported by various donors. A sec-
torwide approach was then adopted in the 
form of the National Health Sector Project. 
Phase I, implemented in 2004–10, sought 
“to expand access to, and increase the use of 
essential health care services, especially by 
underserved populations” (World Bank 2004: 
vii). Phase II, implemented in 2010–15, 
aimed to “enable the Government of Nepal 
to increase access to essential health care ser-
vices and their utilization by the underserved 
and the poor” (World Bank 2010: 7). 
Rural infrastructure also received support 
during and since the wide-scale violent con-
flict. The World Bank provided a loan for the 
Rural Infrastructure Project in 1999–2003, in 
addition to other sectoral investments (World 
Bank 2005a). The Bank then supported the 
Rural Access Improvement and Decentral-
ization Project, implemented in two phases: 
2005–09 and 2010–13. Its objective was to 
assist “residents of participating districts to 
utilize improved rural transport infrastructure 
and services in order to have enhanced access 
to social services and economic opportunities” 
(World Bank 2005a: 3; World Bank 2009: 5).
map 2.3. map of nepal
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puzzles 
Like Afghanistan, an examination of the Nepal 
cases reveal impressive yet counterintuitive 
progress as well as some notable subnational 
variation. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of 
literature to explain this, particularly from a 
political economy and violence perspective:
Puzzle 1: What explains the impressive progress 
achieved in health delivery—that is, on track 
to achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals—in the context of large-scale violence 
and supposedly “dysfunctional” governance? 
In addition, how were gains made in rural 
infrastructure in this context?
Despite the adverse context of violence, 
political instability, and weak governance, 
Nepal registered progress. The country’s 
health sector made progress throughout the 
Maoist insurgency and since (table 2.2). Two 
aspects of this progress are particularly puz-
zling. First, improvements occurred regard-
less of the intensity of violent conflict. Table 
2.3 illustrates how the midwestern hill re-
gion, which bore the brunt of the fighting, 
did generally as well as the other regions 
and is not even the worst performer. Sec-
ond, the progress occurred in a context that 
would normally be considered the antithesis 
to good governance: a public administration 
table 2.2. health indicators, nepal, 1990–2011
millennium development goal/ 
impact indicator 1991
maoist insurgency
2011
target 
20151996 2001 2006
Maternal mortality ratio (per 1,000 live births) 539 539 415 281 170a 134
total fertility rate 5 .3 4 .6 4 .1 3 .1 2 .6 2 .5
Adolescent fertility rate (15–19 years) per 1,000 
population
nA 127 110 98 81 70
contraceptive prevalence rate, modern methods 
(percent)
24 26 35 44 43 .2 55
under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 158 118 .3 91 61 54 38
infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 106 78 .5 64 48 46 32
neonatal mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) nA 49 .9 43 33 33 16
Percent of underweight children nA 49 .2 48 .3 38 .6 28 .8 29
tuberculosis cases
detection rate (percent) nA 48 70 65 76 85
successful treatment rate (percent) nA 79 89 89 90 90
Malaria annual parasite incidence per 1,000 nA 0 .54 0 .40 0 .28 0 .11 0 .06
Source: MoHP 2010; Government of Nepal and UN Country Team of Nepal 2013.
a. Further analysis of the 2011 census released in December 2014 showed the maternal mortality rate to be a high 
of 480 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2014). 
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characterized by politicized appointments 
and rapid turnover of staff, the absence of 
locally elected governments, and wide-
spread corruption and clientelism outside 
and within sectors (World Bank and SSB 
2016). Progress was less impressive for rural 
infrastructure, although some progress was 
made, including at the height of the conflict 
(2004–06). 
Puzzle 2: Why, in the post-2006 period, in a 
context where large-scale violence has ceased, 
aid has increased, and political settlements are 
fluid, has much greater progress been achieved 
in health and rural infrastructure in the hill and 
mountain regions of Palpa and Rolpa compared 
with the Tarai lowlands of Siraha and Bardiya?
The data point to notable subnational vari-
ation between the hill region and the Tarai 
(“lowlands,” “plains”). For example, the Tarai 
was among the lowest-ranked regions on 
health indicators such as the percentage of 
women giving birth in a health facility, ante-
natal care, and nutritional status. Meanwhile, 
the hill region ranked among the highest na-
tionally on these same health indicators. In 
terms of roads, Palpa, in the hill region, has 
seen rapid expansion in the years since 2006 
while two districts in the Tarai have regis-
tered very limited progress (table 2.4).
Village road. Nepal. Simone D. McCourtie/World Bank
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findings 
Puzzle 1: What explains the impressive progress 
achieved in health delivery—that is, on track to 
achieving Millennium Development Goals—in the 
context of large-scale violence and supposedly 
“dysfunctional” governance? In addition, how 
were gains made in rural infrastructure in this 
context?
Progress was made in the health sector, even 
in the face of violent conflict, due to a se-
ries of elite bargains between insurgents, local 
elites, and service providers. This was possible 
because the insurgency was organized and 
disciplined (which made it possible to iden-
tify leaders who could engage in bargaining); 
had an ideology in support of health provi-
sion; needed health services itself; and relied 
on local legitimacy. In addition, rent-sharing 
agreements were struck and maintained.
Puzzle 2: Why, in the post-2006 period, in a 
context where large-scale violence has ceased, 
aid has increased, and political settlements are 
fluid, has much greater progress been achieved 
in health and rural infrastructure in the hill and 
mountain regions of Palpa and Rolpa compared 
with the Tarai lowlands of Siraha and Bardiya?
Progress in the health and roads sectors was 
stronger in the hill region than the Tarai due, 
in part, to differences in subnational political 
settlements, forms of political organization, 
and the nature of the violence. The Tarai is 
characterized by more predatory and feu-
dalistic elite bargains and fragmented roving 
armed groups (often with criminal motives). 
This form of violence makes it harder to 
strike the types of bargains that can protect 
SSD from appropriation. The hill region is 
characterized by programmatic forms of po-
litical organization—especially the Maoist 
party, which competes as a political party and 
advocates for pro-poor service delivery, and 
for a more equal land distribution and inclu-
sive political settlement. There is evidence 
that links between Maoist party elites and the 
state administration were closer than those 
of landlords and political elites in the Tarai, 
which could help explain why elite bargains 
were more durable and credible around health 
and road provision.
table 2.4. Road networks in siraha (plains), palpa 
(hills), and Bardiya (plains)
2006–07 2011–12 2013–14
siraha 143 .93 144 .93 144 .93
Palpa 128 .59 199 .59 235 .89
Bardiya 189 .32 211 .42 211 .42
Source: World Bank and SSB 2016.
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table 2.5. social service delivery in nepal: framework, puzzles, and findings
site political settlement
dominant form of 
violence
prospects 
for pro-ssd 
elite bargain
mode of 
delivery puzzles and findings
palpa 
(hill district) 
during large-
scale violent 
conflict: 
1996–2006
moderately un-
stable. Pro-ssd 
incentives exist but 
are contested among 
state and pro-ssd, 
disciplined armed 
insurgencies .
Well-organized, disci-
plined armed groups 
with incentives favoring 
ssd. Organized insurgen-
cies resisting the state but 
desiring of some services .
Medium/high health and 
roads—central-
ized state pro-
vision (during 
and after large-
scale violent 
conflict)
Puzzle 1: What explains the impres-
sive progress achieved in health de-
livery—that is, on track to achieving 
Millennium Development Goals—in 
the context of large-scale violence 
and supposedly “dysfunctional” 
governance? In addition, how were 
gains made in rural infrastructure in 
this context?
•  A series of elite bargains 
between insurgents, local elites, 
and service providers was 
possible because the insurgency 
was organized and disciplined 
so leaders who could engage in 
bargaining were identifiable, 
had an ideology supporting 
health provision, relied on the 
health service, and needed local 
legitimacy .
•  Rent-sharing agreements were 
struck and maintained .
Puzzle 2: Why, in the post-2006 pe-
riod, in a context of the cessation of 
large-scale violence and increased 
aid and fluid political settlements, 
was much greater progress achieved 
in health and rural infrastructure 
in the hill and mountain regions of 
Palpa and Rolpa compared with 
the Tarai lowlands of Siraha and 
Bardiya?
(Key reasons are differences in 
subnational political settlements, 
forms of political organization, and 
nature of violence:
Post large-
scale violent 
conflict 
(2006–)
Relatively stable. 
competitive electoral 
politics; program-
matic pro-ssd 
political party dom-
inant; Maoist party 
influential .
Relatively little criminal 
gang activity .
high Multisector—
simultaneous 
provision 
of mutually 
reinforcing 
services (not 
by design)
Rolpa  
(hill district) 
during large-
scale violent 
conflict: 
1996–2006
moderately unstable. 
Pro-ssd incentives 
existed but were 
contested among 
state and pro-ssd 
disciplined armed 
insurgencies .
Well-organized, disci-
plined armed groups 
with incentives favoring 
ssd. Organized insurgen-
cies resisting the state but 
desiring of some services .
Medium/high health and 
roads—central-
ized state pro-
vision (during 
and after large-
scale violent 
conflict)
Post large-
scale violent 
conflict 
(2006–)
Relatively stable. 
competitive electoral 
politics; program-
matic pro-ssd 
political party dom-
inant; Maoist party 
influential .
Relatively little criminal 
gang activity.
high Multisector— 
simultaneous 
provision 
of mutually 
reinforcing 
services (not 
by design)
siraha  
(the tarai) 
during large-
scale violent 
conflict: 
1996–2006
moderately un-
stable. Pro-ssd 
incentives exist but 
are contested among 
state and pro-ssd 
disciplined armed 
insurgencies .
Well-organized, disci-
plined armed groups 
with incentives favoring 
ssd. Organized insurgen-
cies resisting the state but 
desiring of some services .
Medium/high health and 
roads—central-
ized state pro-
vision (during 
and after large-
scale violent 
conflict)
Post large-
scale violent 
conflict 
(2006–)
highly unstable. 
Factionalized political 
parties . no pro-ssd 
programmatic po-
litical party . landed 
elites dominant .
significant elements of 
highly disorganized/frag- 
mented, mobile/roving 
armed groups with 
criminal (nonpolitical) 
motives. no pro-ssd pro-
grammatic political party .
low/medium Multisector—
simultaneous 
provision 
of mutually 
reinforcing 
services (not 
by design)
(continued)
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table 2.5. Continued
site political settlement
dominant form of 
violence
prospects 
for pro-ssd 
elite bargain
mode of 
delivery puzzles and findings
Bardiya  
(the tarai) 
during large-
scale violent 
conflict: 
1996–2006
moderately un-
stable. Pro-ssd 
incentives exist but 
are contested among 
state and pro-ssd 
disciplined armed 
insurgencies .
Well-organized, disci-
plined armed groups 
with incentives favoring 
ssd. Organized insurgen-
cies resisting the state but 
desiring of some services .
Medium/high centralized 
state provision 
in health and 
roads (during 
and after large-
scale violent 
conflict)
•  the tarai is characterized by 
more predatory, feudalistic elite 
bargains and fragmented, roving 
armed groups, making it more 
difficult to strike the types of 
bargains that could protect ssd 
from appropriation .
•  the hill region is characterized 
by more programmatic forms of 
political organization, especially 
the Maoist party, which supports 
more equitable land distri-
bution and inclusive political 
settlement .
•  there is evidence that links 
between the Maoist party elites 
and the state administration 
were closer than those of land-
lords and political elites in the 
tarai, which could help explain 
why elite bargains were more 
durable and credible around 
health and road provision .
Post large-
scale violent 
conflict 
(2006–)
highly unstable. 
Factionalized political 
parties . no pro-ssd 
programmatic po-
litical party . landed 
elites dominant .
significant elements of 
highly disorganized/ 
fragmented, mobile/rov-
ing armed groups with 
criminal (nonpolitical) 
motives. no pro-ssd 
programmatic political 
party .
low/medium Multisector— 
simultaneous 
provision 
of mutually 
reinforcing 
services (not 
by design)
2.3. pakistan 
In Pakistan (see map 2.4), violent conflict has 
characterized Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 
and Balochistan for many years. This has led 
to heavy loss of life and economic stagnation. 
FATA is a border region that shares a long, 
porous, and mostly unmanned border with 
Afghanistan. FATA, as well as the Swat Val-
ley in KP, have both seen the rise of violent 
extremism and significant state military oper-
ations. Balochistan has experienced violence 
as Baluch nationalists have battled the Pa-
kistani state for greater autonomy. There are 
multiple, overlapping causes of conflict and 
violence in the region, including political and 
economic marginalization, Baluch national-
ism and militancy, the role of state security 
forces, the impact of the long-running con-
flict in Afghanistan since 1979, and violence 
from armed Islamist groups (Gazdar, Kaker, 
and Khan 2010: 2–3).
Health services, including polio eradication, 
face numerous challenges. This part of the re-
search focuses on efforts to eradicate polio in 
KP and FATA. Ninety percent of all polio cases 
in Pakistan, and the nation’s post-2005 in-
crease in polio incidence, relate to the Pashtun 
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areas of KP and FATA. Over 70 percent of 
confirmed polio cases in recent years has been 
in FATA alone. Attempts to eradicate polio 
have centered on the Polio Eradication Project, 
a national campaign involving federal and pro-
vincial governments and international partners. 
The Second Partnership for Polio Eradication 
(2005–08), a follow-up to the Partnership 
for Polio Eradication (2003–2005), aimed 
“to assist Pakistan’s effort to eradicate polio 
through supply of the Oral Polio Vaccine 
(OPV) for the country’s supplementary immu-
nization activities during 2006–07” (World 
Bank 2005b: 5). The Third Partnership for 
Polio Eradication (2009–14) aimed to “assist 
Pakistan in its efforts under its Polio Eradica-
tion Initiative to eradicate polio from its terri-
tory” (World Bank 2015c: viii).
map 2.4. map of pakistan
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Education is an important area of activity in 
Pakistan. The second part of the research fo-
cuses on efforts to improve education in Ba-
lochistan, which lags behind other provinces 
across a range of development indicators, 
including educational attainment and liter-
acy (World Bank 2006). Challenges include 
low primary enrollment rates among boys 
and girls, low-quality education, high rates of 
teacher absenteeism, poor monitoring and su-
pervision, and weak institutional capacity in 
the public sector. The main objective of the 
2006–14 World Bank–supported Baloch-
istan Education Support Project (BESP) was 
“to promote public-private and community 
partnerships to improve access to quality pri-
mary education, in particular for girls” (World 
Bank 2015a: viii). 
puzzles 
Puzzle 1: How and why did social service 
delivery—in the form of polio eradication—
become politicized and targeted by violent 
resistance? Why was delivering polio vaccine 
services so difficult? Why were outcomes worse 
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas than 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa?
Polio workers, but not other service providers, 
have repeatedly been targets of political vio-
lence in some areas of Pakistan. It is crucial 
to understand the reasons behind this, with a 
particular view to designing future risk miti-
gation strategies. Moreover, the data underline 
that progress toward eradication was greater in 
KP than in FATA, especially since 2007 (figure 
2.2). Polio delivery was also more fraught with 
implementation challenges and more intensely 
targeted by political violence in FATA than KP.
figure 2.2. Cases of polio in pakistan: the federally Administered tribal Areas 
versus khyber pakhtunkhwa, 2001–14
Source: World Bank and Akram 2016.
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Puzzle 2: Why was the Balochistan Education 
Support Project relatively successful in the 
context of a violent insurgency and clientelestic 
politics?
In Balochistan, progress in education through 
BESP was relatively successful. Despite the 
violent context, four out of five indicators of 
the project development objectives exceeded 
their targets. Project-supported schools in-
creased overall enrollment in the province by 
5.0 percent and girls’ enrollment by 5.3 per-
cent (World Bank 2015a: 13). How did this 
happen in a historically challenging region 
where violence was widespread? What was it 
about the nature of politics and violence that 
enabled this progress?
findings 
Puzzle 1: How and why did social service 
delivery—in the form of polio eradication—
become politicized and targeted by violent 
resistance? Why was delivering polio vaccine 
services so difficult? Why were outcomes worse 
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas than 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa?
Polio eradication became the target of polit-
ical violence due to: (1) the nature of violent 
conflict and antagonism with the central state, 
(2) the perception that SSD was a vehicle for 
state penetration—and the manner in which 
the polio vaccine was delivered did not miti-
gate this concern, and (3) the fact that many 
Umair, 9, a student of Government Comprehensive School in Gujranwala, Pakistan reads from a book in 
the classroom. Visual News/World Bank
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table 2.6. social service delivery in pakistan: framework, puzzles, and findings 
site political settlement
dominant form of 
violence
prospects 
for pro-ssd 
elite bargain
mode of 
delivery puzzles and findings
federally Ad-
ministered 
tribal Areas 
(fAtA)
highly unstable. 
Weaker state pene-
tration and control 
than in KP; more 
fragmented armed 
groups and weak ssd 
incentives/ideology . 
 
Antagonistic relation-
ship with state and 
limited state penetra-
tion in terms of elites 
and administration .
somewhat orga-
nized/ disciplined 
insurgent armed 
groups largely 
opposed to ssd . 
low Polio eradica-
tion: central-
ized state 
provision 
Puzzle 1: How and why did SSD—in the form 
of polio eradication—become politicized 
and targeted by violent resistance? Why 
was delivering polio vaccine services so 
difficult? Why were outcomes worse in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas than in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa?
Polio eradication became the target of 
political violence due to: (1) the nature of 
violent conflict and antagonism with the 
“state,” (2) the perception that ssd was a 
vehicle for state penetration—the manner 
in which the polio vaccine was delivered 
did not mitigate this concern, and (3) 
the fact that many insurgents and local 
elites did not consider polio eradication a 
priority .
Polio eradication efforts were more diffi-
cult in FAtA than in KP because the form 
of violence in FAtA was more fragmented; 
the political settlement—and relations 
between national and local elites—was 
less stable; the insurgents were more hos-
tile to “state activity,” which was partly 
caused by drone attacks that took place 
in FAtA but not in KP; and violent actors 
were more mobile . these factors meant 
that service providers found it more 
difficult to organize local elite bargains 
to protect polio vaccine service providers 
from violence .
Puzzle 2: Why was the Balochistan Educa-
tion Support Project relatively successful 
in the context of a violent insurgency and 
clientelestic politics?
education progress was accomplished 
under the program due to a more orga-
nized insurgency; the small-scale model of 
delivery, which to some degree managed 
to circumvent national and regional cli-
entelist networks; and the fact that there 
were incentives for insurgents and local 
elites to support education delivery be-
c use they contributed to their ideological 
goals of empowering Balochistan .
khyber pa-
khtunkhwa 
(kp)—pe-
shawar and 
swabi
moderately to highly 
unstable. Weak ssd 
incentives; some 
state penetration in 
areas controlled by 
relatively disciplined 
armed groups . 
 
central state penetra-
tion in administrative 
and military terms 
greater and more 
durable than in FAtA .
somewhat orga-
nized/disciplined 
insurgent armed 
groups largely 
opposed to ssd . 
 
somewhat disci-
plined, organized 
armed groups 
competing for local 
power, legitimacy, 
and ssd . 
low-medium Polio eradica-
tion: central-
ized state 
provision 
Balochistan—
Quetta, 
turbat, dera 
Bugti, and 
pishin
moderately un-
stable. Pro-ssd 
incentives exist but 
are contested among 
state and pro-ssd 
disciplined armed 
insurgencies with 
nationalist ideology . 
 
clientelism/corrup-
tion widespread in 
the education sector .
Well-organized, 
disciplined insur-
gent armed groups 
with incentives 
favoring ssd . 
Organized/domi-
nant insurgencies 
resisting state but 
desiring of some 
services .
Medium education: 
decentralized, 
communi-
ty-based, non-
state provision 
(Balochistan 
education sup-
port Project)
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insurgents and local elites did not consider 
polio eradication a development priority.
Polio eradication efforts were more difficult 
in FATA than in KP because the form of vi-
olence in FATA was more fragmented; the 
political settlement—and relations between 
national and local elites—was less stable; 
the insurgents were more hostile to “state 
activity,” in part because drone attacks took 
place in FATA but not in KP; and violent ac-
tors were more mobile. These factors meant 
that service providers found it more difficult 
to organize local elite bargains in order to 
protect providers of the polio vaccine from 
violence.
Puzzle 2: Why was the Balochistan Education 
Support Project relatively successful in the context 
of a violent insurgency and clientelestic politics?
The BESP managed to increase enrollment 
rates because of the nature of the insurgency 
in Balochistan; the small-scale delivery model, 
which to some degree managed to circumvent 
national and regional clientelist networks 
in the education sector; the fact that it was 
NGO-led, which was reportedly more accept-
able to an antistate insurgent group than a 
state-led mode would have been; and the fact 
that some armed elites and nonarmed local 
elites saw education as contributing to their 
nationalist goals of empowering Balochistan.
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Soraya gets a check up at the local medical health clinicTajikhan Village, Jabalseraj District Parwan 
Province, Afghanistan, May 2012. World Bank/Graham Crouch
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3. political settlements matter
This chapter explores how the four interre-
lated dimensions, and cross-cutting charac-
teristics, of settlements outlined in chapter 1 
affect service delivery.
3.1. national settlements 
The broad characteristics of the political set-
tlement at the national level inform what we 
consider to be the likely obstacles to and/
or enabling factors for social service deliv-
ery (SSD). These include the extent to which 
the settlement is clientelistic/developmental, 
exclusionary/inclusive, or stable/unstable—
characteristics that impact service delivery 
in a broad sense by shaping the policy space 
toward more or less progressive forms of de-
livery, as well as affecting the nature of local 
implementation arrangements.
Health and education delivery in Afghanistan, 
for example, occurs in a fluid and contested 
context with a precarious set of national po-
litical settlements. The post-2005 Taliban re-
surgence and the subsequent withdrawal of 
most international troops at the end of 2014 
contributed to the insecurity. The post-2001 
Kabul government’s attempts at maintaining a 
fluid, “inclusive” peace agreement to buy off 
and/or co-opt regional power brokers while 
excluding the Taliban was a major source of 
instability and uncertainty. According to a 
former government official, the main problem 
with the Bonn Agreement was its exclusion 
of the Taliban:
“The Bonn Agreement (December 
2001) was a bad start in terms of in-
creasing the insurgency in the country. 
Why would you bring the warlords to 
the Bonn Agreement and use them as 
ground forces, but deliberately isolate 
Hezb-e Islami and the Taliban, who 
were the real opposition? The warlords 
were not the opposition; they were al-
lies. You should bring peace and secu-
rity to those whom you are fighting, 
not those who are eating with you.” 
(KL: IDI–63)
The new government was ethnically and ideo-
logically heterogeneous, complicating former 
President Karzai’s attempts to unify the coun-
try. From 2002 to 2013, a delicate balance of 
power was achieved between strong provin-
cial actors, with the president at the center. 
The president bought off elites with access to 
major political or government posts. Endemic 
corruption and elite impunity weakened the 
image of the government and led to a grow-
ing Taliban resurgence in the countryside. 
The nature of this settlement broadly impacts 
service delivery in two ways:
44 | social service delivery in violent contexts: Achieving Results Against the Odds
1. The unstable and fragile nature of the set-
tlement translates into fragmented, varied, 
and unpredictable elite bargains that link 
provinces to the center, which makes ser-
vice delivery coordination increasingly 
politicized and challenging. Provincial 
elites often entertain disparate or even 
antagonistic relationships with elements 
of the political elite at the national level, 
with the aim of accessing greater resources 
from Kabul. 
2. The fluid and uncertain nature of the set-
tlement creates incentives for the sectors 
to engage in short-term profiteering and 
impacts the space for delivering services in 
several ways, including:
•	 In many cases leading to unstable and 
fluid linkages between the center and 
the provinces, disrupting SSD;
•	 Limiting the ability of provincial and 
central elites to strike and sustain elite 
bargains to deliver services; and
•	 Heightening the incentives for elites to 
engage in short-term profiteering with 
regard to the allocation of resources and 
incentivizing some to allocate service 
delivery resources toward strengthen-
ing local patronage networks. 
The nature of Nepal’s political settlement af-
fects service delivery there as well. Political 
A young boy points to the letter F, with his teacher’s help in a classroom in rural Nepal.  
Aisha Faquir/World Bank
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violence during the 10-year large-scale violent 
conflict (hereon referred to as the conflict) in 
1996–2006 and the period of postwar polit-
ical contestation (post-2006) led to changes 
in the political settlement, which in turn con-
tributed to shifts in the way services were 
delivered. Two overlapping points deserve 
mention:
1. In the late 2000s, the national politi-
cal settlement shifted to become a more 
inclusive elite coalition, which led to an 
increasingly inclusive approach to deliver-
ing services. The ostensibly pro-inclusion 
agenda of the Maoist insurgents contrib-
uted to shifts toward a more inclusive cen-
tral political settlement and encouraged 
traditional elite coalitions to address issues 
of socioeconomic inequalities in SSD. The 
changes at the national level then filtered 
down to the sectoral policy and local im-
plementation levels (box 3.1). This case 
illustrates the point that political violence 
is not always “development in reverse.” 
2. The nascent, unstable, competitive, and 
clientelistic form of political settlement 
at the central level contributed to the for-
mation of contested and politicized local 
structures for service delivery. The fluidity 
and uncertainty at the center, most evi-
dent in the postwar transitional period, 
translated into a lack of clear rules and 
power sharing at the local level. During 
the Maoist insurgency and during the 
postwar period, informal arrangements 
and bargains between contending politi-
cal elites tended to dominate attempts at 
reintroducing local government institu-
tions, as local-level transitional authority 
was “up for grabs” (Byrne and Shrestha 
2014). These local political elite bargains 
were shaped, to a large degree, by the na-
ture of central political party competition, 
which lead to patronage-ridden yet more 
inclusive SSD at the sector and local levels 
in basic health care and in the roads sector. 
Three important points emerge from the 
Nepal cases: 
1. The politicization of local service delivery 
is the norm—not an aberration or dys-
function, as is commonly suggested in dis-
courses about good governance. It serves 
the function of “making things work” in 
the absence of unclear rules and contested 
sites of local authority. 
2. The front line of delivery in the health 
and roads sectors continues to experience 
progress in this highly political environ-
ment, suggesting that politicization is 
not the problem per se. Instead, the form 
of politicization seems to matter. Progress 
varies depending on the local nature of 
politics, including the nature of elites and 
the bargaining between them.
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Box 3.1. nepal’s shift toward inclusion shapes social service delivery
An increasingly inclusive form of political settlement emerged during and after the Maoist insurgency. The war 
and political violence appear to have influenced the motivations of decision makers within the ruling coalition to 
address inequalities in the polity. This shift created space and mechanisms at the national and local levels for more 
inclusive service delivery. In this instance, political violence—although it created many negative impacts—cannot 
be characterized as simply “development in reverse.”
The forging of this new, fluid, and unstable political settlement was punctuated by measures and agreements rein-
forcing inclusiveness. A series of agreements culminated in declarations in the Comprehensive Peace Accord from 
both sides of their “determination for a progressive restructuring of the state to resolve existing problems in the 
country, based on class, caste, region, and sex”a and in the 2007 interim constitution, which recognizes women, 
Dalits, Janajatis, and Madhesis—in addition to peasants and laborers—as groups that require special attention.b
These shifts filtered down into various measures. In 1991, the health ministry introduced the National Health 
Policy, which focused on outreach to vulnerable groups, women, children, rural populations, the poor, and the 
marginalized.c There were impacts to local operational mechanisms for public goods delivery that were focused on 
increasing the involvement of local bodies and communities in the planning, implementation, and management of 
local-level development activities, such as the 1999 Local Self-Governance Act.d
The shift at the center did not solve all of the country’s issues around inclusion but did translate into more inclusive 
service delivery structures, which then impacted service delivery. A short survey of groups typically excluded from 
health services, conducted for this study, points to a longer-term shift on the ground (World Bank and SSB 2016):
•	 Seventy-five percent of respondents reported using services provided by the local health-care post and/or pri-
mary health-care center;
•	 Ninety-four percent said they used government facilities more often than they had 10 years back;
•	 Fifty-six percent felt health services had improved; and
•	 Fifty-five percent of Dalit respondents felt that the behavior of the health personnel had changed for the better.e
a. Unofficial translation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist), November 21, 2006 (www.unmin.org.np).
b. See Article 11(3) of the 1990 constitution and 13(3) of the 2007 interim constitution.
c. The National Health Policy extended the modern health-care system to the rural population by making the sector more decentralized and 
regionalized (MoHP 1991). Successive government health plans and policies that focused on outreach to vulnerable groups, the poor, and the 
marginalized included the Second Long Term Health Plan (1997–2017), Health Sector Strategy: An Agenda for Reform (2003), the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan (2002–07) and the Three-Year Interim Plan (2007/08–2009/10).
d. Other local operational mechanisms included increased emphasis on bringing the poor and marginalized groups into the development 
mainstream as well as various measures adopted by the government to support more inclusive government, most notably by reserving 45 
percent of all government jobs for excluded groups.
e. Almost half felt that this was due to education, growing awareness, and the fact that it is now illegal to discriminate on the basis of caste.
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3. Political party competition driven by 
patronage and collusion can increase in-
clusion, upward mobility, and local own-
ership. In the absence of local elections, 
political parties ensure that the smaller 
political parties receive at least some rec-
ognition; they also provide a forum for 
dialogue, which smooths project imple-
mentation. The chairperson of a local road 
user committee justified the dominance of 
political parties in the formation of user 
committees by noting that including rep-
resentatives from all locally active parties 
ensures that people take ownership of a 
project. Moreover, in the case of the Rural 
Access Improvement and Decentralization 
Project, a local road user committee is re-
quired to include at least one woman and 
one member of a disadvantaged group, al-
though the effort is subordinated to politi-
cal party logic and affiliation. In the words 
of one informant: “People from the in-
digenous community are hand-picked by 
political parties to fulfil the quota needs 
of people and not for actual representa-
tion. Political interest takes precedence 
over true representation” (G15–KII–BAR). 
Nevertheless, many see the quotas as a 
route, albeit contested and imperfect, to-
ward increased inclusion, and political 
parties serve as a vehicle for the recogni-
tion of previously excluded demands. 
3.2. sectoral settlements 
Elite balance-of-power and rent-sharing 
agreements, like national settlements, affect 
SSD in various sectors. Two aspects of these 
settlements—how elite rent-sharing influ-
ences SSD and how different sectors present 
different forms of and opportunities for elite 
bargaining—are examined here.
Rents 
Patterns of rent-seeking among political and 
bureaucratic elites shape the allocation of ser-
vices across the studied cases in Pakistan. For 
example, networks of patronage are embed-
ded in the polio vaccine delivery chain. Evi-
dence points to instances of corruption, ghost 
teams, and claims of immunizations where 
none occurred. One senior donor official ex-
presses the challenge posed by corruption and 
rent-seeking behaviors by noting that money 
meant for polio eradication lines the pockets 
of some officials who dispense jobs as favors, 
turning over vaccination posts to their broth-
ers or cousins, who pass them on to their 
children. The official concedes that his or-
ganization is helpless in these circumstances. 
Regarding the negative aspects of the Polio 
Eradication Project, he remarks, “We created 
a monster.” He acknowledges that there are 
instances of ghost campaigns, where money 
is spent but no actual work takes place. He 
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Box 3.2. political settlements in Afghanistan’s education and health sectors
The elite balance of power, interests, and incentives in Afghanistan’s education sector, combined with blurred po-
litical and bureaucratic boundaries, influences the selection of school locations, the number of schools built in each 
province or district, and the hiring of staff. Key findings include the following.
Vote bank. Even though the Ministry of Education is the “largest single civilian employer in the country,” it is 
sometimes treated as a “vote bank.” As one informant expresses it:
“Education in particular . . . is very interesting, as it is one of the largest employers in the country. For instance, 
in election campaigns, it is an extremely useful ministry to have. If you want, you can instruct all teachers to 
campaign for certain candidates; you can instruct them to tell students to tell their parents . . .” (KL: KII–44)
Recruitment. Although the Ministry of Education in general and the Education Quality Improvement Project 
(EQUIP) in particular are supposed to abide by certain criteria in terms of recruitment, cases of nepotistic recruit-
ments are reported (KL: KII–37 and 43). Another national program implementer admits that while hiring people 
without adequate qualifications compromises the quality of education service delivery, it is nonetheless necessary 
(KL: KII–37).
Patronage pyramids. The existence of patronage pyramids is alleged, where each bureaucratic layer sells positions 
to the layer below, and the bottom layer regularly demands payments from the beneficiaries (teachers, students, and 
even parents). According to an international researcher:
“Everything is the same everywhere; if you want the job of provincial director of education, you’ll have to 
pay someone, that’s for sure. You will not get the job without paying . . . How do they get reimbursed? Well, 
they will make sure that all the people who work for them collect money for them. Through this, they get 
reimbursed for the investment that they made to get the position of provincial director [of education]. How 
do these people get money [referring to those below the level of the provincial director]? From the students, 
from the parents, from the teachers . . .” (KL: KII–45)
Diversion to certain areas. Local political elites such as Members of Parliament (MPs) and power brokers play a 
role in shaping how education services are distributed. One national program implementer, referring to some MPs, 
remarked, “They have facilitated [the delivery of education services] in the sense that there are now more education 
service deliveries in their respective areas. They did not equally distribute the education services; more are found in 
their areas” (KL: KII–37; also, KL: KII–34 to 37). The leverage of politicians and local power brokers is enhanced 
by the fact that, historically, the Afghan government had difficulties with communities not previously exposed to 
state education (Giustozzi 2010). 
(continued)
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believes this is why some are skeptical of the 
polio eradication effort and do not trust the 
polio teams (see Roberts 2012). 
A number of notable rent-sharing arrange-
ments and patterns were also identified in 
Afghanistan’s education and health sectors; 
these affect if, how, and where services are 
delivered (box 3.2).
In Nepal, sectoral settlements, revolving 
around rent-sharing, shape progress in the 
health sector. Observers point to the politi-
cization of health appointments, where elites 
seek to expand their political base by influ-
encing the hiring of staff and the appoint-
ment of key officials (Asia Foundation 2012: 
23; Harris et al. 2013; Sharma 2010). This has 
led to a lack of integrated planning, where 
the “failure to devolve sufficient authority, ex-
acerbated by local collusion to benefit private 
interests, has prevented the development of 
participatory and integrated planning in the 
health sector” (Asia Foundation 2012: 24). 
The growing number of strikes and scandals 
emerging from prominent hospitals suggests 
that the public administration, including the 
health sector, has been embroiled in a proxy 
war between the three main parties contend-
ing for power (Sharma 2010). 
Bargains differ by sector 
Interestingly, sectoral characteristics and sec-
tor-specific modes of delivery seem to affect 
the form of and opportunities for rent-shar-
ing and patronage (KL: KII–44). In Afghan-
istan, there are different and fewer forms of 
Box 3.2. Continued
Creating rent opportunities. Interviews with key study participants suggest that the emphasis on school con-
struction is driven, at least in part, by the need to maintain and expand patronage networks: construction projects 
provide greater opportunities for rents than soft investments (KL: KII–45 and 50). EQUIP I’s implementation 
review hints at this, but does not allude to the political drivers: it notes that infrastructure grants are an area where 
“financial overcommitments” were made (World Bank 2009: 4).
Patronage politics. Similarly, the health sector is not immune to the impact of patronage politics. Actors well con-
nected to the ruling elite manipulate the allocation of resources to favor their power bases, resulting in the unequal 
distribution of health resources between provinces and districts because better-connected politicians and power 
brokers can lobby more effectively (KL: KII–53; KL: KII–47). One study participant puts it this way:
“If you go to some provinces, you will see two clinics in one village, but another village does not have one. 
In [so-and-so’s, naming a particular Member of Parliament] district, there are many clinics, but in the other 
districts of the same province, which do not have a good connection with a powerholder, there is not a single 
clinic.” (KL: KII–53)
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elite bargaining and patronage in the health 
sector compared with the education sector, in 
part because the latter provides more oppor-
tunities for rents in the form of construction 
projects and employment. Further, extracting 
rents from the education sector is deemed to 
be more straightforward because education is 
largely delivered through state mechanisms, 
as opposed to basic health-care delivery, 
which is contracted to NGOs, making it more 
difficult to directly divert resources without 
co-opting staff. 
In Nepal, elite interests in the health sector 
varied at the subsectoral level (in preventative 
versus curative health); this in turn had varied 
impacts on the progress of delivery. Sectoral 
political settlements in the health sector, linked 
to wider political party patronage, help explain 
why progress in basic preventive health care 
in Nepal was more advanced than in curative/
diagnostic care. This is because basic preven-
tive health care relied on locally embedded 
female volunteer workers who were dedicated 
to their jobs and were not appointed because 
they had political connections. Indeed, they 
operated outside the clientelist party structures. 
Conversely, curative health care depended on 
skilled physicians and nurses who were often 
able to avoid being posted in remote rural 
areas (generally considered undesirable) be-
cause they were part of unions closely allied 
to political parties. One of the main sources of 
political party power was the ability to broker 
deals for members of powerful unions (includ-
ing those for skilled health workers).
Box 3.3. Relationships between elites shapes delivery of polio services
Delivering polio eradication services is more challenging in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) than 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, partly due to the different relationships each region has with the central state. FATA has 
long had a tenuous relationship with the state, and following a 2002 military intervention, its governance structures 
were dissolved. A series of central government military operations to destroy local militia and insurgent groups were 
only partially successful. This in turn has further isolated the region from the rest of Pakistan.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s links to the central government are comparatively stronger. The public participates in the 
local, provincial, and central legislature through elections. There is state patronage, particularly in the roads and 
electricity sectors, whereas it is virtually nonexistent in FATA. Interviewees suggest that the delivery structures are 
more contested and complex in FATA because of these differences, which makes it much more challenging to strike 
or to maintain service delivery bargains.
Another difference between the two regions is in the forms of violence and objectives of violent actors (see chapter 4).
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3.3. Central and  
subnational elites 
The nature of the relationship between rul-
ing elites at the national level and subnational 
elites at the provincial, district, and village 
level shapes opportunities for accessing SSD 
resources and support. It impacts the degree of 
state penetration and control over insurgents, 
the flow of resources to a locality, and the au-
tonomy and control of subnational elites over 
service delivery policy and implementation. 
National service delivery programs impact 
regions differently depending on these rela-
tionships, which helps explain why delivering 
services is more difficult in the Federally Ad-
ministered Tribal Areas (FATA) than in Khy-
ber Pakhtunkhwa (see box 3.3). 
The case of Afghanistan demonstrates the 
importance of this relationship to service de-
livery. As box 3.4 illustrates, the relationship 
influences the flow of resources and opportu-
nities for SSD and therefore affects progress 
Box 3.4. Central-subnational linkages and service delivery in Afghanistan
diverse networks
The diversity among the linkages and relationships between provincial elites and those in Kabul is significant. Each 
province has a unique set of formal and informal relationships with the central government, which appears to sig-
nificantly impact social service delivery.
Balkh. This province is characterized by a stable provincial settlement centered on a charismatic and resourceful 
strongman: Provincial Governor General Atta Mohammed Noor. The general has established an influential power 
base and positive linkages with the capital, giving the province more privileged access to Kabul-based ministers and 
senior civil servants.
Wardak. Some Wardak elites have obtained prestigious appointments in Kabul, and the main provincial-level 
networks have been nationally integrated, at least to a degree. The networks operate as quasi-political parties, and 
they are relatively well organized. They run the province through their local associates who control the machinery 
of government at the provincial and district levels.
Badghis. Widely seen as strategically unimportant, Badghis is economically underdeveloped and subject to 
fluid secondary political settlements because of the unstable relationships between its various strongmen. As a result, 
the province is unable to effectively lobby Kabul or form strong alliances with actors who are part of the primary 
elite bargain.
(continued)
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Box 3.4. Continued
impact on service delivery
A background country report (World Bank and AREU 2016) illustrates how the relationship between the subna-
tional and central actors in each of the three provinces shapes the quality and quantity of its social services. The 
weak relationship between the provincial settlement in Badghis and the primary (central) one, in addition to its 
under representation in Kabul, negatively affects its opportunities for social service delivery. Badghis is not consid-
ered strategic by the Kabul-based elite. In the words of one key informant:
“If you look at it, it is far from Kabul, and unlike Herat and Faryab, it is not in a position to create problems for those 
in the center. So yes, it is left out. Also, it is not significant in terms of border relations, and there are no connecting 
roads leading to Kabul ... It is not that politically significant.” (KL: KII–49)
Another informant noted that the lack of powerful provincial warlords left them at a disadvantage: “If we had those 
kinds of powerful warlords, then the central government would have feared them and our province would have 
received attention” (BS: IDI–33).
Interviewees noted that Kabul’s perceived lack of interest in Badghis is one explanation for the poor level of ser-
vices in the province, including a higher student-teacher ratio and a shortage of school buildings compared with 
Wardak. The reported sense of neglect spills into the health sector as well, with some interviewees noting a lack of 
qualified personnel, insufficient supplies, and poor quality of medicine (BS: IDI–31). Balkh, however, has managed 
to secure a more significant share of resources and linkages with Kabul, compared to Badghis.
Wardak also suffers from a lack of local resources, but because it is closer to Kabul, the province enjoys privileged 
access to higher education and career opportunities in the capital and elsewhere.
across health and education. Indeed, the extent 
to which provincial power brokers can draw 
on the resources and political commitment of 
central state resources and cooperation seems 
to depend on the history of subnational elite 
linkages to the center, the coherence and sta-
bility of the provincial-level political settle-
ment, and the extent to which the province’s 
economic resources affect the political calcu-
lations of national coalition leaders.
In the post-2006 period, the different types 
of relationships between Kathmandu-based 
elites and the hill region compared with the 
Tarai shaped the ability of each district to bro-
ker service delivery deals. The research points 
to more embedded linkages between political 
elites in the hill region and the public admin-
istration (box 3.5). The Maoist political party 
is more dominant in the hill region, and the 
social background of the Maoist leadership 
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Box 3.5. subnational settlements in nepal help explain ssd outcomes
Our research suggests that a combination of organizational and programmatic factors explain why in the postcon-
flict period in Nepal, the health and roads sectors in the Tarai performed more poorly than those in the hill and 
mountain regions. The Maoist hill and mountain areas are very different than the Tarai in terms of the nature of 
their subnational political settlements, political organizations, and agendas of political party elites (see map 2.3 for 
ecological zones).
hill and mountain regions
The postconflict settlement in the hill and mountain regions is relatively stable, and organized around the program-
matic party of the Maoists, who are electorally dominant there. The party’s appeal is its programmatic push for 
socioeconomic change and pro-poor social service delivery and its capacity to deliver local results better than most 
political parties can (Bevan 2010). This makes it easier to deliver services and to organize bargains around service 
delivery.
the tarai a
Compared with the hill and mountain regions, the postconflict settlement in the Tarai is unstable and contested; it is 
characterized by highly disorganized and mobile roving armed groups (often with criminal motives); and there is limited 
state penetration in many parts of the region. Groups that emerged as a result of the Madhesi movement in 2007 included 
political parties linked to criminal gangs engaged in cross-border crime and extortion. This predatory behavior flourished 
in the region due to a weak state presence, and there was a higher incidence of criminal activity. Post-2007, the dominant 
motivations of the political leadership in the Tarai have centered on greater political representation of Madhesi leaders in 
Kathmandu rather than on forging a social service delivery agenda. Weaker links and less political influence in government 
has made brokering deals with central government ministries more difficult, resulting in the targeting of service delivery 
for appropriation and much riskier and more challenging service delivery.
a. Historically, the Tarai has experienced far less state extension and a far higher incidence of criminality as local groups have taken advantage 
of the state’s absence to engage in criminal enterprises and appropriate valuable assets such as land. The absence of state penetration was a 
central condition to the rise of mafia-like organizations elsewhere (Gambetta 1993). The political landscape in the Tarai is therefore much 
more predatory and less oriented toward programmatic political projects that advance social welfare than in the hill and mountain regions, 
which may account for the fact that political instability and uncertainty is also greater in the Tarai.
is similar to those that dominate the public 
administration, which ostensibly facilitates a 
more functional working relationship with 
the state and more stable local-level politi-
cal bargaining. Landlords and political lead-
ers in the Tarai have less influence with the 
government bureaucracy and the political sys-
tem than the elites in the hill region. Weaker 
links and less political influence with the gov-
ernment appear to make coordinating and 
brokering deals with government ministries 
more tenuous (KII–03–NEP–GEN).20 
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3.4. subnational (secondary) 
settlement 
The fourth, and perhaps most important, di-
mension is the subnational settlement. The 
research uncovered various types of settle-
ments—and forms of violence—at the sub-
national level, each with its own impacts on 
the prospects for services and the ability to 
forge pro-SSD bargains. Key factors include 
the level of stability and contestation in the 
subnational settlement; the degree to which 
a developmental orientation cascades through 
the settlement, including the ideas and incen-
tives among elites regarding development 
and service delivery; and the local balance of 
power between traditional, local elites, and 
armed elites and their allied insurgents. 
stability, inclusiveness, and 
development orientation 
The extent to which a subnational settlement 
is stable or contested, inclusive or exclusion-
ary, and in turn has some elements of a de-
velopmental orientation, impacts its ability to 
deliver services. 
In Afghanistan, subnational settlements dif-
fer widely across the three provinces in terms 
of their stability and fragmentation, and this 
shapes service delivery. In Badghis, for exam-
ple, the local power brokers have not man-
aged to form a stable or inclusive provincial 
settlement, instead remaining roving bandits. 
Forms of violence are more fragmented and 
predatory in Badghis (see chapter 4), which 
partly explains their difficulty in delivering 
services.
The settlement in Balkh is quite different. It 
has been generally conducive to relatively 
smooth implementation of SSD. Balkh’s re-
cent history is dominated by General Atta 
Mohammed Noor, who has successfully cen-
tralized much of the power and largely disci-
plined other armed groups since about 2004. 
In Nepal, differences in the subnational po-
litical settlement and forms of political orga-
nization help explain disparate progress in 
the health and roads sector in the hill region 
versus the Tarai. This case illustrates that who 
is in power and what their agenda is—at the 
subnational level—reveals a great deal about 
the politics of local-level SSD (see box 3.5). 
power and incentives of local 
“nonarmed” elites 
At lower levels of the polity, the nature of in-
centives for localized elites and the balance 
of power between traditional local elites and 
armed elites and allied insurgents are crucial 
to shaping front-line delivery. The points 
briefly outlined here are further explored in 
chapter 4.
The first case relates to the nature and incen-
tives of traditional local elites in Balochistan, 
Pakistan, with regard to education delivery. 
The Balochistan Education Support Project 
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(BESP) model focused on local, smaller-scale, 
and “community-run” schooling models. As 
noted previously, BESP made significant 
progress in the delivery of education services 
despite the violent context and clientelistic 
politics where the hiring of “ghost teachers” 
and the tolerance of teacher absenteeism by 
higher-level central and provincial elites (es-
pecially those linked with the Ministry of 
Education) was commonplace. Progress was 
possible, at least in part, because the local 
village elites were in favor of education ser-
vice delivery free from clientelist politics and 
enjoyed robust local autonomy from provin-
cial and central elites in terms of service de-
livery decisions. While Baloch and Pashtun 
villages are organized differently from one 
another, they tend to be close-knit and are 
frequently composed of members of the same 
tribe or close relatives. All villages have an 
elder—often whoever has the most land, is 
the oldest, and/or is the most experienced in 
local decision-making councils. These elites 
typically aspire to educate their children, but 
they cannot afford to send their children to 
school outside Balochistan, unlike many of 
the higher-level provincial elite—known as 
nawabs or sardars.21 Because these elites had a 
stake in local education they often supported 
the BESP and encouraged bargains with Ba-
loch militants to ensure that schools remained 
open (see chapter 4).
The case of Wardak, Afghanistan, simi-
larly demonstrates the importance of local 
nonarmed elites and their relative power to 
“discipline” armed elites and allied insurgents 
with regard to driving progress in health 
service delivery. Local elders and traditional 
leaders play an important role in service de-
livery within the province. As one interviewee 
puts it: “The traditional leaders are more in-
fluential in the province than those elites who 
are at the national level, because the latter do 
not have large families in Wardak” (KL: KII–
49; WK: IDI–17). These elites are sufficiently 
cohesive and aware of the potential benefits 
of lobbying provincial elites and keeping 
them on track to deliver services. Interview-
ees describe the interactions among these 
elites as generally good, with a fair degree 
of coordination to agree on basic operating 
guidelines to deliver services (WK: KII–09 
and 13; WK: FGD–18 and 23; WK: KII–01, 
03, and 07).22 In this sense, secondary settle-
ments demonstrate a level of resilience. One 
interviewee notes:
“Their interaction and relationship are 
very good, because they have mutual 
and shared benefits. As in the case of 
any construction project, they benefit 
from it in terms of giving a contract 
to construction companies, and then 
their relatives are hired to work on 
the project. If they face problems, they 
solve them as soon as possible.” (WK: 
KII–07)
The coordination of the local elites over ser-
vice delivery positively impacted health de-
livery. Their interests, ideas, and incentives 
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support local health service delivery, so they 
have sought to enable it. And because they 
are relatively influential and organized, they 
can often counterbalance and bargain with 
insurgents to ensure that services are deliv-
ered (see chapter 4).
The increased power of armed elites and al-
lied insurgents relative to traditional local 
elites in FATA, on the other hand, resulted in 
service delivery problems. The breakdown of 
the links between the central and provincial 
government in the post-2005 period created 
a power vacuum, which was filled by several 
armed groups. This impacted the prospects 
for SSD because traditionally, local elites—
maliks—are instrumental in implementing 
development activities. Implementing infra-
structure construction projects, delivering 
aid, and facilitating the movement of goods 
were conducted largely with the involvement 
of local elites. While the maliks were known 
to extract bribes from contractors tasked 
with infrastructure projects, such as road 
construction or the establishment of schools 
and health centers, they also provided a focal 
point for local elite bargaining that at least 
provided predictable and relatively safe access 
for SSD workers. As the power and author-
ity of local elites declined compared with 
that of the armed elites and allied insurgents, 
the prospects for striking elite bargains that 
would allow access to health workers became 
much more tenuous.23
In summary, various dimensions of polit-
ical settlements at different levels of the 
polity shape the space, opportunities, and 
constraints for delivering services. The exam-
ination of these dimensions provides a bet-
ter understanding of how the space for more 
or less progressive SSD is created, and what 
the prospects are for making local bargains. 
Understanding the nature of the settlement 
alone, however, does not adequately explain 
how and why services are delivered in vio-
lence-affected contexts. There is a need to dig 
deeper to get a fuller picture of how progress 
is made and why there is variation within and 
between violent contexts. These issues are ex-
plored in the following chapters.
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This chapter explores how various forms of 
violence may affect service delivery. As out-
lined in chapter 1, the research finds that 
elites take up arms for multiple reasons in 
varying contexts, as discussed in detail below.
4.1. organization of Violence 
The prospects for delivering social services 
partly depend on the ability of the govern-
ment and armed and other elites to make 
political bargains that enable—or at least do 
not disrupt—on-the-ground delivery. A key 
determinant for whether some form of bar-
gaining is feasible is the extent to which the 
insurgency is organized and uniform, and the 
leaders recognizable and incentivized to offer 
points for negotiation and bargaining.
For example, the organization of violence 
helps explain variations across provinces 
in Afghanistan (see box 4.1). For example, 
Balkh’s more organized and disciplined form 
of violence and more stable political settle-
ment enabled easier implementation of social 
service delivery (SSD) than the more frag-
mented—but still relatively organized—vio-
lence in Wardak, and the highly fragmented 
and contested form of politics and violence 
in Badghis. (See chapter 3 for a more in-
depth discussion of the political settlements 
in Afghanistan.) 
Another example is the case of Nepal. Prog-
ress in SSD in the health and roads sectors was 
possible during the conflict partly due to three 
organizational elements: (1) leaders were 
recognizable, focal points for bargaining; 
4.  the form of Violence and the  
ideology behind it matter 
“Many of the interviewees [working on service delivery in Afghanistan] did not see violence 
as a problem in itself for the delivery of services so long as it was possible to identify the 
key players and negotiate access to the services. It became much more difficult when local 
strongmen competed against each other or ‘criminal gangs’ were involved without any clear 
incentive to ensuring services were sustained ….” (World Bank and AREU 2016)
“The national … data suggests that [the] Maoist rebellion [in Nepal] has not had the 
devastating effects on the health and well-being of the population as we can see resulting 
from similar types of violent conflict across the globe.” (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2015)
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(2) Maoist leaders were disciplined in their 
policies, and so agreements were predict-
able and upheld; and (3) the ideology of the 
Maoists meant that health delivery aligned, 
to some degree, with their goals. The back-
ground country report explains:
“The Maoists represented a dominant, 
disciplined organized armed insur-
gency, and one that organized around 
an ostensibly political program of pro-
poor service delivery. Our interview 
evidence suggests that the Maoists 
were organized armed insurgents with 
a ‘pro-poor’ agenda and while they 
were engaging in threats, kidnapping, 
displacement of government officials, 
destruction of infrastructure for po-
litical motives (G3–KII–SRH), their 
leaders were recognizable and some-
how disciplined around certain policies 
(G9–KII–SRH) and therefore a focal 
point for organized political bargain-
ing.” (World Bank and SSB 2016).
Chapter 5 explores the bargains that were 
struck with the Maoists that enabled the con-
tinuance of service delivery in those areas 
under their influence. 
The importance of the organization of armed 
groups is further underlined when one tries 
to understand the challenges for SSD in the 
Tarai region of Nepal. During the post-2006 
period, there was more progress in service de-
livery in the hill region of Nepal than in the 
Tarai, partly because politics took a more pro-
grammatic form in the hills. Indeed, the frag-
mented, competitive, and criminalized forms 
of violence in the Tarai made it extremely dif-
ficult to deliver services, protect service pro-
viders from violence and appropriation, and 
negotiate and uphold elite bargains. A former 
World Bank staff member explains:
“The project in Tarai suffered the pres-
sure/threats from various armed groups 
making it difficult to continue working, 
whereas, in the Hill districts a condu-
cive environment was created for proj-
ect implementation.” (R6–KII–KTH) 
A former district development committee 
member in Siraha also noted that “[p]eople of 
[the] Hill Region, businessmen, were threat-
ened by these armed groups [in the Tarai] 
without any political motives, but only for 
financial gain” (G3–KII–SRH ).
Similarly, in Pakistan, the differences in the 
organization of violent actors helps explain 
why bargains are more difficult to strike in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
than in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The 
background country report suggests that the 
more fragmented, contested, and radicalized 
forms of violence in FATA contribute to more 
difficult and dangerous service delivery. 
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Box 4.1. organization of violence in Badghis and Wardak
Badghis province
Delivering services in Badghis Province, Afghanistan, is particularly challenging, mainly due to the disjointed and 
unstable nature of the political settlement (see chapter 3) and the fragmented, divided, and contested forms of vio-
lence, which makes it extremely difficult to identify leaders with whom to bargain, predict the behaviors of violent 
actors, and reach bargains that enable the service delivery.
Violent conflict in Badghis is characterized by regular armed clashes between insurgents and government forces and 
periodic conflicts between rival warlords. The dominant form of violence is therefore characterized within our ty-
pology as highly disorganized and fragmented, with roving (and sometimes competing) armed groups. Dominating 
Badghis is an expensive enterprise that brings few rewards. Unlike Wardak, Badghis has a history of numerous in-
fluential warlords trying to assert control over it, both before and after the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 
Abdul Malik, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Ismail Khan each had influence over the province at different times, but 
none could assert full control (see Giustozzi 2009). This form of violence in Badghis affects service delivery in a 
number of ways, as outlined below.
Weak incentives and coordination. Many informants note that the competitive and fragmented scenario results 
in poor coordination between power holders and weak incentives for social service delivery, with a focus on pred-
atory behavior. As one informant puts it:
“There is no doubt that the biggest suffering of Badghis comes from these unauthorized armed groups; they will 
be a big problem in the future. You know that a wrong policy was previously welcomed—to support militias. But 
this was happily decided by the central government to prevent a build-up of militia groups, since their existence can 
be a very big threat. But look at Ab Kamari, for example. It used to be the district of peace; now … unauthorized 
armed groups create problems that the Taliban doesn’t.” (BS: IDI–32)
Another informant expresses it this way:
“… We can see the security situation and some conflicts inside the center or in the districts of Badghis. This 
is a sign of powerholders not having good relationships. However, they portray themselves as honest and 
friends with each other to show the community that they are not against each other and that they are just 
working for the province. They are not honest; they are not supporting each other. Everyone looks out for 
his own position and power. If they show themselves to be allies, it is just to keep their own positions. We 
all know that they are against each other and that they are in different political parties … When there are 
contracts for some projects or other sources of money that they can benefit from, they compete to gain a 
greater share than the others …” (BS: IDI–23)
(continued)
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Box 4.1. Continued
Challenges to bargaining. Many interviewees do not think violence is itself an obstacle to service delivery as 
long as it is possible to identify key players with whom to negotiate access. The situation is much more difficult 
when local strongmen compete against each other or when there is criminal gang activity and an absence of clear 
incentives for ensuring that services are sustained over the long term, which is largely the case in Badghis.
Unstable climate. Many leaders and service providers complain that they cannot understand or predict the behav-
ior of the strongmen and warlords, and this creates an uncertain and unstable climate. One interviewee exemplifies 
this point by saying: “I don’t understand how they interact with each other. They are sometimes at war with each 
other and sometimes at peace” (BS: IDI–22). Another notes:
“They [Badghis warlords and strongmen] have their own agreements with each other in terms of what to do. 
Sometimes, they fight with each other … sometimes, they make deals, especially during the pistachio har-
vest … It is good that they come to an agreement on how to share it, so then there is no argument between 
them.” (BS: KII–15)
In this context, even when bargains were struck (see chapter 5), they were particularly difficult to forge and keep. 
Many local actors hoped for the arrival of a strong leader who could serve as a catalyst for the formation of a more 
stable provincial settlement. Some, including elders and activists, suggested that the emergence of a strong warlord 
such as General Atta Mohammed Noor in Balkh could be the best possible outcome for Badghis.
Wardak province
Wardak, like Badghis, is often characterized as insecure and violent. Still, many interviewees perceive Wardak as 
a place where it is easier to deliver services than it is in Badghis, and its outcomes also tend to be notably better, 
particularly until 2008. Why is that? Insights from the research include the following:
•	 Violence is, to a degree, more organized and less mobile (compared to Baghdis). In the absence of 
a strong leader to act as a catalyst for collective action, provincial elites did not develop a strong vision of 
the future or become more organized and centralized in their monopoly over violence, as they did in Balkh. 
Nevertheless, the more organized form of violence in Wardak enables bargaining, as the local elite is relatively 
strong (see chapter 3) and supports health and education, and the Taliban are relatively reliant on local support, 
which contributed to cases of forging bargains around social service delivery between service providers and 
insurgents (see chapter 5).
•	 The provincial settlement in Wardak requires less rapacious behavior from the provincial elites and is 
more cohesive. The main power broker is linked to anti-Taliban factions, which later incorporated Hezb-e Islami 
networks. The strong Hezb-e Islami and Hizb-i Wahdat networks in the Pashtun and Hazara areas, respectively, 
may have helped bring service delivery to these constituencies, but there is a lack of conclusive evidence.
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4.2. ideologies, incentives, and 
motivations behind Violence 
The second key dimension of violence in-
volves the ideologies, incentives, and motiva-
tions behind it. The aspects of this dimension 
are manifest in various ways across the study 
sites, and the differences between them had 
some surprising and disparate impacts on SSD. 
ideology of Violence and  
service delivery 
The degree of alignment between the objec-
tives and ideology of armed elites (whether 
leaders of armed insurgencies or established 
warlords) and the logic and scope of the ser-
vice strongly impacted whether the service 
was tolerated or became the target of political 
violence. This is illustrated by several exam-
ples in the case material. 
For instance, ideology’s crucial role is starkly 
illustrated in the comparison between polio 
eradication and education delivery in Paki-
stan. Insurgents have engaged in violent at-
tacks over polio eradication delivery in KP 
and FATA, while insurgents in Balochistan 
have, at times, tolerated and even supported 
education delivery. Differences in the history 
of, motivations for, and organization of vi-
olence appear to play a contributing role in 
explaining the disparity (box 4.2).
The case of health delivery in Nepal also il-
lustrates the importance of the motivations of 
armed elites and allied insurgents. Prospects 
of bargaining with health workers were en-
hanced because attempts to deliver health “to 
all” aligned with aspects of the Maoist agenda 
focused on expanding equality and inclusion 
(see chapter 5). Sociologist Chaitanya Mishra 
sums it up this way:
“Most analysts … have concurred that 
poverty, illiteracy and low level of ed-
ucational attainment, unemployment 
and underemployment, inter-house-
hold economic inequality—primarily 
in terms of landownership and in-
come—and caste, ethnic, regional/
spatial and gender oppression and in-
equality are the primary referents of 
the Maoist struggle.” (World Bank and 
SSB 2016)
This case also demonstrates that motivations 
for violence are not static. For example, the 
Maoists consciously changed their strategy 
around the building of roads. At the start of 
the insurgency, the Maoists were opposed to 
any kind of government-sponsored develop-
ment activity because part of their strategy 
was to discredit the state. But by the early 
2000s, the Maoists had changed tactics. An 
assessment from 2002 concludes: 
“The Maoists have recently recognized 
the adverse propaganda effect of their 
earlier attacks on rural infrastructure 
and installations that could be regarded 
as primarily for development purposes, 
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Box 4.2. ideology matters? education in Balochistan versus polio eradication in kp and fAtA
A comparative analysis of education in Balochistan and polio eradication in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) stresses the role of ideology, as well as other dimensions of violence, to 
explain the disparate social service delivery risks and performance.
Balochistan and education. Armed elites and allied insurgents sometimes did not overtly oppose the Balochistan 
Education Support Project (BESP). In fact, on various occasions, insurgents let the project take its course without 
any direct interference or threat, which helps to explain why BESP registered progress (see chapter 2). As one in-
dividual from Turbat explains:
“Extra judicial killing, abduction, and the like are observable everywhere but as far as this school and educa-
tional activities are concerned, Sarmachar [a local term for Baloch militants] never interrupted our activities. 
Rather, they encouraged us to get education.” (FGD–01)
Much depended on the case, but why could this be?
•	 Ideology. There was some degree of alignment between the goal of delivering education and the goals of the 
Baloch insurgency. First, some Baloch armed elites and allied insurgents viewed education as a means to achiev-
ing their goals. They viewed a lack of education as an obstacle for the province and therefore believed some 
forms of education could promote local empowerment. Second, certain militants relied, in part, on local support, 
which incentivized them to support services that the local communities wanted. Finally, locally influential na-
tionalist elites viewed education as a means to pursue their nationalist objectives.a
•	 Organization of violence. In addition, the Baloch insurgency is relatively well organized and disciplined at 
the local level, making it easier to identify leaders with whom to bargain and negotiate to ensure that social 
service delivery was protected.
•	 Bargains and compromises. Baloch armed elites and allied insurgents were further incentivized to support 
local education by modifying and co-opting the education services (see chapter 5); moreover it was a nonstate, 
as opposed to a state-led, project.
polio eradication in fAtA
In contrast to the example of education in Balochistan, the history of the Polio Eradication Project (PEP) in FATA 
is more rife with violent attacks, with some vaccination workers being abducted or killed. In both regions, the in-
surgency is resisting the state, but has different motivations. In Balochistan the insurgency is driven by nationalist 
sentiment; in FATA it is linked to global Jihadi networks keen on imposing their vision of Sharia law on the state. 
The FATA insurgency has been increasingly radicalized and its relations with the state further antagonized by re-
peated drone attacks. Moreover, attacks against PEP workers increased after it came to light that the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency had used a vaccination drive in Abbotabad to gather intelligence against Osama Bin Laden. 
Resistance to polio became a proxy for resistance to the state as well as a bargaining tool.
(continued)
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and have promised to leave them alone 
from now on.” (Seddon and Hussein 
2002)
Practitioners would do well to regularly visit 
the field to track changes in these kinds of 
perceptions and local tactics (see chapter 8).
Another example emerges from Afghanistan, 
where the evolving Taliban ideology around 
education impacts whether or not it is vio-
lently targeted as well as the types of edu-
cation that will be tolerated. The Taliban is 
a diverse group, and its ideology can differ 
from province to province, but some interest-
ing points emerge from the research:
The Taliban’s ideology and “policy” partly 
explains why it conducted violent attacks on 
schools. The armed opposition of the Taliban 
Box 4.2. Continued
Further, in Balochistan, education is viewed as a vehicle for provincial empowerment, and its localized mode of 
delivery gives insurgents some control over how the services are delivered. In FATA, however, the polio eradication 
program is seen as a Trojan horse for external intelligence gathering. It is not considered a priority due to the lack 
of other basic health-care services and due to local demand for other services, such as electricity. Repetitive polio 
campaigns and poor communication with insurgents have exacerbated these problems (see chapter 6).
polio eradication: fAtA versus khyber pakhtunkhwa
The role of the ideology and organization of violence is further demonstrated by the comparison of polio eradica-
tion delivery in KP and FATA. PEP was more problematic to implement, at greater risk of violent attacks, and made 
less progress toward achieving its outcomes in FATA than in KP for a number of reasons, including:
•	 Ideology. FATA-based armed elites and allied insurgents have a more radicalized ideology and antagonistic 
view of the state than those in KP, partly due to the drone attacks in the region. Many focus group participants 
argue that the drone attacks also fueled the widespread perception in FATA that polio campaigns are a cover for 
U.S. intelligence gathering prior to pinpointing targets for drone attacks. Association with the state can automat-
ically make one a target in FATA.
•	 State penetration and organization of violence. In FATA, state penetration and control is deemed to be 
relatively weaker than it is in KP (see chapter 3), which has led to more fragmented and autonomous forms of 
violence there. It also means there are fewer opportunities for political and administrative cooperation and co-
ordination to deliver services on the ground.
a. The president of the Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party, the leading Pashtun Nationalist Party of Balochistan, perhaps representing a more 
radical, nationalist view, claims: “Our children are being kept out of schools intentionally. This policy dates back to British rule of this region. 
The British had a clear policy for our children that they must not get education. This state, mostly represented by Punjab, is continuing the 
same policy… they fear that if we get education and awareness, we will demand our rights.” (KII–14)
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identified education delivery as a key field 
of state activity. It regarded it as an attempt 
to indoctrinate and impose Western ideas on 
children. The resulting campaign of violence 
in 2006–08 led to the destruction of numer-
ous schools and the closure of even more. 
The evolution of the Taliban policy toward 
schools helps explain the reduction in at-
tacks. Gradually, the Taliban’s campaign 
evolved toward an attempt to influence state 
schools through local-level negotiations 
with Ministry of Education officials. By the 
end of 2008, none of the schools in Balkh 
and Wardak were inactive, and only 5 per-
cent were in Badghis. It also explains why, in 
various cases (chapter 5), some Taliban were 
bargaining around co-opting, rather than 
closing, schools.
Taliban ideology was more tolerant of edu-
cation for boys than girls, which impacted 
the nature of bargaining and their violent 
recourse, especially in Wardak. Despite the 
growing acceptance of state-sponsored edu-
cation, Taliban ideology against girls being 
educated continued. This was particularly 
prominent in Wardak where, with the arrival 
of the Taliban in 1995, girls stopped attend-
ing school, and most of the schools were 
turned into madrasas. As a result, Wardak 
performed relatively well over the period 
Classes in Physics and Chemistry being conducted at the Female Experimental High School in  
Herat, Afghanistan. Graham Crouch/World Bank
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2008–14 in terms of health and boys’ educa-
tion, but poorly in terms of girls’ education, 
with the most significant decline in prima-
ry-school attendance rates among the three 
provinces studied. In effect, the Taliban made 
implicit sectoral bargains to allow boys to 
attend school at the expense of girls, which 
might help explain why in Balkh, where the 
Taliban presence and power is negligible, and 
in Badghis, where their collective power is 
fragmented, opposition to education for girls 
was less dominant.
incentives 
Armed elites and allied insurgents are more 
supportive of service delivery if there are 
incentives for them to do so. Two questions 
emerged as particularly important: are the vi-
olent actors in need of the service in question, 
and can they extract rents?
do violent actors need the services? 
The extent to which insurgents tolerate ser-
vice delivery is shaped by the extent to which 
they, their families, and their “friends” need 
the service. When insurgents require the ser-
vice, they tend to facilitate basic SSD cover-
age, particularly in the health sector. 
In Nepal, for example, the Maoists main-
tained some health facilities because they and 
their families needed the services. One of the 
reasons given at all the research sites for the 
Maoists allowing health facilities to remain 
open was the need for the rebels and their 
families to make use of them (H3–FGD-SRH; 
H8–FGD–PAL). Indeed, a number of inter-
viewees argue that improvements in health 
were possible during the conflict because the 
Maoists had a strong interest in keeping them 
open as a source of services and rents (H21–
KII–PAL; H29–KII–ROL; G10–KII–SRH).
Similarly, in Afghanistan, insurgents’ need 
for services helps explain numerous cases of 
health and education services being insu-
lated from violence. In Wardak, for example, 
there were instances of the Taliban allowing 
and protecting health services because they 
needed them. One informant notes:
“Medical staff does not have security prob-
lems, as the Taliban and militants only tar-
gets military convoys. Ambulances can easily 
travel around, because the Taliban and mili-
tants need health services. They are treated in 
these clinics, and their relatives also come for 
treatment to these clinics. Therefore, they do 
not prevent the delivery of health services.” 
(WK: IDI–07)
Interestingly, there are even examples of the 
Taliban actively protecting health service de-
livery from criminal networks:
“The Taliban also has a level of commitment, 
because if they wanted to stop the delivery of 
health services, they could have already done 
it. For instance, there are robbers or other 
criminal groups who want to interrupt ser-
vices or harm our medical staff. Sometimes, 
the Taliban protect our staff and they do not 
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let people or criminals interfere in the health 
service delivery. So yes, there is this level of 
commitment present.” (KL: KII–47)
Likewise, an interesting example from Af-
ghanistan shows how commanders con-
tinued to protect education despite major 
armed clashes because their children and the 
children from the local community needed 
the service (box 4.3).
Can violent actors extract rents? 
The ability of violent actors to extract rents 
also impacts whether or not they will allow 
the delivery of services. Every service offers 
a unique opportunity for rent extraction, and 
Box 4.3. Wardak, Afghanistan: education incentives before the taliban
In the 1980s and 1990s, the main jihadi party in Wardak was the Islamist Hezb-e Is-
lami, which favored scientific and technical education, albeit within an Islamic framework 
(WK: KII–05 and 06). Some jihadi commanders wanted schooling for their own children 
and the support of locals. This is why even during armed clashes, many schools were 
actively kept open. Interviewees told some interesting stories about this:
“The main factors that kept the schools open were the jihadi commanders, village elders, 
ulema, mullah, imams, and maliks. People gave land for school buildings and they main-
tained the security of the schools, because on the one hand, their own children were at-
tending these schools, and on the other hand, it was a service for their villagers. Although 
there were conflicts among the jihadi parties, they tried to support schools and they did 
not plan to close them.” (WK: KII–01)
“Tribal and party competition were the highest in this area. This means that each 
party and commander had his own government in his area. But most of the people 
agreed with the delivery of education services and supported education. I can give 
you an example of their support to education. In Chak District, there was a govern-
ment school building in the Shir Khana area. In this area, there were different par-
ties. The members of each of these parties occupied a room of this school building; 
they were living there. When the people of the community asked the commanders 
to leave the school building so that it could be used for teaching and studying, they 
also ordered their personnel to leave the school buildings. Finally, all of them left 
the school building and classes started again.” (WK: KII–02)
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across the studied cases, insurgents were more 
willing to support a service if they could ex-
tract rent. This was manifest in a range of elite 
bargains where insurgents would allow or 
even enable the service to continue provided 
there was a clear rent-sharing agreement that 
gave them access to supplies, privileged ser-
vices, or payments (see chapter 5).
4.3. localization of Violence 
When armed elites are embedded in local 
communities during times of violent conflict, 
the prospects for local bargaining around 
SSD improve. A number of factors emerge as 
important, including the insurgents’ reliance 
on local support and how mobile or localized 
they are.
Reliance on local support 
When armed elites rely on local support and 
local constituents want a service, then the 
elites are more willing to enable delivery. 
During the conflict in Nepal, for example, 
the incumbent government and the Maoist 
insurgency grew to realize that health service 
delivery was a vehicle for gaining legitimacy 
in the eyes of the people. This reduced dis-
ruptions to health services and increased the 
propensity for accommodations and bargain-
ing. The government continued to deliver 
medical supplies to areas where the Maoists 
held sway, and the Maoists allowed health fa-
cilities to function, with national campaigns 
such as polio and measles immunizations, vi-
tamin supplementation, and family planning 
hardly affected (Devkota and van Teijlingen 
2009). A doctor who had served in a rural 
primary health-care center during the conflict 
explains: “The Maoists also wanted the sup-
port of the general mass for their insurgency 
and since health services are directly related 
to the people, they did not choose to obstruct 
it” (H18–KII–PAL). 
Afghanistan offers another example. In cer-
tain areas of Wardak, the Taliban relies on the 
support of local tribal elites and communities 
for local entry and legitimacy. As a result, 
they were predisposed to enabling services 
and appeasing local elites (see chapter 5). One 
informant explains:
“You see, the strength of the Taliban 
is highly dependent on the support of 
the people [in Wardak Province] … 
The Taliban approach the leaders of 
the community like the maliks, and this 
is their entry to the community.” (KL: 
KII–42)
Similarly, as noted previously, Jihadi com-
manders were also willing to enable educa-
tion delivery in part because they relied on 
local support.
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localized Versus mobile insurgents  
The research shows that localized insur-
gents, who have strong links with the local 
community, are more likely to enable local 
service delivery than are mobile insurgents. 
The more localized the armed elites and al-
lied insurgents, the stronger their links to the 
community, the more responsive they are to 
local needs, and the more willing they are to 
tolerate local service delivery (see box 4.4).
In conclusion, context-specific dimensions 
of violence have varying impacts on service 
delivery implementation and progress. They 
explain how and why service delivery out-
comes differ at the subnational level and how 
progress is—and is not—made. The various 
forms of violence, in addition to political set-
tlements, expand or reduce the bargaining 
space for delivering services. The following 
chapter explores the issue of bargaining in 
more depth.
A girl receives polio vaccine drops at the door step of her family home in 2016. Akhtar Soomro/ Reuters
Box 4.4. localized armed elites and allied insurgents and social service delivery bargains
Across the studied cases, the ethnographic evidence suggests that the more localized the armed elites and allied 
insurgents, the easier it is to negotiate for and deliver services. Following is a summary of findings.
Afghanistan
A range of interviewees note that mobile insurgents, usually deployed from neighboring countries during the fight-
ing season, do not have links to local communities and do not stay long enough to establish smooth communication 
channels with local elders. They note that these armed elites and allied insurgents are much less bound by local 
needs or bargains, and they cite numerous instances of insurgents from outside the province disrupting service de-
livery. Some local representatives claim that “those Taliban who are not independent” (out-of-area Taliban coming 
from Pakistani territory) and the security forces are equally responsible for school attendance disruptions in some 
areas (WK: IDI–18).
A range of informants claim that it is easier to negotiate service delivery with the help of local elders if the Taliban 
are locally connected. One informant describes an example of local Taliban being so amenable to service delivery 
bargains that they allowed unofficial schools to be established:
“Until last year, girls in grade six did not have any problems. But due to some concerns, for girls in higher 
grades, between grade six and ten, the Taliban and the local people advised renting a specific house where 
these girls could attend school until the 10th grade.” (WK: IDI–14)
In Wardak, the rise of external violent actors, who are less respectful of local bargains and elders, more ideologi-
cally opposed to education, and less dependent on local support, helps explain the weakening sectoral bargains and 
overall decline of school attendance (particularly among girls).
nepal
Evidence suggests that local village Maoists were more understanding of community needs than those from outside 
the village. The village of Taratal in Bardiya, for example, was relatively unaffected by the conflict because the 
Maoists in charge understood local needs. It was indeed Maoists from outside the village who obstructed develop-
ment work (H16–KII–BAR). And nonlocal Maoists in the village of Madanpokhara in Palpa were reportedly more 
“forceful,” while local Maoists were more understanding (H22–KII–PAL).
pakistan
The comparison between the Polio Eradication Project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) underlines similar findings. Roving forms of violence, fostered by FATA’s porous borders with 
neighboring Afghanistan, made organizing negotiation focal points difficult. Indeed, when international forces 
engage in a military offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan, militants move to Pakistani FATA. If there is an 
offensive by the Pakistani military, militants move to adjoining areas in Afghanistan. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa com-
munities, however, do not offer such a safe haven to militants as those in FATA tend to do.
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5. elite Bargaining matters 
“I see less harm in hiring a person who is corrupt but is capable of doing something … 
and is doing something.” (KL: KII–42)
As discussed in previous chapters, con-
text-specific political settlements and forms 
of violence create space and opportunities for 
delivering services. But service delivery is not 
mechanically determined by these factors. In-
deed, the research indicates that there is room 
for actors to strategize, negotiate, and com-
promise to get things done.
This chapter explores how elite bargain-
ing affects if and how services are delivered 
and progress achieved. Many bargains were 
sustained even during periods of intense vi-
olence. This research goes beyond broad 
statements like “elite bargains matter” to 
identify the actual processes through which 
bargains are achieved and reproduced. Bar-
gaining is a fluid and overlapping process, 
but it can be identified in various forms, as 
outlined below. The bargains examined in 
this study facilitated some progress, but often 
came with trade-offs. 
5.1. forms of Bargaining  
Many of the bargains considered in this 
study are rolling agreements. They were in-
formally devised and must be regularly rene-
gotiated. Some bargains were more successful 
or far-reaching than others. The form that a 
bargain took was shaped by the local elite 
balance of power, the incentives and ideas of 
armed and unarmed elites, and the ability of 
different actors to identify common interests.
negotiating with insurgents 
In Nepal, a range of informal negotiations be-
tween local actors and Maoists facilitated the 
delivery of health and rural road services. In 
Palpa and Bardiya, for example, the Maoists 
obstructed road construction, viewing it as 
state encroachment. But in several instances, 
construction resumed after negotiations took 
place between road users, local elites, and the 
Maoists, suggesting that the Maoists allowed 
the road construction projects to proceed 
when they believed that doing so enhanced 
their legitimacy with local communities. 
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Another example involved negotiations be-
tween a district health officer in Siraha and 
armed elites in the Tarai, which facilitated the 
delivery of health training programs: 
“The [district health officer] was trying 
to organize a training program during 
a strike by one of the two Jana Tan-
trik Mukti Morcha (JTMM) group [an 
ostensible political party engaged in 
armed criminality in the Tarai]. All the 
offices were closed. But, Dr C did not 
want to stop the training program re-
lated to OPD (Outpatient Department). 
Some JTMM cadres came and threat-
ened Dr C to stop the program. How-
ever, he dealt with them and told them 
that it was a program that came from 
donor agencies and stopping the train-
ing program would send out a wrong 
message and such programs would 
be stopped in Siraha district. He also 
told them that the program was four 
hours long and two hours had already 
been completed and requested them 
to let him carry on with the training 
program. The JTMM cadres listened 
to him and returned.” (H4–KII–SRH; 
H1–FGD–SRH)
Persuasion earned support for SSD among 
some insurgents in Afghanistan as well. Even 
in Badghis, where bargains are uncommon 
and problematic (see chapters 3 and 4), ser-
vice providers sometimes convinced the in-
surgents to allow services to continue:
“Before, the Taliban didn’t even let 
boys’ schools open, but in many places, 
boys’ schools are now open. We asked 
them, ‘Will it be better for your son to 
be educated or illiterate at that time?’ 
We [service providers and users] asked 
them that. In this way, we convinced 
them and opened schools for Mush-
kawani, which is in the Taliban’s terri-
tory.” (BS: IDI–33)
Sometimes, negotiations required gaining the 
permission and trust of armed elites and allied 
insurgents. Local elites and service providers 
regularly informed and engaged with insur-
gents, which was important because build-
ing a level of trust with armed elites fostered 
needed predictability for service delivery. For 
example, there were significant dialogues and 
trust-building efforts between implementing 
partners, local armed elites, and local elites 
for the Balochistan Education Support Proj-
ect (BESP), enabling service delivery. 
This form of bargaining sometimes resulted in 
insurgents actually codelivering the service. In 
Nepal, for example, interviewees argue that a 
great deal of heath delivery continued during 
the conflict, partly because health workers 
regularly liaised with the Maoist leaders and 
because the Maoists were informed in ad-
vance when health programs were coming to 
their areas, building trust and predictability. 
One interviewee recalls:
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“Such people [auxiliary health work-
ers] needed permission from the Mao-
ists and that was not so easily available. 
But since we knew the local Maoists, 
someone from the health post would 
accompany the district people. We 
would coordinate with the local Mao-
ists here while those in the district 
center would coordinate with the se-
curity forces. Whenever we held health 
camps, the dates would be decided 
beforehand so that the security forces 
were aware where our camps were 
being held and they would not come 
on a patrol [so as not to cause conflict].” 
(H29–KII–ROL)
In Rolpa, local health staff coordinated with 
Maoists who issued passes for them to con-
duct national health programs during the 
conflict (H25–KII–ROL). One health worker 
coordinated with the Maoists to take a group 
of 20 men on a three-hour walk to a vasec-
tomy clinic (H32–KII–ROL).
enlisting the support of elites 
Another form of bargaining involves enlisting 
locally influential elites to serve as intermedi-
aries to enable service delivery. This involves, 
but goes beyond, basic dialogue and nego-
tiations with armed elites and allied insur-
gents. In Afghanistan, these forms of bargains 
were crucial. In Wardak, elders proactively 
supported education, and their bargaining, 
negotiations, and accommodations with the 
Taliban partly explains why, based on a num-
ber of indicators, Wardak service delivery has 
performed relatively well, even in the face of 
volatile security conditions. Even at the peak 
of the Taliban’s power in the province, sec-
toral elite bargains were struck. According 
to a former Wardak government official, the 
“coordination and cooperation between el-
ders and government in the province is much 
better compared with other provinces” (KL: 
IDI–63). Box 5.1 offers examples from the 
field research. It is noteworthy that even in 
Badghis, bargains were struck regarding 
health and education delivery, facilitated by 
local elites, even though they were somewhat 
fleeting and unstable.
In Pakistan, religious elites played a role in 
enabling polio eradication delivery even in 
the difficult environments of Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa and the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA). There are instances of 
religious elites helping to convince armed 
elites and allied insurgents, local elites, and 
constituents to allow the delivery of polio 
eradication services. In some cases, however, 
the support of such elites was needed but in-
sufficient to ensure successful delivery (see 
box 5.2).
Finally, the case of road construction in Nepal 
underlines the role of political party elites in 
resolving local conflicts and negotiating with 
armed elites and allied insurgents to deliver 
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Box 5.1. enlisting the support of local elites in Wardak, Afghanistan
education
Local elites in Wardak were enlisted on multiple occasions to ensure that education services were sustained during 
the insurgency:
“When the Taliban closed schools, the Ministry of Education asked the tribal elders [in Wardak] to talk to the 
Taliban. Then there were discussions between the tribal elders and the Taliban, and some of their requests 
were accepted. Actually, only the tribal elders could convince the Taliban to keep the schools open.” (WK: 
IDI–16)
“Last year, a girls’ school was blocked … by the Taliban [in Wardak]. They [pointing to the elders in the 
room] went to some Taliban members and mediated for the opening of the girls’ school. Those problems are 
not resolved by the government; those issues are solved by these elders.” (WK: IDI–14)
health
Local elites and health shuras (consultative councils) in Wardak also enabled health service delivery:
“There were security checkpoints near the clinic, which were attacked by [the Taliban]. Due to the fighting 
between opposite groups and security checkpoints, it was difficult for patients to come for treatment to the 
clinic … This problem was shared with health shura members, and to some extent, the problem was solved. 
The health shura and elders talked to the group of insurgents about not disturbing them during the day when 
women, men, and children go to the clinic for treatment, which they accepted.” (WK: IDI–07)
“The … problem was the presence of insurgent groups against the government; that is a threat to everyone’s 
life. Through the establishment and communication of the health shuras, this problem was solved … The 
shura talked to insurgent groups about the need for health services … With that, [the insurgents] agreed to 
service delivery and that they will not interfere with the health sector staff.” (WK: KII–13)
“About the interaction of these power holders [local elites] with the insurgents, they agreed to the delivery of 
health and education services in the area, because of the involvement of the elders … They verbally agreed 
that they would do no harm to health and education service delivery.” (WK: KII–09; WK: KII–12)
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services. The presence of politicians in local 
user committees made it easier to resolve con-
flict (R5–KII–KTH). As one informant put it: 
“It is … true that having politicians 
on board helped in ensuring that con-
struction work was not halted even in 
the most adverse circumstances such as 
direct negotiations with the Maoists 
during the insurgency as happened in 
the case of the Arebhanjyang-Ram-
pur Road in Palpa, a role the project 
could not have undertaken on its own.” 
(G17–KII–PAL) 
Box 5.2. Religious elites, fatwas, and polio delivery in pakistan
The example of Pakistan illustrates the important role religious elites can play in social service delivery. According 
to some practitioners, fatwas from respected clerics helped convince skeptical local religious leaders to accept the 
vaccination program, and they in turn convinced insurgents and locals (R20–KII–PSH; R15–FGD–PSH). One 
donor agency official, noting how fatwas helped tackle cases of refusals, cites an instance of a fatwa issued by a 
madrasa in Multan persuading the religious elite to cooperate:
“We had to face refusal from the whole village once, when the imam of the mosque announced to boycott 
polio drops in a village named ‘Sadri Jadeed’ in Dagi, Swabi. In the year 2012–13, we brought a fatwa from 
a madrasa in Multan to convince reluctant religious persons.” (R10–KII–PSH)
In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), internally displaced female community members from North 
Waziristan engaged with religious and political elites to convince the Taliban of the benefits of polio vaccination 
(R19–FGD–PSH). However, while fatwas were necessary, they could not ensure effective polio eradication delivery, 
especially in FATA.
Even though numerous respected clerics supported polio immunization, the Pakistani Taliban have consistently 
refused to allow polio teams into their areas, especially in FATA. The background country report notes that in some 
cases, ensuring the support of religious leaders was not enough to broker deals around the Polio Eradication Proj-
ect. A focus group discussion participant with the FATA polio program technical staff argues:
“Due to lack of education, religious guidelines take heavy precedent over everything else—but having a 
fatwa issued is not enough, you need to convince local imams as well or they will oppose you despite the 
fatwa from higher level imams.” (R–24–GI–PSH)
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There were other examples cited as well. In 
Bardiya, road construction was blocked by 
the Maoists but then resumed after the road 
user committee got local supporters to con-
vince the insurgents that the road was indeed 
in the community interest (G13–KII–BAR); 
and a locally influential elite successfully con-
vinced the Maoists to allow health training 
programs to be conducted (H7–FGD–BAR). 
In Palpa, local political parties engaged in di-
alogues with the Maoists in order to reduce 
the violence (G19–KII–PAL). 
Concessions and Compromises 
These types of concession-making bargains 
manifested themselves in at least three ways: 
(1) providing privileged services to insur-
gents; (2) modifying the service; and (3) using 
services as a bargaining chip.
1. providing privileged services to 
insurgents  
In Afghanistan, concessions were made with 
the Taliban so that they would not attack 
health services. For example, nongovern-
mental organizations and government clinics 
have been asked by local elders to treat the 
Taliban, and to allow the Taliban to conduct 
inspections of facilities so they could ensure 
that these were not being used for “spying” 
purposes. There have been instances of vi-
olence and bans on further service delivery 
when service providers refused (Jackson and 
Giustozzi 2012; Norland 2012).
Similar concessions were made in Nepal. If 
local health workers agreed to discreetly pro-
vide services to the Maoists, then health ser-
vices were often maintained. Sometimes, the 
Maoists cultivated personal relationships with 
health workers, seeking their help at any time 
of the day or night. The health workers had 
to be discrete and cultivate trust with the in-
surgents, who did not spare anyone suspected 
of being an informant (World Bank and SSB 
2016).
2. modifying the service 
A second aspect of bargaining involves mod-
ifying aspects of a service to appease armed 
elites and allied insurgents. This tactic was 
apparent in education delivery in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. In Balochistan, Pakistan, armed 
elites and allied insurgents were more predis-
posed to allowing education services if the 
curriculum was modified. The armed elites 
and allied insurgents did not interfere with 
school operations as long as: (1) the school 
did not raise the Pakistani flag; (2) school 
children did not sing the national anthem; 
and (3) Pakistani history was not taught 
(PIPS 2012).
Similarly, in Afghanistan, the Taliban allowed 
education services as long as the curriculum 
was modified in a way that aligned with their 
ideology. For example, there were reports that 
deals were negotiated in Wardak allowing 
schools to stay open in exchange for conces-
sions that included changes to the curriculum 
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(Giustozzi and Franco 2011). As one infor-
mant describes: 
“In most of the districts, the govern-
ment curriculum is being taught in 
schools. But in some areas, where there 
is the Taliban, there is a slight change 
in the curriculum, which the govern-
ment does not favor. … The Taliban 
… keep control over the curriculum of 
education in their controlled areas … 
We have not heard that the Taliban has 
made any problems with either minis-
try [the Ministry of Public Health or the 
Ministry of Education] or their work in 
Wardak Province.” (WK: IDI–18) 
Another informant made a similar point: “If 
there were a problem with the curriculum, 
the Taliban would go to those schools and 
would advise for those subjects to be taken 
out and suggest which subjects to include.” 
(WK: IDI–14).
3. Using services as a bargaining chip 
Armed elites and other elites sometimes use 
services as a bargaining chip to achieve other 
goals. This tactic emerged most prominently 
in the case of polio eradication delivery in 
Pakistan. There were instances of the Tali-
ban opposing polio vaccination ostensibly in 
an effort to halt the drone attacks in FATA. 
Local elites and constituents attempted to use 
resistance to polio eradication delivery as a 
political bargaining chip to ask for govern-
ment concessions, such as improved power 
supplies, a reduction in the cost of power, 
and increased wages. This is expressed in a 
number of ways:
“[P]eople were saying … that if their 
salaries were not increased they would 
boycott Polio Eradication activities. So 
it is becoming a political tool in the 
hands of people as a bargaining chip.” 
(R11–KII–PSH)
“… if they [elites and constituents] 
need something (roads, electricity) they 
target polio, knowing that it is prior-
ity of the government and through this 
their voice can be finally heard. This is 
kind of a weapon that they have to be 
heard.” (R13–KII–PSH)
“There are three types of refusals, re-
ligious, demand and misconception. 
Either they are refusing on religious 
grounds; or they demand for some-
thing and threaten not to vaccinate 
their children unless the demand is met 
with; or they have a misconception 
regarding polio drops about it having 
dangerous elements such as inducing 
infertility.” (R–24–GI–PSH)
Chapter 6 explores these points in greater 
detail.
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sharing Rents and tolerating 
Corruption 
One form of bargaining involves rent-shar-
ing arrangements that enable progress in ser-
vice delivery in the midst of violent conflict. 
These bargains emerged across the three stud-
ied countries, some more enabling of service 
delivery than others. None resembled best 
practice or good governance approaches to 
SSD. This section outlines some of these ar-
rangements at the front line of delivery. (See 
chapter 3 for a more thorough exploration 
of these rent-sharing arrangements at higher 
levels of the polity.) 
In Nepal, a key puzzle is how health service 
delivery was sustained during periods of in-
tense violent conflict. One part of this answer 
relates to the incentives of the armed elites 
and allied insurgents and a series of bargains, 
as outlined above. Another dimension of this 
bargaining involved rent-sharing agreements. 
In a number of cases, Maoists allowed health 
services to remain operational in exchange for 
rents in the form of donations and levies. The 
Maoists typically demanded either “dona-
tions” or a day’s worth of salary per month as a 
“levy” from health staff in health posts (health 
assistants, assistant health workers, nurses) 
as well as private medical practitioners.24 In 
Principal of Sorya High School in West Kabul, Afghanistan. Graham Crouch/World Bank
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some cases, they also demanded a share of the 
supply of medicines, especially during peri-
ods of intense fighting.25 Because local health 
workers could not easily find commensurate 
employment elsewhere, many remained at 
their posts despite the extortion.26 
There is evidence that government officials 
turned a blind eye to these practices, a crit-
ical factor enabling continued delivery. Dis-
trict-level officials reportedly understood that 
they needed to continue sending medicine to 
villages in accordance with the government’s 
strategy of delivering services and enhancing 
local legitimacy even if some would fall into 
rebel hands. They understood that only by 
heeding the demands of local health work-
ers could district offices ensure their contin-
ued presence in the villages, especially when 
the insurgents heightened oversight of their 
activities (Hart 2001; Seddon and Hussein 
2002). Cases of district officials relaxing their 
formal oversight of supplies was noted, as a 
health worker in Rolpa recalls:
“We did have to keep a record of all the 
medical supplies that came to our health 
post. But we were not made to clarify how 
medicines were consumed to the district of-
fice. The people at the district headquarters 
knew everything. They were well acquainted 
with the situation at the local level. Even the 
CDO (Chief District Officer)27 during our 
review meetings would ask us to adapt to 
the situation and would not cross-question 
us on either the supplies we received or the 
services we had to provide to the Maoists.” 
(H30–KII–ROL) 
From a policy perspective, these examples 
suggest how rent-sharing can enable contin-
ued delivery and reduce the risk that insur-
gents will target a service (see also box 5.3 
and chapter 8).
Rent-sharing bargains were also evident in 
road construction projects in Nepal. Some-
times, the Maoists viewed road projects as a 
source of their own funding during their in-
surgency; the same was later true for many of 
the armed elites in the Tarai. There is some 
evidence that negotiations and rent-sharing 
between Maoists and local supporters allowed 
road construction to continue. One key infor-
mant notes:
“BJ [interviewee] shared an incident 
in 2003, when the Maoists looted 
40,000 Nepali Rupees from [the chair 
of the road construction committee] 
… They blamed him for constructing 
the roads without their permission and 
for the convenience of security officials 
to travel rather than for the public. In 
order to continue the project after a 
halt of some time, the committee sent 
local supporters of the Maoists to them 
to explain the importance of the road 
to the community and succeeded in 
getting their permission to resume the 
project.” (G13–KII–BAR)
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According to another informant, adherence 
to a strict policy of neutrality toward all sides 
was the only way people could continue to 
live in the affected areas (R20–KII–PAL).
Similarly, in Afghanistan, we find cases of 
rent-sharing in both health and education. 
In Badghis, for example, armed and un-
armed elites colluded in several instances to 
appropriate and share rents from the social 
service sectors (BS: IDI–23). In Wardak, some 
in the education sector accept patronage and 
corruption as a necessary evil in exchange for 
delivering services. One informant notes that 
some who are recruited through patronage 
networks for the wrong reasons may still be 
able to deliver:
Box 5.3. Bargaining with the maoists in palpa, nepal
K.C., a health care assistant at the Tahu primary health care center in the district of Palpa in Nepal, discussed several 
strategies that were used to keep health services functioning during the Maoist insurgency in Palpa:
Rents. In addition to paying a levy of a day’s salary every month to the Maoists, providing supplies to them was 
crucial to remaining operational. K.C. gave the insurgents anything they requested, though he could not ask them 
to submit a medicine demand form, as the procedure dictated. On one occasion, insurgents asked for a sphygmo-
manometer (a tool that measures blood pressure), but the center did not have one, so K.C. put in a request for two. 
The district health officer who sent the equipment knew without asking any questions. K.C. believed that the officer 
understood the sensitive and difficult nature of the conditions under which health centers located in remote areas 
were operating, and therefore promptly responded to their requests. Supplies were continually replenished, and the 
district officer never demanded any kind of accounting for them.
Discretion. An important survival strategy was to never provide any information about the security forces to the 
Maoists and vice versa. For example, government forces would often arrive at the primary health care center a few 
days after a battle and question the staff as to whether injured combatants had been brought in for treatment. The 
standard response from the staff was to suggest that they had perhaps been taken to Rampur—a nearby market 
town.
Treat on request. Wounded Maoist fighters were discreetly treated on request in a room separate from other pa-
tients. Some of the Maoist insurgents visited K.C. at his home as well because he had a private pharmacy. When this 
happened, K.C. had to provide both health services and accommodation.
Source: Based on H17–KII–PAL.
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“I see less harm in hiring a person 
who is corrupt but is capable of doing 
something and is doing something. For 
instance, look at the enthusiasm that 
everyone has in the education sector. 
Everyone is looking to what is going 
on in schools, with teacher training 
and the curriculum. However, if you 
place someone there who looks at the 
delivery of any services as something 
to help him or her gain economic re-
sources or use it to promote a certain 
agenda, but does not work toward its 
development, that is another thing.” 
(KL: KII–42)
SSD was more developmental in Balkh but 
still not immune to rent-sharing bargains as 
a way of getting things done. For example, 
interviewees in the education sector admit 
that interference and pressure for favors or 
bribes from Members of Parliament (MPs) 
and strongmen did occasionally occur during 
the implementation of the Education Quality 
Improvement Project (EQUIP).28 See chapter 
3 for further discussion about these types of 
arrangements. 
if A Bargain Cannot Be struck 
The research indicates that the absence of a 
bargain complicates SSD. Across all sectors 
and countries studied, an absence of dialogue 
and bargaining with armed elites and other 
powerholders disrupted delivery and made 
life more difficult for SSD workers. 
The case of polio eradication delivery in Paki-
stan illustrates this point. As noted in part I, a 
key objective of the research is to explain why 
polio eradication delivery was so challenging 
and frequently targeted by acts of violence, 
especially in FATA. Chapters 3 and 4 describe 
how this was partly shaped by the nature of 
the political settlements and the forms of 
and motivations for violence that contribute 
to the absence of bargaining—negotiations, 
accommodations, and concessions—with in-
surgents, in turn leading to highly problem-
atic service delivery.29 Insurgents felt their 
demands were not being met even partially, 
dialogue and trust building with insurgents 
was at best weak, and local elites wanted ser-
vices other than polio eradication (see chapter 
6). As a result, delivery of the Polio Eradi-
cation Project became a dangerous business. 
Health workers could not travel to FATA and 
some parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, such as 
Swabi, because of the heightened security 
risk.30 There has been no polio eradication 
campaign in North Waziristan since 2010 be-
cause of the security risks and lack of access 
to the region (R13–KII–PSH).31 Security was 
particularly difficult for female local health 
workers, who were seen as key enablers to 
improved vaccination coverage because they 
could enter households to vaccinate children 
and were familiar with and known to their 
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communities. These women were specifically 
targeted by insurgents in their effort to dis-
rupt the operations of the Polio Eradication 
Project (R15–FGD–PSH). In some communi-
ties, people would not get vaccinated because 
they feared retribution by insurgents opposed 
to the program (R09–KII–PSH; R10–KII–
PSH). In Swabi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, fewer 
people vaccinated their children at the district 
level because the government required proof 
of address, and families were afraid of being 
targeted by insurgents (R10–KII–PSH).32 
Limited outreach, dialogue, and trust-build-
ing with armed elites and allied insurgents 
also contributed to challenges in Balochistan. 
While local elite bargains and the alignment 
of interests between insurgents, local elders/
elites, and implementing partners facilitated 
the local elite bargains that underpinned the 
progress of the BESP, the absence of such 
bargains seemed to have the opposite effect. 
Security raids led to school closures in some 
areas (KII–11); some city schools such as in 
Turbat, Panjgor, and Awaran were affected by 
raids (KII–05); violence in the southeast re-
gion between different groups blocked access 
to schools (KII–02); and there were reports 
of attacks on project implementers who were 
perceived to be representatives of the govern-
ment (KII–09). Similar incidents occurred in 
Nepal, where delivery of health and road ser-
vices were disrupted when demands for “do-
nations” were not met.33
5.2. trade-offs 
The research does not suggest that bargain-
ing is the ideal way to deliver services, merely 
that it often appears necessary to achieve 
progress. Elite bargains frequently include 
trade-offs, which do not represent technical 
failures in SSD design or implementation, 
but instead reflect the political compromises 
made to allow or to maintain SSD. A better 
understanding of these trade-offs can help 
inform strategies for supporting SSD in vio-
lence-affected contexts (see chapter 8). Four 
significant trade-offs emerge from the re-
search, which are described in turn below.
1. service delivery maintained, but 
flow of Resources skewed 
It is not unusual for resources to be diverted 
as a result of bargaining. For example, the 
bargains between local elites and armed elites 
in Wardak, Afghanistan, were crucial to en-
abling the continuation of education and 
health services, but at the same time, signif-
icant evidence exists of skewed investments. 
Local elites, despite their positive attitude to-
ward education, also view it as an opportunity 
to extend their patronage. In some instances, 
lobbying by economic and political elites 
over the location of schools disrupted edu-
cational development in the area, resulting in 
suboptimal sites that left some communities 
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very far from a school and others quite close 
(WK: KII–01). Allegations of corruption 
in the education sector are common (WK: 
IDI–18). In Wardak’s health sector, there was 
an alignment of interests between provincial 
and powerful local elites to enable services 
but this also affected their distribution (box 
5.4). Similarly, local politicians in Nepal who 
played a role in bargaining also influenced 
the selection of roads, diverting projects to 
areas they favored.34
Box 5.4. Bargains and skewed health provision in Wardak, Afghanistan
The experience of the health sector in Wardak demonstrates how bargaining between 
provincial and more powerful elites can contribute to a skewed provision of services. For 
example, provincial council members from the two Hazara-dominated districts in Wardak 
authorized several local clinics, despite these not being in accordance with Ministry of 
Health guidance. As one interviewee notes about two related events:
“They have many recommendations for upgrading a health facility, for downgrad-
ing a health facility, for establishing a new health facility. In the two Behsud areas, 
this is very common. Therefore, we have an extensive number of health facilities in 
Behsud, because every time they go to the minister, he is not brave enough to face 
these Members of Parliament (MPs). The minister refers the case to the Grants and 
Service Contracts Management Unit in the Ministry of Health and then to us. What 
began as a small clinic eventually became a well-established clinic. We now have 23 
clinics in the two Behsud areas; 40 percent of our clinics in Wardak are in Behsud.
He [senior health official] forced us to accept what he thought was right in terms 
of the staff in one of the clinics, where he had some personal interest. That clinic 
was previously supported by the government and was later taken over by a nongov-
ernmental organization. He still had links in the clinic. He wanted to be involved 
in all of the recruitment and everything that was happening in the clinic. He was 
frequently supervising it. He forced us to upgrade it from a Comprehensive Health 
Centre (CHC) to a CHC+, and he succeeded. But he did not stop with the CHC+, 
as he said that it should be a special CHC+. So he went to the new minister and 
gained special approval to hire people.” (KL: KII–47)
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2. Basic service Coverage sustained, 
but Quality Compromised 
In the Tarai region of Nepal, bargains struck 
regarding road construction helped maintain 
service delivery but compromised quality. 
Large-scale road contractors—usually based 
out of Kathmandu—were more frequently 
targeted by roving armed groups in the post-
2006 period because they were seen as major 
money-making targets. A resulting adaptation 
involved the use of local subcontractors who 
could get the work done more easily because 
they were more localized, more trusted by the 
bandits, able to negotiate on a local level with 
armed elites, and better equipped to resolve 
local problems as they arose (R1–FGD–SRH). 
However, because of this deal, road construc-
tion quality was compromised. Smaller-scale 
local contractors were less skilled, and sub-
contracting made monitoring and controlling 
construction less straightforward. Therefore, 
the problem of substandard quality in road 
construction is not merely technical. Rather, 
it involves the political economy challenges 
around securing a feasible bargain in a violent 
context.
The education sector in Pakistan and Afghan-
istan require similar trade-offs. In Balochistan, 
bargains were struck with armed elites and 
allied insurgents that enabled education de-
livery as long as the curriculum was modified 
in line with Balochi nationalist ideology. This 
allowed access to education, but questions re-
main as to how greatly the quality of educa-
tion was compromised by removing certain 
modules, such as history, from the curriculum. 
Likewise, deals were struck in Afghanistan 
with the Taliban to keep schools open that 
required adaptations to the curriculum and 
there are similar questions about the impact 
on learning outcomes of the dramatic expan-
sion in hours dedicated to religious subjects 
to the detriment of math and reading. Wardak 
commanders were willing to allow education, 
but there is scant evidence suggesting that 
they were incentivized to deal with issues 
related to quality of education, such as low 
attendance rates or poor quality of teachers.
3. some groups Benefit, but  
others Are excluded 
Sometimes, bargains maintain delivery for 
some groups and exclude others. These bar-
gains depend on the interests, incentives, and 
ideology of armed elites and allied insurgents 
and the extent to which service providers are 
willing to compromise certain goals to en-
sure minimum service delivery. The example 
of girls’ education in Afghanistan is a case in 
point. The Taliban tolerated schools in some 
areas as long as they did not emphasize edu-
cation for girls. Providers were left in a quan-
dary: should they adapt to the demands of the 
local Taliban or go against them and risk the 
entire service being targeted or shut down? 
This explains why in Wardak, even though 
education for girls is a priority for EQUIP, 
progress has been minimal, marked by a de-
cline in attendance rates for girls in primary 
schools over the course of the project. 
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4. small-scale impacts, but difficult 
to scale Up 
Bargains made at the local or micro level can 
prove difficult to scale up. Some interventions 
are focused on small-scale, localized delivery, 
which enables them to forge bargains with lo-
cal-level elites and allows them to circumvent 
higher-level predatory or clientelistic elites. 
Scaling up, however, is challenging because 
elite interests and incentives operating at 
higher levels of the polity may be quite dif-
ferent (see discussion of BESP in Balochistan 
in chapter 6). 
In short, different forms of bargaining can 
make or break service delivery in violence-af-
fected contexts. These various modes of bar-
gaining help explain how progress is made 
against the odds, and why the lack of a bargain 
can make life very difficult for service pro-
viders. But bargains bring trade-offs, and the 
same agreement can contain both progressive 
and regressive elements. The extent to which 
a bargain is regressive or suboptimal depends 
on the nature of the political settlement and 
the motivations and ideas of local insurgents 
and elites. Finally, the research suggests that 
different modes of delivery can shape the po-
tential for more progressive forms of bargain-
ing, as the next chapter explores. 
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This chapter explores the final piece of our 
framework: how progress in service delivery 
is shaped by the extent to which a strategy 
or mode of delivery adapts to local forms of 
politics, violence, and bargaining. While po-
litical settlements, forms of violence, and the 
nature of bargains can be important drivers 
of—or barriers to—progress, service delivery 
strategies and implementation modalities also 
seem to matter. 
6.1. mitigating the effects of 
sectoral patronage 
Some approaches—by luck or by design—
seemed to reduce the impact of sectoral 
politics that constrain social service delivery 
(SSD). These modes of delivery manage to 
lessen the influence of existing, clientelistic 
political coalitions. 
establish semiautonomous 
institutional delivery Channels 
An important aspect of the Balochistan Ed-
ucation Support Project (BESP) was the es-
tablishment of a semiautonomous institution 
to manage and finance education delivery. 
The Balochistan Education Foundation (BEF) 
was the main executing body of the BESP 
with a mandate to support public-private 
and community partnerships in education 
(World Bank 2006).35 Evidence suggests 
that the BEF contributed to progress under 
the BESP in part by bypassing the provin-
cial-level, clientelistic, incumbent education 
settlement that was centered around the De-
partment of Education. At least two factors 
appear to have enabled this. First, because it 
was a semiautonomous agency overseen by a 
board of governors and directors, its account-
ability structures and bureaucratic procedures 
were somewhat separate from other education 
activities under the department. Second, its 
mandate to work with nonstate and private 
sector actors meant that it was more able to 
work through new coalitions and actors, such 
as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
and other agencies with direct links to local 
elites, which brought a broader network of 
elites into the operation. 
However, this model was contested and came 
with trade-offs. Points of disagreement in-
cluded the following:
•	 There was a rivalry between the BEF and 
the Department of Education, and the lat-
ter had concerns about setting up a “dual” 
(or parallel) public sector in rural educa-
tion. Some department officials suggested 
6. modes of delivery matter 
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that the BEF was establishing a parallel and 
overlapping implementation channel, while 
others suggested that the reason the BEF 
was being criticized was that it was outper-
forming the department, and in so doing 
was seen as a threat. One official notes: 
“[W]e felt, on basis of various in-
teractions, that the government felt 
threatened by the role of Balochistan 
Education Foundation (BEF). Their 
feeling was as if BEF was intending 
to act as a parallel department to the 
education department of the Gov-
ernment of Balochistan.” (KII–01)36
•	 Some claimed that the BEF and nonstate 
implementers were themselves prone to 
clientelistic capture by the new elites who 
had been incorporated into the sector.37 
These claims are not explored or corrobo-
rated by this research.
•	 Some thought the nonstate model under 
the BEF could undermine trust-building 
efforts. The World Bank’s implementa-
tion, completion, and results report for the 
Promoting Girls Education in Balochistan 
(PGEB) project (2012–15), a follow-up to 
the BESP, explains that “implementation 
by the government as opposed to NGOs 
or other parties greatly contributes to the 
sustainability of operations and building 
trust among citizens” (World Bank 2015b).
In fact, under the Balochistan follow-up proj-
ect, implementation shifted from a semiauton-
omous body to a government-led operation. 
An important question is if such changes were 
due to inefficiencies or to a backlash from in-
cumbent political coalitions seeking to regain 
sectoral control. 
Working small and local 
Another aspect of the BESP that was seen as 
politically astute was how it worked through 
local-level elites. Evidence from interviewees 
at various levels of the polity suggests that 
the BESP model was relatively successful not 
only because it was community based but 
also because it was able to work directly with 
the local-level elite, who were motivated to 
support education in their communities and 
reduce capture by provincial-level elites, who 
were more linked to the mainstream educa-
tion settlement. This strategy also aligned 
with the BEF model of encouraging greater 
local involvement. But it came with trade-offs 
(see box 6.1).
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Box 6.1. engaging local elites in the Balochistan education support project: Challenges to 
scaling up
A politically savvy approach
One reason that the Balochistan Education Support Project (BESP) made progress was that it was able to work 
through local-level elites, which was arguably politically savvy in a number of ways, as outlined below.
•	 Direct links to local elite. The project was able to work directly with local elites who had greater incentives 
and interest in furthering education than higher-level elites (see chapter 3). For example, by only permitting 
parents whose children were enrolled in BESP schools to be members of the parent education committees, the 
project design reduced the direct influence of higher-level elites who would typically send their own children to 
private schools.
•	 Reduced scope for interference. By working more at the local level, with smaller contracts and protected by 
the Balochistan Education Foundation model, there was less scope and interests for elites (especially ones linked 
with the Department of Education) that dominated the sectoral political settlement to interfere with or capture 
the project.
•	 Space for local bargains. Working at the local level also provided space for bargains between local elites and 
armed elites and allied insurgents (see chapter 5).
•	 Demonstration effect. Although at a small scale, interviewees suggest that the local-level approach created an 
important political demonstration effect by showing how projects can work in a context of violence. It further 
contributed to local demand and education which could eventually create new coalitions of elites and pressure 
higher-level elites to be more responsive.
(continued)
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Box 6.1. Continued
trade-offs
There are, however, political and developmental trade-offs that accompany this model, as summarized below.
•	 Prospects for scaling up. Evidence suggests that attempts at scaling up would be challenging because doing 
so would likely challenge the incumbent sectoral political settlement (World Bank 2006).a Issues include:
– The Ministry of Education is already thought to be overstaffed, with more than 60,000 school teachers on 
the government payroll. Many of these teachers are ostensibly recruited on a political basis, and teacher ab-
senteeism is high at 15 percent—among the highest rates in Pakistan. Integrating BESP teachers could put 
additional pressure on the payroll.
– The new provincial coalition government is planning to reform its teacher recruitment method by outsourcing 
it to the National Testing Service, an independent recruiting and testing agency. Because BESP teachers were 
recruited by traditional methods, the government may be reluctant to regularize them.
– The political parties in the new government may have little political capital to gain by supporting the regular-
ized recruitment of the nearly 800 BESP teachers—although some argue that they can be considered a po-
tential “800 voters.” A donor technical specialist, commenting on the complexities of the teacher recruitment 
agenda, explains:
“As the nearly 800 BESP teachers existed outside the teacher union, many political economy aspects 
connected to the role of regularized teachers in the system did not apply to them. This included for in-
stance the bargaining power of regular teachers through their role in the election and census.” (KII–11)
•	 Limited impact on sectoral transformation. BESP has remained a small part of the total education provision 
in the province, constituting only 1.7 percent of the government’s education expenditures from 2006 to 2014.
•	 Quality challenges. Efforts to maximize coverage of marginalized communities has come at the expense of 
teacher salaries, teacher quality, and potentially, education quality. Evidence gleaned from interviews suggests 
that low teacher salaries makes recruiting and retaining qualified teachers challenging.
a. The project was actually intended as a pilot intervention, to be expanded if successful (World Bank 2006: 3).
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6.2. Anticipating and mitigating 
insurgent Resistance 
Various strategies emerge from the research 
as more or less effective in mitigating resis-
tance and violence from armed groups. The 
research revealed the following types: (1) 
buying off armed elites and allied insurgents 
and opposing elites; (2) using trusted service 
providers; (3) embedding conflict resolution 
mechanisms; and (4) actively reaching out to 
armed elites and allied insurgents.
Buying off insurgents and  
opposing elites 
As described in chapter 5, rent-sharing ar-
rangements with insurgents are critical to 
maintaining service delivery in the face of vi-
olent conflict. By contrast, the case of polio 
eradication efforts in Pakistan suggests that a 
singular focus on polio eradication and the 
lack of service bundling undermined efforts 
to buy off local insurgents and elites and to 
forge local bargains (see box 6.2). The case 
demonstrates that it is extremely risky to em-
phasize one service without tailoring it to the 
incentives of the local elites and insurgents.
Students are doing practice of their lessons in the laboratory of Mashriqi high school.  
Imal Hashemi/Taimani Films/World Bank
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Box 6.2. lack of bundling undermined elite bargains on polio eradication in pakistan
limited incentives
Evidence from interviews suggests that a singular focus and a lack of service bundling undermined the Polio Erad-
ication Project’s ability to buy off local insurgents and elites, incentivize local cooperation, and forge local bar-
gains. Armed elites and allied insurgents were more interested in other potential services, such as infrastructure and 
electricity, as well as other forms of bargaining, such as reducing drone attacks. Local elites and their constituents 
considered polio eradication a low priority, especially when compared with other health and nonhealth services. 
As a result, in many cases, local elites had limited incentives to protect or promote polio eradication delivery. One 
donor notes:
“Because there have been significant gains in polio reduction throughout the rest of the country, because 
there are very few polio cases in a population of 180 million, and because 140,000 children die annually in 
Pakistan from other causes, it is not hard to see why polio is down the list of priorities.” (R–04–KII–PSH)
potential for bundling
Clear political economy incentives for allowing social service delivery and bargaining around polio eradication 
delivery were lacking. Several interviewees suggest that this problem could be solved through bundling. They argue 
that local elites and households would be more responsive to polio vaccination efforts if they were offered as part 
of a wider package of health—and other—services. Polio program technical staff describe it like this:
“Free medical camps should be used as mediums to encourage polio vaccination rather than relying on door 
to door visits that ferment resistance and suspicion of [the] polio-specific eradication program … Provision 
of ‘complete health packages’ (including polio immunization) and facilities can bolster trust of local people. 
Such activities, moreover, are supported by political, religious and local elites.” (R11–KII–PSH)
This again demonstrates how seemingly technical changes in service delivery can have notable implications to the 
broader acceptance of a particular intervention.
Challenges to bundling
There are also challenges to putting bundling into practice. One donor official notes that it may be costly to pro-
vide other services in tandem with the Polio Eradication Project (R05–KII–PSH), but program designers should 
nonetheless weigh the costs against the risk of polio eradication efforts being rejected or targeted by violence. In 
addition, bundling would require coordination within the health ministry and across other ministries, and this 
would likely be more difficult in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas than in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, because 
administrative structures are much weaker there (see chapter 3).
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Using trusted service providers  
Multiple cases demonstrate that certain ser-
vice providers were more or less trusted by 
armed elites and allied insurgents and there-
fore more or less likely to be allowed to con-
tinue delivering services. Examples include 
the extremely negative consequences of pro-
viders being associated with the state in the 
Polio Eradication Project; the need to use local 
subcontractors for road projects in Nepal; the 
reliance on local shuras (consultative councils) 
in Afghanistan; or the use of local implement-
ing partners for BESP (see chapters 4 and 5). 
Another example relates to the role of local 
female volunteers in the provision of health 
services in Nepal. Health services, particularly 
preventative services, were sustained and even 
expanded during the violent conflict partly 
because the local female volunteers, on whom 
the service delivery depended, earned the 
trust of the Maoists (box 6.3).
Students study in the library at the Female Experimental High School in Herat, Afghanistan.  
Graham Crouch/World Bank
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Box 6.3. female volunteers deliver health services in violent contexts in nepal
Background
The use of female community health volunteers (FCHV) in Nepal can be seen as an approach that is sensitive to 
context-specific politics and violence. It’s particularly politically savvy because it bypasses some of the entrenched 
human resource patronage in the health sector, which revolves around close linkages between political parties, el-
ements of the Ministry of Health, and trade unions (see chapter 3). The strategy was also sensitive to the violent 
context.
Nepal’s Female Community Health Volunteer Program, a partnership between Nepal’s Ministry of Health and Popula-
tion and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), began in 1988 and by 1995 covered all 75 
districts.a The program’s goals were to “improve community participation and outreach of health promotion through 
local women working voluntarily” (Bhandari, Gordon, and Shakya 2011). By 2012 there were around 52,000 female 
volunteers in Nepal serving as the primary contact between health facilities and communities.b From providing door-
to-door services disseminating health information to supplying necessary medications and advice to pregnant women 
and new mothers, FCHVs guide people to the health facilities and educate them on the services available.
impact of fChVs
One health worker described the volunteers as the “medical officers” of their communities, claiming that without 
them health information would not have been distributed and the services would not have been as effective (H8–
KII–SRH). A World Bank assessment notes that:
“Continuation, improvement and strengthening of the FCHV program therefore appear as a key strategic 
priority for HSS [Health Sector Strategy]. Regarding the importance of first line health workers in rural and 
remote areas a strengthened FCHV program will act as a powerful booster for the social impact of HSS not 
least according to gender, indigenous peoples and Dalit communities.” (World Bank 2004)
And in a 2004 statement, the minister of health, acknowledges that the then over 49,000 FCHVs served as the 
main link between the village and the country’s health infrastructure (Nepal Ministry of Health 2004).
trusted providers
Even at the peak of the conflict, the volunteers managed to sustain service delivery, largely because they were non-
governmental workers and locally based and recruited and so therefore trusted by the Maoist leadership as well as by 
the local communities. FCHVs tend to remain in their roles for a long time—the program has a very low turnover 
rate, enabling them to build longer-term relationships and bonds of trust with insurgents, local elites, and community 
members.c A health worker in Rolpa emphasizes the key role the volunteers play in violence-affected and remote areas:
(continued)
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Box 6.3. Continued
“FCHVs were not harassed by the state nor by the Maoists, and so they were able to carry out their work. Would 
you think that without the FCHVs family planning measures in their wards and village development committees 
would have been successful? Would the locals consume medications if there had been no FCHVs? It’s easy to 
make policies but the crux is its implementation. Even we have not been able to go and raise awareness in the 
nooks and crannies of each and every VDC. I have worked here for 20 years but I have been able to go to only 
five of the 22 VDCs under my charge. Do you think that by going to five VDCs there would be changes at the 
local level in terms of health awareness? The local Maoists have also benefitted from the activities of the FCHVs. 
If they had a headache, they were able to get paracetamol [acetaminophen] from the FCHVs.” (H25–KII–ROL)
not a panacea
FCHVs were not, however, a cure-all for health delivery. They did help drive progress in basic health care, but they 
were unable to deliver more complex, staff-intensive, curative health care that requires a more skilled workforce, 
which for political economy reasons cannot be easily deployed in rural areas (see chapter 3). According to one es-
timate, there is only one doctor available for every 150,000 people in rural areas, compared with the urban area of 
Kathmandu where the ratio is one doctor for 850 people. The government relied on lower-skilled staff to deliver 
preventative health services, enabling it to remain on track in meeting its Millennium Development Goals. For ex-
ample, apart from occasional and always brief stints by medical doctors, one primary health-care center in Rolpa 
had effectively been run by an auxiliary health worker for 20 years.d
a. At least one woman serves as a volunteer per ward (the smallest subdivision of local governance). An estimated 40,000 FCHVs were en-
gaged by mid-1997 (Fielder 2000), and even during the most intense fighting period (2001–06), their numbers grew by 14 percent.
b. Facing a severe shortage of health workers, the World Health Organization promoted the idea of “task-shifting,” that is the “review and 
subsequent delegation of tasks to the “lowest” category that can perform them successfully” (Lehmann and Sanders 2007: 1). This idea has 
received renewed interest among community health worker programs. FCHVs are chosen by local mothers’ groups from the community to 
support activities conducted by local health facilities. Following an 18-day basic training, they can provide an array of services, including 
distributing vitamin A capsules and deworming tablets to children under five years old, providing health education in terms of family plan-
ning, distributing condoms and birth control pills, providing community-based treatment of pneumonia, treating diarrhea, referring out sick 
newborn babies, providing antenatal counseling to pregnant women, and distributing medication to mothers for improved neonatal cord 
stump care and to pregnant women to prevent postpartum hemorrhages. Despite these varied responsibilities and the fact that the volunteers 
do not get paid, the program has a low attrition rate of less than 4 percent per year.
c. A focus group discussion participant explains:
“During the construction of the Sub-Health Post at Tarataal in Bardiya district, the Maoists had been obstructing the work asking about the 
source of the funds. Finally, they allowed the construction to proceed provided that the monitoring was done by no one else but an FCHV. 
Hence, each of the 21 FCHVs active at the time took turns to oversee and monitor the construction work every day, and they were even on 
duty during important holidays. It was this kind of trust that allowed FCHVs to move around unhindered during the time of the conflict.” 
(H16–KII–BAR)
Even during the Madhesi uprising in 2008 and the subsequent armed activity in the Tarai, during which it became quite perilous for people 
from the hill region to work there, the fact that the FCHVs were themselves Madhesis allowed them to operate freely (H6–KII–SRH). “There 
was a time when health officials would come in their vehicles to provide family planning services but the locals would not trust them. But 
now as FCHVs have been recruited from the local level the people trust us” (H4–FGD–SRH). As members of the community, they could 
convince others of the benefits of getting vaccinated, as an example (H6–FGD–BAR).
d. See “Nepal at a Glance” at http://www.pahs.edu.np/about/about-nepal.
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embedding Conflict Resolution 
mechanisms
Approaches that put a major emphasis on 
conflict resolution as an in-built function of 
service delivery also seem to offer promise. 
One aspect of BESP was to recruit and train 
an army of local facilitators who were hired 
by implementing partners—local community 
members who would work directly with the 
community and build trust during project im-
plementation. The implementing partners and 
their facilitators were selected partly based on 
their experience with community mobilization 
and engagement. The local facilitators were 
widely considered to be the drivers of progress 
due to their ability to resolve local conflicts and 
therefore forge bargains. Aspects contributing 
to their effectiveness include the following:
•	 Most came from the community—usu-
ally from the same district, which allowed 
them to travel fairly easily, even during 
times of conflict, and help mediate and 
resolve disputes between insurgents, elites, 
and constituents.
•	 Because of their local connections, they 
were also largely trusted by the local pop-
ulation, enabling them to foster locally 
based collective action and resolve con-
flicts—violent or not. Training enhanced 
their ability to negotiate bargains with 
mechanisms such as community meet-
ings to discuss disputes and enable prob-
lem solving; bringing disparate groups 
together; and using traditional customs, 
language, and culture to resolve issues.
Actively Reaching out to insurgents
The research suggests that proactive and 
savvy forms of communication and engage-
ment with armed elites and allied insurgents 
can help reduce their interference with SSD. 
Chapter 5 outlines how engaging in dialogue 
and negotiations can be a form of bargaining. 
An interesting example of what did not work 
well in this regard is the Polio Eradication 
Project in Pakistan. Interviewees point to a 
number of failings. One senior donor official 
who is heavily involved in the health sector 
in Pakistan notes that no serious attempts 
were made to target the Pakistan Taliban in 
a communication campaign to counter their 
resistance to polio vaccinations. The gov-
ernment policy of not communicating with 
armed elites and allied insurgents and the lack 
of local communication channels to negotiate 
with them reduced the prospects for achiev-
ing their cooperation. Attempts to engage the 
military to potentially reduce their resistance 
were also limited (R04–KII–PSH).
In addition, the unsophisticated forms of 
communication, which were not sensitive to 
the ideology or incentives of violent actors, 
backfired. As one informant explains: “Door 
to door campaigns, high publicity of polio 
campaigns, advance notice of health work-
ers’ visits and field campaigns, predictabil-
ity of movement of teams, agency surgeons 
and stakeholders make them susceptible to 
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attacks” (R11–KII–PSH). Another makes the 
point more forcefully: “A life threatening sit-
uation is invoked in the door to door cam-
paigns. When I send my workers on a door to 
door campaign in Bara, it’s like sending them 
towards their death” (R11–KII–PSH ).
There are no easy solutions when an insur-
gency is aggressively targeting a service, but 
field experience suggests that a more sophis-
ticated and violence-sensitive approach could 
have been adopted.38
6.3. increasing local  
Bargaining space
Some of the interventions in this study relied 
on decentralized and participatory modes of 
delivery. The overall evidence across the three 
countries demonstrates that these approaches 
created some space for local deliberation and 
problem solving, and in turn, local-level bar-
gains and local ownership facilitated service 
delivery. Yet the on-the-ground unfolding 
of these approaches rarely resembled good 
governance notions of community-based de-
livery. Elites routinely jostled for power; the 
local structures were politicized; a share of re-
sources was skimmed; and the bargains could 
work against, or for, SSD (World Bank and 
Akram 2016; World Bank and AREU 2016; 
World Bank and SSB 2016). Examples of this 
have been discussed in previous chapters and 
a few are briefly outlined below.
In Nepal, local user committees were estab-
lished for road service delivery. They included 
the village road coordination committees and 
local road user committees. As illustrated 
in chapters 3 and 5, these local committees 
became the focal points for political party 
bargaining. User committee members were 
chosen on the basis of their political affilia-
tion, but the three main positions of chair-
person, vice-chairperson, and secretary were 
usually divvied among the country’s three 
major parties—the Nepali Congress, the Uni-
fied Marxist Leninist Party, and the United 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The po-
sitions depended on the relative strength and 
the influence of the parties in the area. This 
strategy contributed to local bargains in three 
ways:
1. It provided local focal points and local 
space for bargaining with the Maoists and 
even with the organized groups in the 
Tarai during the postwar period.
2. It enabled political parties to “cut up the 
pie” and follow their imperatives of local 
patronage, while still promoting a degree 
of progress in road construction.
3.. While local jostling for political repre-
sentation was dominated by political par-
ties, it still increased the representation of 
previously excluded groups and increased 
the local stake in the way the roads were 
managed.
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Similarly, under BESP in Pakistan, the lo-
calized and participatory nature of delivery 
helped enable some services to be sustained 
even during violent conflict. This model in-
creased the space for local elites, local con-
stituents, and at times local armed elites and 
allied insurgents to negotiate and modify 
services in ways that were locally acceptable. 
Moreover, this model fostered local owner-
ship by encouraging local participation and 
by incentivizing local communities and elites 
to have a stake in implementation: BESP cri-
teria required that a community request the 
program for a local school and demonstrate 
a commitment toward managing the school 
prior to any physical construction occurring 
(KII–11).39 One informant notes:
“Despite the poor law and order situation 
in Balochistan, BESP schools would remain 
functional because of the beauty of the model 
on which this project was based. Under this 
model, the community was involved and they 
were given the ownership of the schools. An 
example of how it worked is in the case of 
this school located in Kahaan, District Kohlu. 
Due to armed conflict, it is very hard for 
outsiders to enter the area, but our school is 
completely functional and very successful.” 
(KII–01, 3–4)
Likewise, mechanisms to decentralize deliv-
ery and increase local autonomy were found 
to enable local service providers to arrive at 
flexible local arrangements with the Maoists 
during the conflict. And in Afghanistan, local 
shuras or consultative councils often served 
as vehicles for mediating local conflicts and 
bringing together conflicting stakeholders to 
settle on bargains.
6.4. supporting progress 
outside the sector
Certain cases in this study show how invest-
ments and reforms outside of a sector contrib-
uted to progress within it. The investments 
and reforms impacted the demand and access 
to services, forms of political organization, 
and even forms of violence (see box 6.4). Ac-
counting for the externalities that affect SSD 
in violence-affected contexts could have im-
portant implications for how projects are de-
signed, implemented, and evaluated, a point 
returned to in chapter 8.
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Box 6.4. the impact of socioeconomic factors outside a sector
Rising wealth contributed to improved social service delivery (SSD) in Balkh, Afghanistan. Political 
stability, developmental leadership, and strong linkages with Kabul contributed to significant economic investment 
and growth in Balkh, which in turn impacted SSD. The net effect was faster development in and around Mazar-
i-Sharif, one of the largest commercial centers of Afghanistan. As a result, its poverty rate more than halved from 
2007 to 2012 (from 60 to 22 percent). In Wardak, poverty rates dropped by only one-quarter (54 to 40 percent); 
and in Badghis, the poverty rate barely improved (40 to 39 percent).a Much of the improvements in SSD outcomes 
in Balkh Province is due the progress made in and around Mazar-i-Sharif, the provincial capital. Neither Badghis 
nor Wardak had a comparable urban population nor could they match Balkh in terms of its overall wealth. Further, 
several wealthy businessmen connected to Balkh’s strongman, General Atta Mohammed Noor, invested in the build-
ing of schools and clinics in the province.
Increased income levels and expanded road networks contributed to health delivery in Nepal. Data sug-
gest that factors outside of the health sector contributed to progress in health outcomes over the past two decades, 
including rising average per capita income levels (there was a 20 percent increase in the 1980s, a 21 percent increase 
in the 1990s, and a 16 percent increase in the 2000s); a decline in one-dollar-a-day poverty from 68 percent of 
the population in 1996 to just 25 percent in 2011; increases in household incomes owing to a rise in remittances 
to Nepal; and improvements in education and advances in empowerment for women. This progress contributed to 
improvements in health knowledge, access, and outcomes. Furthermore, 33 percent expansion of the road network 
between 1999 and 2008 improved access of people in remote villages to medical help.
Differences in land rights and distribution as well as income equality contributed to varying SSD dy-
namics and outcomes in the Tarai versus the hill region of Nepal. There is evidence that the Tarai performed 
worse than the hill region in terms of SSD, which can be traced back to differences in land and income distribution. 
The hill and mountain regions, which generally have a lower per capita income than the Tarai, distribute land and 
income in a more egalitarian way. While a small degree of landlessness still exists in the hill region, 33 percent of 
eastern and central Tarai households are landless compared with 13 percent in western Tarai. Tarai dalits form a 
major part of these landless groups, who are the subject of quasi-feudal relations with landlords, especially in the 
eastern Tarai. These differences have had varied effects on local politics and violence, which in turn impact SSD 
(see chapters 3 and 4).
a. See Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy, and World Bank (2015).
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part iii.  
implications for  
policy and operations
Schoolgirls walk past a damaged mini-bus after it was hit by a bomb blast in the Bagrami district of 
Kabul, Afghanistan, April 11, 2016. Mohammad Ismail/Reuters
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This chapter attempts to extract the five over-
arching and overlapping policy implications 
of the above findings. As box 7.1 outlines, the 
implications are preliminary, but nevertheless 
7. policy takeaways: A Radical Rethinking
potentially significant. Scant research has 
been conducted to date that systematically 
takes into account and addresses the issues 
identified in this study.40
Box 7.1. Clarifying expectations:  
What this study tells policy makers and practitioners
Further research is needed. The policy implications are nuanced and powerful, but also partial for 
three reasons:
1. The research findings need to be further tested and replicated in other contexts;
2. Given the high level of contextual variation in violence-affected settings, it is not possible to pro-
vide an off-the-shelf road map for action; and
3. The extent to which development actors adopt (or interpret) the study implications will depend on 
a given organization’s objectives, available instruments, and appetite for risk, among other factors.
The focus is on the “how to” of delivering services.. The implications focus on the delivery of 
services and progress toward achieving service delivery objectives over the short-to-medium term in 
violence-affected contexts. Issues such as the relationship between social service delivery (SSD) and 
drivers of violence or whether external actors should be supporting SSD in such contexts are import-
ant, but not the subject of this research.
The report touches on sensitive issues.. The findings highlight the prevalence of corruption, 
rent-sharing, and collaboration with armed elites in the “real world” of SSD—and the following policy 
implications do not endorse, but do not also side-step, these thorny issues. Recognizing the role of 
such unpalatable elements in the cases is a reflection of what the field evidence revealed, but this does 
not mean that the authors of this report condone these practices. The study does, however, recognize 
that these issues require systematic and realistic treatment in policy making and program design.
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7.1. Adapt to a new set of 
Contextual factors 
Most development practitioners recognize 
that “context matters,” but this rather broad 
adage provides limited practical or granular 
guidance. Moreover, progress has been lim-
ited in terms of understanding how context 
matters to driving and constraining service 
delivery progress in violence-affected settings.
programs must Better Adapt  
to Context 
Contextual factors that remain underexplored, 
including forms of political settlement, forms 
of violence, processes of elite bargaining, and 
modes of delivery, play important roles in 
making or breaking service delivery in vio-
lence-affected contexts. Development actors 
need to take these aspects much more seri-
ously. Chapter 8 explores how these factors 
shape opportunities for and constraints to so-
cial service delivery (SSD) programs.
Adaptation to subnational Contextual 
Variation is an Absolute must 
Subnational contextual variation is particu-
larly decisive. It helps explain major differ-
ences in SSD implementation and outcomes 
in the same violence-affected country. Such 
adaptation is not straightforward, however 
(see chapter 8).
Female health care workers in rural Nepal. Aisha Faquir/World Bank
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7.2. Recognize that some forms 
of Violence Are less Bad than 
others for service delivery 
Mainstream approaches tend to view violence 
as simply bad for service delivery. But the 
research shows that different forms of and 
motivations for violence can be more or less 
amenable to SSD.
national notions of Violence  
Are not Always helpful 
When classifying contexts as fragile or vio-
lence-affected, policy makers too often focus 
on the national level. As our and other re-
search demonstrates, such a focus risks gloss-
ing over important subnational variations in 
violence. Policy makers must move beyond 
national definitions of fragility to focus more 
on subnational specifics.
Unpack “Violence” for the true 
scope for progress to Be Revealed 
The various dimensions of violence—orga-
nization, ideology, and mobility—need to 
be unpacked to see how they offer diverse 
opportunities for and constraints to service 
delivery. Of course, violence harms SSD, 
but opportunities for progress vary within 
and between violence-affected contexts to a 
much greater extent than previously thought. 
Put differently, we need to better understand 
whether nonstate armed actors have an inter-
est in more effective service delivery. If they 
do, policy makers should try to understand 
how this interest can be tapped; if they do 
not, policy makers may need to think about 
how such actors might develop such an in-
terest. Chapter 8 offers some preliminary 
guidance.
7.3. Address the operational 
Ways through Which elites 
matter 
Clearly, politics and elites influence devel-
opment progress. Yet, in many ways, this 
assertion has frustrated service delivery prac-
titioners. It tends to yield a long list of broad 
recommendations, rarely specific to the me-
chanics of front-line service delivery. More-
over, elites are too often framed in a negative 
light, as actors who capture and subvert SSD 
and whose role should thus be minimized or 
mitigated.
the technical is political 
The report reinforces the view that technical 
aspects tell only part of the service delivery 
story. Political economy factors repeatedly 
undercut attempts to foster best practices and 
influence outcomes.41 Even technical aspects 
such as the selection of the mode of delivery 
have profound political implications.
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the mechanics of elite Bargaining 
must Be put front and Center 
The lens of elite bargaining provides a more 
granular—and thus operationally relevant—
understanding of how politics matter to SSD 
in violence-affected contexts, including at the 
front line of delivery. Specifically, three new 
policy insights emerge:
1. Elites, armed and unarmed, are often (if 
not always) intimately involved in shaping 
SSD in such fluid, informal, and contested 
contexts.
2. Elite bargains are critical to explaining 
SSD progress—or the lack of it—and 
such bargains can take different concrete 
forms, which have different implications 
for SSD programming.
3. The extent to which elites facilitate or 
undermine a service in a given context 
depends on the political settlement, es-
pecially at the sectoral and subnational 
levels; the incentives and ideology of the 
elites; and the extent to which the mode 
of delivery creates some space for bargains 
that support service delivery.
7.4. Rethink the function of 
service delivery: Rents matter 
Mainstream approaches tend to view service 
delivery as being largely politically neutral. 
They also make significant efforts to en-
sure this “neutrality” is maintained and safe-
guarded throughout project implementation. 
But this research raises questions about the 
validity of this line of thinking.
Rents Can Be generated by  
service delivery 
On the difficult issue of rents and SSD, the 
findings give rise to three interrelated policy 
insights:
1. SSD is not politically neutral. SSD 
can generate important rents in vio-
lence-affected contexts, and such rents 
can strengthen certain elites, armed or un-
armed, which can in turn impact the bal-
ance of power and the political order.
2. SSD can sustain, spark, or mitigate vi-
olence. Rents created or constrained by 
an SSD program can impact the dynam-
ics of violence because in such settings 
violence is often controlled by (fragile) 
rent-sharing agreements.
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3. Rent-sharing may sometimes be a nec-
essary evil. Rent-seeking and rent appro-
priation of SSD resources by armed elites 
can, in some cases, be the “cost of doing 
business” in terms of ensuring peaceful 
project implementation. In some cases, 
rent-sharing agreements may satisfy key 
elite gatekeepers and help sustain pro-SSD 
coalitions. In other cases, some rent-shar-
ing agreements may totally undermine ser-
vice provision. The extent to which partial 
rent appropriation by armed elites is a cost 
worth absorbing is as much a political as a 
technical judgement—more an art than a 
science.
modes of delivery Affect Rent  
Access and elite Bargaining 
Sectors and modes of delivery matter by of-
fering different opportunities regarding if and 
how rents are accessed and bargained over by 
elites and their constituents.42 In fact, the rents 
generated by SSD can be most clearly iden-
tified through a sector-by-sector analysis of 
political settlements and elite bargains These 
aspects should be considered when working 
in specific sectors, and when selecting modes 
of delivery (see chapter 8).
7.5. Be Realistic about  
good governance 
Overall, the findings—in line with the 2017 
World Development Report—raise import-
ant questions about the good governance 
paradigm, which has dominated mainstream 
governance-for-development discourse over 
the past two decades. The paradigm pro-
motes formal rules, liberal democratic norms 
of transparency and accountability, techno-
cratic fixes, and institutional models derived 
from best practices often borrowed from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) member and up-
per-middle-income countries.
governance matters, but not 
necessarily as expected 
The findings do not suggest that governance 
does not matter or that “bad” governance 
should be promoted. It is just that many of 
the governance characteristics in our cases 
did not always resemble the “good gover-
nance” paradigm (see table 7.1). Moreover, 
the findings suggest that there are a wider 
range of options for progress in the midst of 
far-from-perfect forms of governance than 
the good governance paradigm assumes. Al-
ternative paradigms, such as “good enough 
governance” or “neo-patrimonial develop-
mentalism” can help flesh this out.43 However, 
such paradigms have yet to be systematically 
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adopted and operationalized in mainstream 
practice. Furthermore, this aspect of our ar-
gument is not new: there is now a burgeoning 
body of evidence on these points.44 Yet, the 
good governance approach remains widely 
dominant.45
some Cases of progress may not 
Resemble good governance 
Related to the last point, there is a need to 
rethink how progress happens. Informal re-
lationships, rent-sharing, far-from-perfect 
transparency or accountability, and deep 
politicization of service delivery—through 
political parties or “unsavory” powerful ac-
tors—can underpin change and progress in 
SSD. In fact, the categories of “communi-
ties,” “civil society,” and “citizens” were less 
apparent in explaining what happens com-
pared with “elites,” “warlords,” and “political 
society.”
This suggests that progress in SSD is not just 
about, or mainly about, preventing elite cap-
ture, but about how and why local elites can 
actively become part of pro-SSD coalitions, 
even though some rent appropriation and 
corruption may occur. While this may seem 
difficult for some to acknowledge (especially 
donors with public constituencies and media 
suspicious of the benefits of overseas devel-
opment assistance in general), there is a grow-
ing recognition that this type of scenario is 
not uncommon, especially in less developed 
countries (World Bank 2017).
narrow the disconnect between 
donor discourse and ground Reality 
The gap between donor discourse and the 
on-the-ground reality needs to narrow. The 
analysis of the cases in this report reveal a 
disconnect between the way development ac-
tors express what is driving change and what 
is actually unfolding on the ground. Indeed, 
many of the factors that the research found 
decisive to project outcomes were hardly 
ever systematically considered in the projects 
examined.46 In other words, our dominant 
mind-sets may be distracting us from what 
really matters.
toward a new paradigm for the 
governance of service delivery 
“History … shows that very significant gains 
in economic transformation and human 
well-being can be achieved within highly 
dysfunctional systems. Reform initiatives 
should surely aim to repeat those gains by 
whatever means are to hand” (Booth 2015b).
Taken as a whole, these findings prompt a 
more nuanced view of the forms of gover-
nance and politics that shape SSD progress. 
Table 7.1 offers a stylized summary of where 
our research diverges from conventional good 
governance discourse.
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table 7.1. Beyond good governance: service delivery in violence-affected contexts
good governance paradigm our research
Rent-sharing corruption, rent-sharing, and patronage are bad 
for social service delivery (ssd) . these aberra-
tions need to be eradicated . 
scope for progress under “patrimonial” governance is larger than often 
perceived . ssd progress can take place in a context of, and even be 
facilitated by, rent-sharing and patronage-based relationships . Rather 
than aberrations, these arrangements are the norm and have wide so-
cial and political legitimacy . Rent-sharing and patronage are subopti-
mal, and measures can be taken to eradicate them if doing so does not 
trigger violence or major disequilibrium . But it is probably not feasible 
to ring-fence delivery from these influences all the time .
technicality 
and neutrality
ssd can be politically neutral . ssd programs 
can be approached with a purely technical 
mind-set .
ssd in violent contexts can often be a vehicle for rent-seeking . A 
feedback loop in which ssd programs influence political dynamics is 
likely . therefore, in addition to thinking technically, there is a need to 
think politically .
Role of elites elites (where recognized) are largely seen as 
capturing or subverting good programs and un-
dermining the poor . elite incentives, interests, 
and bargaining dynamics are rarely unpacked . 
Bargaining with elites is rarely encouraged .
elites can play a positive or negative role . elite capture can subvert a 
program, but it can also enable progress . elite incentives and interests 
must be fully understood, and bargaining must be taken more seriously 
in ssd design and implementation .
violence violence is harmful to service delivery . different forms of violence are more or less harmful . this must be 
recognized and ssd tailored accordingly .
Formal and 
informal 
institutions
Formal institutions are crucial . they need to be 
put in place and be formalized to the greatest 
extent possible . the form of such institutions, 
usually based on the Organisation for economic 
co-operation and development (Oecd) models, 
are often the focal point . informal institutions 
are problems to be bypassed or ignored .
informal institutions can often prove decisive . Formal institutions 
are unlikely to function in the absence of the widespread social and 
political legitimacy that is often tied to “informal” practices . these 
informal practices can be seen as part of the solution, not as just a 
problem; they should be better understood and built on . Approaches 
that actively combine formal and informal institutions, such as prac-
tical hybrids or institutional bricolage, may be critical .47 institutional 
function is what matters .
citizens, 
communities, 
and civil 
society
communities, civil society, and citizens tend to 
be framed as homogenous forces for good .
these actors can and do matter, but they require more nuanced 
treatment . they are not homogenous; they comprise contesting and 
undemocratic elites and power relations between different groups with 
disparate incentives toward or tolerance for broad-based ssd .
context Best practices can be more easily transferred 
across contexts . Win-win scenarios are 
common . 
“good enough” or “best fit” approaches, with substantial contextual 
adaption, are more likely to work . trade-offs are more common than 
win-wins .
important 
actors
Prominence is given to the “usual suspects,” 
such as the state, service users/citizens, and 
service providers .
systematic attention is also given to “unsavory” actors, such as insur-
gents, the military, landlords, and political parties .
how change 
happens
citizens, armed with information, can hold ser-
vice providers and the state accountable; top-
down state incentives can also drive change .
citizen pressures and top-down state pressures matter, but change 
is also driven by dynamics between pro- and anti-ssd networks and 
coalitions that include elites from the state, economy, and society .
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The policy implications presented in chapter 
7 contain nuanced, potentially difficult, op-
erational implications. This chapter identifies 
some operational starting points that address 
the implications of this research and relates key 
points to the global evidence base to make the 
implications more widely generalizable. There 
are no simple solutions, but the following 
discussion suggests that we can take steps to 
develop a more realistic and grounded treat-
ment of political and violence dynamics in 
social service delivery (SSD) programming, in 
turn enabling us to take more calculated risks. 
Moreover, parts of the discussion may raise as 
many questions as they answer (see box 7.1), 
but this does not make the issues any less wor-
thy of significant thought and attention.
Six mutually reinforcing recommendations 
emerge from the research (see figure 8.1):
1. Improve diagnostics for measuring the ac-
tual scope of progress;
2. Think and work politically;
3. Tailor approach to specific forms of violence;
4. Take bargaining seriously;
5. Revise internal donor rules and incentives; 
and
6. Explore new frontiers of delivery and 
research.
8. practical directions and Recommendations
Zahir Shahe high school library. Imal Hashemi/Taimani Films/World Bank
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8.1. improve diagnostics  
for measuring the Actual  
scope of progress 
In order to improve context-specific diagnos-
tics to inform program design, we propose 
integrating a new diagnostic toolkit. This 
has three interrelated modules (box 8.1 out-
lines the scope of the proposed toolkit and 
appendix B has guiding questions for each 
module).The first step is to identify the sec-
toral problems to diagnose. This will involve 
bringing together management, project staff, 
and relevant local stakeholders to discuss 
focal sector(s), the scope of the diagnostic, 
and the sectoral problem(s) that need further 
analysis.48 Next, answers could be sought to 
the questions in each module.
module 1: Understand relevant political 
settlements, who the relevant elites are, and 
how they matter 
Identifying the elites and power brokers who 
are relevant to the sector and locality as well 
as their ideologies and incentives is crucial. 
If feasible, identifying power brokers that are 
figure 8.1. A new framework for strengthening service delivery  
in violence-affected contexts
2. Think and work politically 
3. Tailor approach to specific forms of violence 
4. Take bargaining seriously 
5. Reform donor rules and incentives 
6. Explore new frontiers of delivery and research 
1. Improve diagnostics for measuring the actual scope of progress
Understand relevant political 
settlements, who the relevant 
elites are, and how they matter
Map the relevant dimensions 
of violence in the program 
areas
Draw lessons from local 
service delivery and 
bargaining
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broadly for or against SSD in a given sector 
can help with coalition-building. At a min-
imum, this module should provide project 
teams with a firmer grasp of the power bro-
kers at the central, sectoral, and local levels 
of delivery.
module 2: map the relevant dimensions of 
violence in the program areas 
Understanding how specific dimensions of 
violence in a given context are likely to pres-
ent their own risks and opportunities for the 
focal sector is critical. The focus would be on 
Box 8.1. What the proposed diagnostic toolkit can and cannot do
The proposed diagnostic seeks to complement, not replace, existing diagnostics. 
The suggested questions can be adapted and included in existing analytical tools that 
support the strategic planning of development actors. This diagnostic offers tools in the 
form of modules and questions for actors specifically concerned with supporting social 
service delivery in contexts affected by active violence.
The diagnostic does not need to be extensive but does require careful applica-
tion. Its scope can be tailored to available resources and urgency. Information can be 
gathered through one-hour conversations with experts; one-day workshops and consul-
tations; rapid desk reviews; or the commissioning of a report. Care should be taken that 
the tools be implemented by people who are in tune with the political dynamics of the 
relevant country and who have a solid understanding of the specific context.
The diagnostic is not a one-time exercise. Given the fluid nature of fragile, conflict, 
and violence-affected contexts, the diagnostic needs to be regularly updated. Perhaps 
more important than the rigor of the diagnostic is the process of ensuring organizational 
uptake of its findings. Adequate resources and incentives must be dedicated to discussing 
and following up on the findings.a
There are unlikely to be magic bullet solutions. The diagnostic is unlikely to offer 
unambiguous solutions; it should, however, provide the basis for better planning and 
more informed risk taking.
a. For other useful resources on performing quality diagnostics in the context of donor programming, see 
Hudson, Marquette, and Waldock (2016); Yanguas (2015); and DFID (2016).
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the key dimensions unearthed in this research: 
organization, ideology, and localization. This 
would enable project teams to come up with 
typologies of violence in their context and to 
consider their different implications for their 
program (see recommendation 3). Because 
forms of violence can differ at the subnational 
level, project teams need to be highly sensi-
tive to subnational variation.
module 3: draw lessons from local service 
delivery and bargaining 
Project teams can also collect lessons on what 
modes of service delivery work and what do 
not, as well as if and how forms of bargain-
ing take place in their context. These lessons 
could derive from the experiences of multiple 
stakeholders, and especially those actors op-
erating at the grassroots level and at the front 
line of delivery. Donor knowledge on such 
local dynamics can sometimes be limited (see 
also recommendation 5).
8.2. think and Work politically 
“We can’t go around it [politics], we 
can’t go over it […], we’ll have to go 
through it” (Evans, paraphrased in 
Menocal 2014: 11).
Our study amply demonstrates the critical 
role of political economy factors in making 
or breaking service delivery. In this area, three 
key operational messages are proposed: (1) 
SSD design should be tailored to the specific 
type of political settlement; (2) the delivery 
of services should be rethought as a func-
tion of coalition-building; and (3) politically 
savvy modes of delivery exist and should be 
actively pursued.
tailor design to political settlements 
Political settlements—particularly at the sub-
national and sectoral levels—exist along a 
spectrum and can differ within and between 
violence-affected contexts. As the report has 
shown, such differences can have important 
practical implications for SSD. Based on the 
typology developed for this report, table 8.1 
attempts to tease out some of the initial, prac-
tical implications. Note that this is just a start-
ing point, and is by no means exhaustive.49
Build service delivery coalitions in  
fluid contexts 
SSD is able to operate more effectively when 
it is supported by coalitions of supportive ac-
tors. A key implication is as follows: improv-
ing SSD is a technical challenge but it is also 
a political one insofar as effective implemen-
tation requires the building of coalitions—
however limited, fluid, or localized—that can 
to some degree enable services to be delivered 
and can protect some aspects of delivery from 
factions that wish to appropriate it. Context 
matters, but three “rules” on coalition-build-
ing can be derived from the research:
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table 8.1. implications of political settlements for social service delivery in 
violence-affected contexts
subnational/sectoral settlement implications for social service delivery (ssd)
1: Relatively stable
Pro-ssd incentives exist for ruling coalition .
•  Organized and centralized around a regional 
strongman/warlord with pro-ssd interests/
incentives .
•  Organized around pro-ssd programmatic  
political party .
Reasonably good prospects for ssd, as incentives 
align . stability in settlement potentially allows for 
planning over longer time horizon and the building 
of a pro-ssd coalition . however, ssd needs to align 
with ruling factions’ preferred mode of delivery 
(given the ruling factions’ relative power in setting 
the rules of the game) . 
2: moderately stable 
ssd incentives mixed; incentives are contested 
between state, disciplined armed insurgencies, and 
powerful traditional elites . 
Medium prospects for ssd . Moderate stability allows 
for better planning and better coalition-building 
around ssd programs, but contestation can under-
mine delivery depending on the level of contestation 
at the front line of service delivery . Mechanisms 
of coordination between powerful elites may be 
needed .
3: moderately unstable 
Pro-ssd incentives exist but are contested among 
state and pro-ssd disciplined armed insurgencies .
some prospects for ssd, given pro-ssd ideology . 
however, active contestation between state and 
insurgent groups potentially undermines service 
delivery . efforts, compromises, and bargains likely 
to be needed to reach consensus among contesting 
groups on “ring-fencing” (to a degree) services . 
4: moderately to highly unstable 
Weak ssd incentives; some state penetration in 
areas controlled by relatively disciplined armed 
groups .
ssd is likely to be challenging . some state pene-
tration offers a modicum of stability that may help 
with service delivery, but weak incentives as well as 
antagonism can undermine service delivery .
5: highly unstable (type a) 
Weaker state penetration; less disciplined armed 
groups and weak ssd incentives/ideology .
ssd is likely to be challenging . Weak ssd incentives 
as well as antagonism can undermine ssd .
6: highly unstable (type b)
situation fluid; marked fragmentation of power and 
no monopoly of violence; weak ssd incentives and 
political organization; multiple centers of power 
controlled by armed criminal organizations .
ssd is likely to be very challenging . the lack of 
broadly agreed rules of the game as well as the 
presence of dominant ideology/incentives that seek 
short-term appropriation of ssd make progress 
difficult . delivery needs to be flexible; practitioners 
need to learn by doing and (most likely) accept that 
bargaining strategies must be built in .
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Rule 1: Expect the unexpected: fluid and  
unstable politics are the norm 
In violence-affected contexts, the rules of the 
game are fluid and everchanging. Even bar-
gains that allow a modicum of stability are 
often made under the constant threat or exis-
tence of violence. They tend to change over 
time and are subject to regular renegotiation 
because the dominant coalition often strug-
gles to maintain its supremacy in the face of 
internal and external pressures (Kelsall 2016). 
Practitioners should thus expect the unex-
pected, and recognize that an adaptive ap-
proach—involving regularly changing tactics 
and strategies—will most likely be needed.
Rule 2: Be realistic about the role of “spoils”  
and rents 
This report suggests that, in violent contexts, 
the relationship between SSD programs and 
rents needs to be considered very seriously 
and very carefully. As argued earlier, SSD 
programs can provide rents, and rent-sharing 
in violent contexts often plays a role in sta-
bilizing coalitions, controlling violence, and 
allowing functional service provision. If an 
SSD program disturbs these arrangements, 
factions could increase their demands and 
increase acts of violence. A case in point is 
the Nepal health sector during the Maoist 
conflict: evidence from interviews suggests 
that attempts to circumscribe rent-sharing 
at the local level would have stalled service 
delivery and would have increased the risk 
of violence to service facilities and staff. Spe-
cifically, two operational implications emerge 
as critical:
1. Systematic consideration must be given to 
the way an SSD program provides rents, 
and whether it maintains or undermines 
specific coalitions; and
2. Overly aggressive attempts to curb rents in 
a sector could result in sabotage or even an 
increase in violence.50
There are no magic bullet solutions, but these 
points require attention.
Rule 3: Find “good enough” ways to support— 
or at least not undermine—coalitions that 
support service delivery 
Even during the best of times, external actors 
play a limited role in supporting or maintain-
ing coalitions. In violence-affected contexts, 
elites find it particularly difficult to act collec-
tively due to weak coordination mechanisms, 
major information asymmetries, extremely 
low levels of trust, limited consensus, power 
jostling, a “winner-takes-all” mentality, and 
unpredictability (North et al. 2011).
Drawing on coalition-building lessons, do-
nors could support mechanisms to: (1) help 
pro-SSD elites coordinate themselves and act 
collectively; (2) reduce information asymme-
tries between factions; (3) build trust across 
groups; and (4) increase predictability to en-
able longer time horizons.51 Yanguas (2016) 
takes this further by suggesting broad strate-
gies for coalition-building that target pro- and 
antireform factions, which could eventually 
be applied to violence-affected settings, how-
ever challenging this may be (see box 8.2).
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Box 8.2. potential strategies for building pro-ssd coalitions
It is often unclear in fragile, conflict, and violence-affected contexts who the pro- and 
anti-SSD actors are. This is partly because actors frequently change sides. As outlined 
below, Yanguas (2016) offers some strategies for building coalitions that could be useful 
in violence-affected contexts.
Aid Recipient
strategy incumbent: Anti-ssd Challenger: pro-ssd
diffusion Adaptation contestation
certification legitimization delegitimization
Brokerage consolidation disruption
Diffusion. The flow of ideas across borders and policy domains in which the aid indus-
try plays a role:
•	 Adaptation of ideas occurs when diffusion is aimed at supporting incumbents to achieve 
their goals through incremental change.
•	 Contestation of ideas occurs when the diffusion of ideas by aid agencies is aimed at 
strengthening challenges to existing ideas held by the incumbents.
Certification. International validation signaling recognition of the existing power 
distribution:
•	 Legitimization. Foreign aid could serve to legitimize the incumbents, bolster elite 
priorities, and signal political backing from the international community.
•	 Delegitimization. Aid and dialogue is directed away from powerful elites or incumbents.
Brokerage. Using donor resources and legitimacy to facilitate bargaining and trust-build-
ing to establish new links between actors and policy fields and to coordinate the forma-
tion of new coalitions.
•	 Consolidation represents brokerage influences that ultimately strengthen the incumbent 
coalition.
•	 Disruption entails brokering new relationships outside the incumbent coalition.
Source: Adapted from Yanguas (2016).
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design modes of delivery that are  
politically savvy 
Building on the previous point, different 
modes of delivery may be able to reduce 
the power of anti-SSD forces. Depending 
on local context, there are myriad potential 
strategies for making delivery more politi-
cally astute, however difficult. Key practical 
lessons from this research are summarized in 
box 8.3.
Box 8.3. making delivery more politically astute: key practical lessons
1. semiautonomous delivery mechanisms can reduce the power of sectoral clientelist networks,  
but sustainability and creation of parallel delivery systems is a challenge 
Examples 
The establishment of semiautonomous management and oversight institutions, such as the Balochistan Education 
Foundation (BEF) in Balochistan.
Using alternative human resource approaches or bypassing existing systems to staff service delivery, such as the case 
of health service volunteers in Nepal.
Why is this politically savvy? 
The BEF experience demonstrates that a semiautonomous agency can reduce the impact of clientelist networks on 
a sector by setting up new procedures that are to some degree ring-fenced from interference. Moreover, the semiau-
tonomous institution may, if designed correctly, have credibility with and the backing of reform-minded elites. In 
other words, “new” institutions must be built on new elite pacts.
Using volunteers or alternative human resources systems can help sustain or expand service delivery by reducing 
the influence of patronage-based appointments and the power of incumbents, such as unions or political parties, in 
civil service transfers and postings.
What are the trade-offs? 
The creation of a semiautonomous institution generates risks: (1) it could become a donor-driven entity with lim-
ited social and political legitimacy; (2) it could perpetuate dual public sectors and create parallel structures; and 
(3) it could be subverted by the old elites or used by the new elite grouping for unintended purposes. Checks and 
balances are crucial. Indeed, various interviewees argued that the Balochistan Education Foundation became less 
effective over time and was subject to capture.
(continued)
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Box 8.3. Continued
The trade-offs for using volunteers or alternative human resources systems include: (1) volunteers might be able to 
fulfill simple short-term functions but not deliver the more complex services (and over the medium term, human re-
sources systems would have to be reformed); (2) the role of unions and political parties would need to be addressed 
on a case-by-case basis: these actors might be more or less supportive of SSD depending on the context. The global 
evidence suggests that their relevance to the development process should not be taken lightly.
2. small-scale interventions can circumvent sectoral elite networks and spark a slow-burning  
political demonstration effect, but efforts to scale up can be elusive 
Examples 
Implementation of smaller-scale and localized interventions, such as the Balochistan Education Support Project 
(BESP) in Pakistan, road user committees in Nepal, and local health shuras in Afghanistan.
Why is this politically savvy? 
BESP’s small-scale and localized model reduced appropriation by higher-level elites. Central- and provincial-level 
rent opportunities were reduced, and local elites—who had greater incentives for local education delivery—had 
more control over resource allocation and implementation.
What are the trade-offs? 
Small-scale or localized successes can spur incremental and indirect political demonstration effects; that is, they can 
increase political pressure by constituents on higher-level elites and open up reform spaces by demonstrating what 
is possible, potentially bolstering reform-minded actors and shifting the mind-set and incentives of elites.
However, local successes can be difficult to scale up, and new forms of local elite subversion can emerge. Rather than 
aiming for a province-wide rollout, programs should seek to deepen local successes, harness reform-minded impulses, 
and broadly disseminate communication about achievements to strengthen the demonstration effect. Further, efforts 
should be scaled up incrementally and have built-in strategies for compensating losers and antagonists to reform.
3. Bundling delivery into a suite of services can increase the political feasibility of success,  
but implementation logistics are challenging
Examples 
Bundling services into a suite of selected services, such as providing a range of health services in Nepal or combin-
ing polio with other services in Pakistan.
Why is this politically savvy? 
While multisectoral delivery is often framed as a technical and capacity challenge, this research suggests that this 
approach can help address some of the political barriers to delivery. For example, as the case of Pakistan illustrates, 
(continued)
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Box 8.3. Continued
combining pro-poor services—such as basic vaccinations—with other services that powerful opponents and/or 
local constituents really want—such as other health services or electricity—can reduce resistance and impact the 
incentives of power brokers to support or block the smooth implementation of SSD. Combining basic SSD with 
measures to address income or land inequalities and/or infrastructure investments, such as road connectivity, can 
increase user demand, and can thus have spillover effects on the sector, as the Nepal case illustrates.
What are the trade-offs? 
Before putting together a suite of services, a strong understanding is needed of what local elites want to ensure that the 
plan is technically feasible and politically palatable. Bundling requires strong multisectoral coordination and logistics 
and includes associated costs.
4. A decentralized, multistakeholder approach can facilitate more inclusive delivery bargains, but serious 
mitigation mechanisms are necessary 
Examples 
Decentralized, multistakeholder approaches to delivery that set up local structures for decision making around 
service delivery, such as the road user committees in Nepal and the local school and community development com-
mittees in Afghanistan.
Why is this politically savvy? 
This approach can create space for local bargaining; absorb the transaction costs of enabling local collective action; and 
create opportunities for previously excluded groups to increase their bargaining power with local elites, thus securing 
a better resource allocation deal for themselves at the local level. In short, it can shift the local balance of power.
What are the trade-offs? 
While a decentralized, multistakeholder approach can create bargaining space, it can also enable local elite capture 
because local structures are invariably dominated by powerful local elites—political, social, and religious. The focus 
should be on how to make these structures improve SSD rather than expecting to instantly eliminate their role. In 
addition, it is difficult for the excluded to bargain effectively with powerful local elites, and their inclusion could be 
met with backlash and even increased violence. On-going political risk management in project management teams 
will be needed to manage these trade-offs.
8.3. tailor Approach to specific 
forms of Violence 
In addition to tailoring SSD to political real-
ities, it should also take into account the spe-
cific forms of violence in the context. Table 
8.2 offers a stylized depiction of the different 
types of violence and their implications for 
SSD. As a general rule, the more fragmented, 
mobile, and ideologically antagonistic the vi-
olent actors, the more difficult it will be to 
deliver services and the more mitigation strat-
egies will be needed.
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table 8.2. forms of violence and implications for service delivery
form of violence implications for delivery of social services
Well-organized, disciplined armed groups with 
incentives favoring social service delivery (ssd)
Example: dominant/organized strongman allied 
with ruling coalition, such as general Atta in Balkh, 
Afghanistan
Bargaining feasible (actors clear, incentives for 
service delivery aligned) . good prospects of direct 
state provision given alliance with ruling coalition . 
Resource transfer—from the center to the subna-
tional level—may be substantial to maintain alliance .
Well-organized, disciplined insurgent armed 
groups with incentives favoring ssd
Examples: organized insurgency resisting or trying to 
capture the state but wanting some services, such as 
Maoists (nepal), Balochistan (Pakistan)
Bargaining feasible (actors clear, incentive align-
ment) . But poor relationship with the state means 
strategies are needed to mitigate risks such as 
nonstate provision and dialogue with insurgents to 
ensure that delivery of social services is not per-
ceived as a proxy for state penetration .
somewhat organized/disciplined insurgent armed 
groups largely opposed to ssd
Example: relatively organized insurgents who want 
to undermine delivery, for example of polio inoc-
ulation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally 
Administered tribal Areas of Pakistan
high risks of violence targeting delivery . insurgent 
leaders relatively clear in their antiservice ideology 
driven by their poor relationship with the state . Mit-
igation strategies could include bundling of services 
to increase insurgent incentives not to undermine 
delivery .
somewhat organized/disciplined armed groups 
competing for regional power and legitimacy; 
positions favoring service delivery contested
Example: large parts of Wardak Province, 
Afghanistan
complex scenario . strategies for service delivery 
will depend on various factors: local contestation 
may lead to competition to improve services or to 
capture/undermine services . competition may also 
be over who is seen to deliver the service . 
disorganized/fragmented, mobile/roving  
insurgent armed groups with some local roots 
creating incentives for service delivery
Examples:fractionalized, uncoordinated armed 
groups with some incentives for service delivery as 
in parts of Badghis, Afghanistan
A more difficult context (compared to the four pre-
vious ones) . leaders fragmented, power contested, 
and violence less predictable, with the result that 
bargaining is less feasible . second-best solutions 
need to apply, such as using local implementers to 
increase safety and securitize delivery .
highly disorganized/fragmented, highly mobile/
roving armed groups with criminal (nonpolitical) 
motives
Examples: some parts of Badghis, Afghanistan; to a 
lesser extent, tarai, nepal, after large-scale violent 
conflict .
Most difficult context: leaders fragmented, power 
contested, and violence less predictable; incentives 
of violent actors are to undermine delivery of social 
services . second-best solutions will be required .
Part iii . implications for Policy and Operations | 119
8.4. take Bargaining seriously 
Bargaining is, as outlined at length, critical in 
making or breaking SSD in violence-affected 
contexts. The implications of these bargains 
are ambiguous and fraught with ethical di-
lemmas, but some key, preliminary practical 
tips are outlined below.
Consider the dynamics of bargaining 
At minimum, the research suggests that pro-
gram designers and implementers should take 
the dynamics of bargaining seriously. Indeed, 
if SSD programs are not tailored to local poli-
tics and bargaining, they risk being a “shot in 
the dark.”52 Two points deserve highlighting:
1. Intended or not, some form of bar-
gaining is likely to occur. Indeed, elite 
bargains emerged as fundamental in all the 
studied cases, but we found scant evidence 
that project implementers are aware of or 
systematically consider them.53
2. Making decisions about projects 
without considering the role of bar-
gains could put SSD at increased risk. 
Engaging in bargains and compromises 
may not be ideal, but might be the only 
way to make SSD progress in some vio-
lence-affected contexts. For example, if 
education delivery in Afghanistan had 
entirely circumscribed the space for mod-
ifications to the curriculum, the Taliban 
might have targeted such services. If 
higher-level officials had demanded an 
accounting of resource flows for health in 
Nepal, it likely would have disrupted del-
icate local bargains, increased acts of vio-
lence, and negatively impacted progress in 
health delivery (see part II).
Carefully weigh trade-offs 
It is also important to put the issue of trade-
offs front and center in this debate. Trade-offs 
exist for both traditional and “bargaining-sen-
sitive” approaches to SSD in violence-affected 
settings. The difficult question is: what should 
be prioritized?
1. Trade-offs with traditional program-
ming. For example, a traditional pro-
gram (that is, one that ignores the role of 
bargaining) might unknowingly create 
rents that sustain locally powerful elites; 
it might circumscribe rents that fuel fac-
tional violence; or the provided services 
might be accessed by insurgents and their 
allies, indirectly sustaining them.54
2. Trade-offs with bargain-sensitive pro-
gramming. Bargains with insurgents can 
enable SSD progress in the short term, but 
they present challenges that must be con-
sidered and managed:
– Bargains might help short-term, lo-
calized delivery progress, but little is 
known about if and how they might 
contribute to longer-term state- or 
peace-building objectives.
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table 8.3. operational strategies for bargaining with insurgents
Bargaining method operational options
Build ssd program 
bargaining capacity
•  create an enabling environment for local service providers to reach ssd 
bargains with local armed elites and allied insurgents, for example, by 
providing front-line staff with some degree of autonomy and incentives to 
reach out to elites and insurgents and find compromise .
•  Provide negotiation and training in bargaining to all relevant staff .
•  employ staff with expertise in negotiation and conflict resolution .
Facilitate dialogue and 
negotiations
•  develop a tailored communication strategy to negotiate with armed elites 
and allied insurgents and persuade them to tolerate the service .
•  Absorb transaction costs of bringing together key stakeholders and armed 
elites to negotiate bargains; use mediation experts to facilitate . 
inform and obtain 
“permission” from 
insurgents
•  inform and build trust with armed elites and allied insurgents and comanage 
delivery with them so delivery is seen as less threatening .
•  use actors trusted by armed elites and allied insurgents to deliver the 
service . if insurgents have an antagonistic relationship with the state, 
implement services through nonstate actors .
enlist influential local 
elites
•  identify local pro-ssd elites who could be allies in delivering services .
•  engage influential, pro-ssd elites to encourage armed elites and allied 
insurgents (and local constituents) to allow the service .
Make concessions and 
compromises
•  identify acceptable areas for modifying the scope of delivery to make it more 
tolerable to armed elites and allied insurgents, such as allowing curriculum 
changes in Balochistan and developing realistic plans for girl’s education in 
parts of Afghanistan .
engage in rent-sharing 
agreements
•  dedicate some of the budget to compensating losers, opponents, and/or 
armed elites and allied insurgents with “sweeteners” or incentives, such as 
bundling or allowing insurgents to use the services .
•  consider tolerating some leakage if it is necessary to reduce violence and 
enable delivery .
Note: Selection of activities should depend on organizational objectives, comparative advantages, and the results 
of the diagnostic.
– Using locally trusted actors and volun-
teers to deliver services might reduce 
the risk of attacks and maintain service 
quantity, but doing so makes it difficult 
to improve service quality. For exam-
ple, volunteers might be unable to de-
liver complex services.
– Service delivery might be maintained 
through bargaining, but resource flows 
could be diverted to areas and groups 
considered more important by pow-
erful insurgents and elites, and de-
pending on the group or area being 
excluded, this can increase violence.
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– Achieving small-scale impacts through 
local bargaining might be possible, but 
scaling up could prove difficult.
– Rent-sharing might be costly and un-
palatable to donor agencies, but these 
concerns must be weighed against the 
risk of violence if the insurgents’ rents 
dry up.
In short, the question of whether bargain-
ing with armed elites and their allied insur-
gent groups to deliver services is better than 
slower progress or no progress at all depends 
on the particulars of a case.
What would a bargain-sensitive delivery 
program look like? 
Let us suppose that, after deliberation, a proj-
ect team decides to consciously integrate 
some form of bargaining into a given SSD 
program. What might this look like? First, 
options could be explored for “doing no 
harm” to pro-SSD bargains, and for reduc-
ing the space for anti-SSD bargains. Second, 
table 8.3 offers some initial ideas to provoke 
thought and debate among project teams. In-
deed, it is recognized that in any given con-
text “bargain-sensitive SSD programs” may 
not be formally possible as it may undermine 
an agency’s relationship with the government 
and articles of association that allow it to op-
erate in the country.
8.5. Reform donor Rules and 
incentives 
Many of this study’s implications upset the 
traditional thinking of the mainstream aid 
system. The findings of this study build on 
at least two important contemporary narra-
tives around changing aid delivery: (1) ad-
vocacy for doing development differently and 
thinking and working politically55 in the aid 
system, which includes adaptive and iterative 
programming;56 and (2) advocacy for a more 
context-specific approach in violent contexts 
that considers the political economy and risk 
of violence and draws on lessons about what 
really works on the ground (IEG 2016; Marc 
et al. 2016).
This report builds on these narratives in two 
main ways: (1) by offering a more granular 
framework for addressing politics and vio-
lence in SSD operations based on bottom-up 
research (above); and (2) by outlining further 
ideas, and associated challenges, on how to 
reform traditional ways of delivering aid 
(below).
encourage honest debate on bargains: avoid 
“shots in the dark” 
One challenge is changing mind-sets. For in-
stance, interviews undertaken for this research 
suggest that such issues are currently glossed 
over or painted in an overly simplistic light 
in internal debates (see also the discussion on 
122 | social service delivery in violent contexts: Achieving Results Against the Odds
“good governance” in chapter 7). Thus one 
recommendation is to actively foster frank in-
ternal debate (table 8.4) on politics, violence, 
and bargaining to start changing organiza-
tional mind-sets and cultures.
What needs to be done differently and why 
is it difficult? 
Taken together, the implications of our re-
search and global evidence underline the 
need to shift, to differing degrees, the way 
aid is delivered in violent contexts.57 Table 
8.5 offers a stylized summary of the main 
differences between traditional approaches 
and what may be required based on this (and 
other) research. It also highlights some of the 
operational risks and policy dilemmas that 
would result from trying to adapt to reform in 
this direction. Indeed, the powerful political 
economy of the aid system and donor agen-
cies presents legitimate dilemmas, which can-
not be wished away.
8.6. explore new frontiers of 
delivery and Research 
Finally, what does this all mean for a for-
ward-looking agenda on models of SSD, as 
well as research in this field? In what follows 
are some initial considerations and thoughts, 
which are meant to encourage further think-
ing and debate among academics and policy 
makers.
Adding to contemporary debates 
During the course of this study, an import-
ant and challenging question was posed: how 
does the approach emerging here differ from 
more standard approaches to SSD? This is an 
expansive question. This report was not in-
tended to provide a new SSD model, even if 
it contains a number of seeds of a new model. 
To explore these points, a literature review 
was undertaken (Deshpande 2016), and the 
main headlines are outlined below.
table 8.4. ideas for shifting donor lexicon and mind-sets on elites  
and bargaining
Recommendation example
Budget for bargaining Fund type of diagnostics proposed in chapter 8; pilot and integrate bargaining 
strategies into design and implementation .
change program 
vocabulary
talk about power and elites at every opportunity . Balance terms such as commu-
nity-driven development and citizen engagement with terms like local-elite-driven 
development and engaging development elites .
involve the “un-usual 
suspects”
talk to insurgents; to military, political, and religious elites; to tribal elders; and 
union representatives—or encourage governments and implementers to do so .
engage in frank internal 
communication
encourage project teams and senior management to openly discuss politics, 
trade-offs, and “leakage” in program design .
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table 8.5. shifts in how aid actors work: frontiers and challenges
mainstream aid priority What this research suggests
Considerations and risks in 
reforming the way of working
emphasize success; under-
line win-wins and underplay 
difficult trade-offs .
emphasis should be on what does 
and does not work as well as why . 
difficult trade-offs and political 
and ethical dilemmas should be 
acknowledged .
Few—if any—agencies seek to 
highlight their mistakes . taxpayer 
and donor tolerance for failure and 
trade-offs is likely limited .
leakage/rent-sharing unac-
ceptable . donor fiduciary 
rules and requirements 
require zero leakage .
A degree of leakage can accom-
pany progress and in some cases is 
necessary to reduce violence and 
allow social service delivery (ssd) 
to continue .
it is extremely challenging for 
donors to encourage or endorse 
leakage . Fiduciary rules need 
to be revised to include built-in 
exceptions .
national and/or “one-size-
fits-all” programs . limited 
internal incentives for staff to 
significantly adapt to subna-
tional variation . Pressure to 
prepare projects quickly . 
significant adaptation to and 
incentives for subnational and local 
variation is necessary . this includes 
staff rewards and time and budget 
allocation for this .
significant subnational variation 
can be costly, very complex, put 
additional pressure on overstretched 
staff, and undermine efforts to scale 
up . consideration should be given 
to how much local calibration is 
practically achievable .
Weak incentives to undertake 
and follow-up on analytical 
diagnostics of project design 
and implementation .
Project teams should be incentiv-
ized to undertake and ensure uptake 
of the proposed diagnostics .
diagnostics rarely present simple 
solutions . expectations should be 
adjusted accordingly .
“One-size-fits-all” project 
preparation and implementa-
tion support budgets . 
greater mitigation and bargaining 
strategies and operational support 
are needed in subnational areas 
where the politics and forms of 
violence are strongly opposed to 
ssd . Budgets should be increased 
relative to the challenges of local 
politics and violence .
A bigger budget does not necessarily 
mean more success . consideration 
should be given to how aid ac-
tors should best allocate limited 
resources in violence-affected 
contexts .
Relatively limited ability of 
and incentives for projects to 
regularly adapt to changes on 
the ground . linear log-frames 
with output focus tend to 
dominate .
Fluidity of the context requires 
strong adaptive capacity and the 
ability to monitor, learn, and experi-
ment over time, including setting up 
systems for more regular monitoring 
at the subnational level .
challenges include building adaptive 
capacity in a violent environment 
with low institutional capacity, a 
weak public sector, and patchy po-
litical coverage; making large-scale 
programs adaptive to local programs 
without creating huge transaction 
costs; and rectifying iterative 
approaches with modern rules of 
accountability and budgeting .
(continued)
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The idea that “governance matters” in ex-
plaining SSD is now widely recognized, 
thanks to the groundbreaking 2004 World 
Development Report (World Bank 2003). 
There are, however, different SSD models in 
both the theoretical and practitioner litera-
ture. One of the main issues that differentiates 
these models are their different understand-
ings of governance and the way it matters for 
service delivery. SSD models include the fol-
lowing (sometimes overlapping) approaches: 
(1) those inspired by the World Development 
Report 2004; (2) the Community-Driven De-
velopment (CDD) approach and its later vari-
ants; (3) combinations of (1) and (2) rooted 
in good governance norms; and (4) a more 
recent generation of approaches that attempt 
to systematically relate service delivery to the 
political economy context.58 The model that 
emerges here is most aligned with the fourth 
type of model and the recently published 
2017 World Development Report.
table 8.5. Continued
development and ssd prob-
lems and programs defined 
by a tight-knit group of 
experts . support of top-down 
implementation, especially in 
fragile contexts where people 
are sometimes stuck in com-
pounds and cut off from life 
outside the compound of the 
capital city .
Projects should enable and absorb 
the costs of gathering multiple 
stakeholders to identify locally 
defined problems and locally driven 
solutions . teams should reach 
beyond the normal interlocutors—
government and other donors—to 
include journalists, political parties, 
and others . 
challenges include engaging with 
local stakeholders in extremely vio-
lent contexts without putting donor 
staff at great risk and ensuring local 
people also benefit from external 
experiences without being dictated 
by them .
sectoral silos . Poor integra-
tion of conflict and political 
economy specialists in 
project teams .
Build knowledge-practice alliances 
between various specialists and 
ensure a multidisciplinary mix on 
project teams .
classic challenges remain regarding 
sector coordination, resourcing, and 
incentivizing of multidisciplinary 
teams .
high turnover of staff among 
many donors . short tours 
are the norm for most in 
violence-affected contexts . 
international staff are regu-
larly rotated .
Revise human resource practices 
by retaining local staff with strong 
local knowledge and reducing high 
levels of staff turnover . engage staff 
in longer-term postings with greater 
emphasis on country knowledge and 
experience .
Attracting and retaining people 
in violence-affected contexts is 
difficult . the psychological effects of 
such postings can take a major toll 
on a person .
Sources: Authors; key informant interviews conducted for this study; Akmeemana et al. n.d.; Devarajan and Khemani 
2016. 
Note: This is a stylized summary; aid agencies differ and exist on a spectrum.
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In sum, this report’s implications differ from a 
number of the mainstream approaches in the 
following ways:
•	 No one model is privileged. Different 
models can be more or less effective de-
pending on local political settlements, the 
form of violence, and the context (see, for 
instance, chapter 6).
•	 It brings new drivers of progress to the 
forefront of the debate. These include 
informal institutions, elite bargaining, and 
far-from-perfect modes of governing.
•	 It suggests that violence needs to be 
unpacked and systematically related 
to service delivery. The varying impacts 
of different forms of violence on SSD are 
central preoccupations.
•	 Political economy is not just about 
material power; it is also about ideas. 
We show the important role of “ideas” 
(held by elites and insurgents) in shaping 
the constraints and opportunities for SSD.
•	 Service delivery is rarely politically 
neutral. The research, by showing how 
SSD is a source of rents that differs by 
sector, undermines traditional approaches 
that suggest it can be technical, neutral, or 
ring-fenced from politics and power.
•	 Bargains and trade-offs are part of the 
new normal. Bargains, trade-offs, and 
compromises are integral to service deliv-
ery—an element scarcely treated by other 
models.
•	 New actors are brought into sharper 
focus. A more concerted effort is made to 
analyze the central role, interests, and in-
centives of key SSD actors, such as elites, 
landlords, or warlords, who have not re-
ceived much, if any, attention in the past.
•	 SSD is understood through a lens of 
political feasibility rather than tech-
nical soundness. Through this lens, we 
reach slightly different conclusions:
– Semiautonomous institutional delivery 
mechanisms are effective because they 
can bypass powerful sectoral clien-
telistic networks, not because they are 
more rational-legal, as standard models 
suggest.
– Small-scale interventions are effective 
because the model is more appealing 
to local elites and because small grants 
offer fewer incentives and opportuni-
ties for rent capture at higher levels 
of governance, not just because they 
involve “local people” and “citizen 
participation.”
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Box 8.4. key questions for further exploration
•	 How can the typology of violence be deepened and further tested in other geographic areas to strengthen its 
general applicability?
•	 How do the ideas, values, and ideologies held by different elites and armed actors shape the way in which basic 
services are delivered in violence-affected contexts? Beyond standard information campaigns, how can develop-
ment actors shape these ideas toward better development outcomes?a
•	 Given the risks and trade-offs inherent in engaging with informal institutions and nonstate actors and in pursu-
ing bargaining for social service delivery (SSD), are there lessons to be learned from any cases where bargaining 
was integrated and risks effectively mitigated?
•	 How can we better understand projects in which elite bargains are struck but major progress is not achieved? Or 
the opposite: are there cases where elite bargains were not struck yet success was achieved?
•	 What role do constituents and project beneficiaries, including the very poor, play in shaping the way elites and 
armed actors approach a given service? In other words, how can we better understand how pro-SSD alliances 
and coalitions between elites and nonelites (especially the poor) form?
•	 How precisely do development interventions create and sustain bargaining structures? How can interventions 
operate within elite bargaining dynamics while creating incentives for the bargains to be more supportive of 
SSD?
•	 How do gender dynamics fit into this elite bargaining approach in violence-affected contexts?
•	 How can donor agencies square the circle between their fiduciary requirements, such as accounting and procure-
ment, and the need for flexibility and bargaining for SSD? What aid instruments would be most appropriate for 
this?
•	 Given the important role it plays in creating and sustaining rents and in shaping elite bargaining around deliv-
ery, how can SSD’s influence on political outcomes—such as strengthening political parties or informal insti-
tutions—be more systematically assessed? What is the measure for whether or not these political outcomes are 
good or bad for development?
•	 How can we better understand if bargaining in the short term to enable the delivery of services endangers or 
advances the long-term goals of reducing the power of the insurgency, bringing about peace, and ensuring the 
legitimacy of the state?
a. See Rodrik (2014). 
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– Bundling can be effective not just 
because of the social and economic 
benefits of combining complementary 
services, but also because it means that 
powerful opponents can be compen-
sated for enabling SSD to continue.
– Decentralized, multistakeholder ap-
proaches are effective because they cre-
ate space for local elites to bargain over 
delivery, not just because local citizens 
are “empowered.”
Areas for further research 
Box 8.4 provides a summary of areas inspired 
by this research that should be explored 
further.
In conclusion, this report provides the foun-
dation for developing an approach to service 
delivery in violence-affected contexts that is 
more sensitive to the actual forms of violence, 
politics, and bargaining that are found on the 
ground in many conflict-affected states today. 
It raises particularly sensitive issues about 
how to approach service delivery in contested 
settings for development organizations such 
as the World Bank which work with recog-
nized governments. As many countries today 
are increasingly riven by violent conflict and 
internal division, the traditional “rules of the 
game” may be inadequate to deal with the 
mounting humanitarian and development 
challenges posed by complex conflict situ-
ations, particularly where SSD access is re-
quired. This raises complex dilemmas about 
the ethical and political judgments and trade-
offs that development actors frequently have 
to make. Some trade-offs will be especially 
difficult to consider due to the nature of the 
compromises required, but it is at least time to 
consider and discuss them as part of a broader 
debate about how to tackle the growing hu-
manitarian and development consequences of 
fragility, conflict, and violence in the world.
At minimum, the report sets out to question 
traditional ways of thinking about delivering 
services in highly fluid, contested, and risky 
contexts. A key challenge is whether develop-
ment actors can adapt their procedures and 
ways of working to the uncertainty of this 
new agenda and its demands for fluidity and 
risk taking, while preserving the sometimes 
fragile support for development assistance 
in the donor country constituencies: “do no 
harm” and provide effective aid. This agenda 
cannot be ignored. Progress in basic service 
delivery in violence-affected contexts will 
make or break global efforts to end poverty 
and increase shared prosperity over the com-
ing decades.
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notes
1. There are synergies between this report and the thinking and 
working politically (TWP) approach. In our view, this report 
makes a contribution to further unpacking and operational-
izing the approach. Thinking politically means understand-
ing that both political and technical dimensions are central 
to developmental outcomes. Working politically in develop-
ment means supporting, brokering, facilitating, and aiding the 
emergence and practices of (public or private) developmental 
or reform leaderships, organizations, networks, and coalitions 
at any level, and across all sectors. It means helping them to 
respond to, and work with, initiatives and requests from local 
individuals and groups.
Below are emerging findings on what thinking and working 
politically means (Leftwich 2011: 9–11):
•	 Prior	and	existing	networks	often	facilitate	the	formation	of	
developmental coalitions in unfolding situations that pres-
ent opportunities for working politically (for example, in 
the context of democratization or decentralization). Prior 
knowledge and experience with working politically extends 
and enriches the tactical and strategic repertoire of such 
leaders and elites. Well-educated and sometimes well-con-
nected individuals play an important part in directing and 
driving coalitions for reform.
•	 The	character	and	conditionality	of	funding	by	donors	or	
supporters can make or break a coalition, for example, if 
tight conditions are applied or funding arrangements are 
transparent.
•	 The	 internal	organization	of	a	 coalition	committed	 to	 re-
form is important, such as transparency of procedures and 
financial arrangements, agreement and clarity on roles and 
responsibilities, size of a coalition and potential trade-offs 
between inclusiveness and effectiveness, and navigating be-
tween formal and informal institutions and environments.
•	 Coalitions	 can	 help	 drive	 the	 endogenous	 politics	 of	 de-
velopmental reforms by achieving a specific policy goal, 
opening up debate on a previously taboo issue, deepening 
and strengthening the coalition’s internal organization and 
relationships for future purposes, and increasing the capac-
ity of constituent organizations.
For more details on what the thinking and working politically ap-
proach entails, see Leftwich (2011: 3–9). For details on the 
principles and characteristics of a politically smart program, as 
per the TWP approach, see Whaites et al. (2015: 44).
2. Given the especially fluid, nonlinear, and unpredictable na-
ture of change in violence-affected contexts, adaptive and real-
istic approaches to supporting change are probably necessary. 
Indeed, our research found important changes on the ground 
over time, but limited evidence of major or real-time adap-
tation to such changes by the programs under investigation.
Key principles of the emerging adaptive approach to social 
service delivery (SSD) programs in fragile and violent contexts 
are as follows (adapted from Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 
[2012] and Valters [2016]):
•	 Focus	on	processes,	behavior	changes,	and	intermediate	out-
comes rather than just on activities or outputs.
•	 Focus	on	solving	locally	nominated	defined	problems	rather	
than transplanting preconceived ideas of what local priori-
ties should be or how things should work.
•	 Actively	engage	broad	sets	of	agents	to	ensure	that	reforms	
are viable, legitimate, relevant, and supportable, rather than 
having a narrow set of external experts promote a top-down 
diffusion of innovations.
•	 Allow	flexibility	and	positive	deviance	by	creating	an	au-
thorizing environment for decision making that encourages 
experimentation rather than designing programs and then 
requiring agents to implement them exactly as designed.
•	 Prioritize	ongoing	learning	and	adaptation	by	ensuring	that	
experimentation is embedded in tight feedback loops that 
facilitate learning rather than having long lag times of ex-
post evaluations.
•	 Think	compass,	not	map.	Set	broad	directions	 for	 change	
rather than laying out microdetails in advance.
Some unanswered practical questions remain, such as: how will 
adaptive capacities be built in environments with low insti-
tutional capacities, a weak public sector, and patchy political 
coverage, as is often the case in violence-affected contexts? 
And how can development agencies operate with such high 
levels of uncertainty?
3. Underpinning this synthesis are three unpublished coun-
try reports and global literature reviews (see World Bank and 
Akram 2016; World Bank and AREU 2016; World Bank and 
SSB 2016).
4. Note that these gaps were identified through a rigorous re-
view of the literature alongside consultations with a range of 
practitioners in these fields.
5. As Booth (2013: 2) puts it: “The evidence is now over-
whelming that most of the binding constraints in development 
are about institutions and institutional change.”
6. There is little evidence that what matters for developmental 
outcomes depends on best practice or good governance (Khan 
2010; Rodrik 2014). “Best fit” or “good enough governance” 
refers to attempts to design development projects in the con-
text of actually existing governance structures, which often 
involve navigating the realities of clientelism, corruption, and 
patronage-ridden politics.
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7. There is scant but growing evidence regarding how the po-
litical economy impacts SSD in low-income countries (for ex-
ample, Mcloughlin and Batley 2012; Harris, McLoughlin, and 
Wild 2013). Significant gaps remain: (1) the existing research 
tends to be conceptual and not strongly informed by firsthand 
ethnographic field research; (2) even studies that recognize 
the importance of politics treat the subject superficially (for 
example, broadly referring to a lack of “political will”); and 
(3) the issue has not been applied to SSD in violence-affected 
contexts.
8. Based on informal consultations with the authors at the 
World Bank Fragility Forum, March 2016, Washington, DC 
(http://www.dlprog.org/opinions/what-do-we-do-on-mon-
day-political-settlements-in-theory-and-practice.php).
9. For a country to be included on the World Bank’s list of 
fragile and conflict-affected states, it only needs to score low 
on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) in-
dicators, which are as much a measure of “underdevelopment” 
as of a particular condition of “fragility.” These indicators, 
drawn up by the World Bank (Moore 2014), are tools that 
allow a lender to rate the creditworthiness of a potential bor-
rower. Countries are given scores based on 16 criteria grouped 
in 4 clusters: (1) economic management, (2) structural policies, 
(3) policies for social inclusion and equity, and (4) public sector 
management and institutions.
10. Even when studies examine SSD in violence-affected con-
texts (for example, World Bank 2011), there is no attempt to 
explore if and how diverse forms of violence matters. Indeed, 
what is missing is a systematic discussion of how and why 
political violence is likely to alter the context of SSD delivery.
11. Because it pilots a new innovative research framework in 
difficult contexts, the inductive approach seemed to be the 
most appropriate. In other words, rigid theories do not apply 
at the beginning of the research, and the researcher is free 
to alter the direction of the study after the research process 
has commenced (http://www.antropocaos.com.ar/Russel-Re-
search-Method-in-Anthropology.pdf ). The study seeks to ex-
amine and refine in an iterative process patterns emerging from 
the field research and assess how and if these patterns fit with 
reigning analytical explanations of the politics around SSD. To 
build an analytical framework that could explain SSD imple-
mentation and outcomes, we drew on and attempt to integrate 
insights from varied and rich literature on the political econ-
omy of institutions in less developed and violence-affected 
contexts and varying options of SSD strategies and modes.
12. The aim was to develop analytical narratives focused on 
common patterns and processes of pro-poor service delivery 
rather than provide systematic comparative analysis of sector 
specificities. Focal projects for each sector were selected based 
on whether the life of a project spanned a certain period of 
violent conflict; if the project and sector presented interesting 
puzzles of successes, challenges, or divergent outcomes; and if 
the Bank project team was interested in the study remit, which 
would improve the chances of getting access to data and en-
courage future uptake.
13. A great deal of literature is available on these subjects, 
but it is not the purpose of this study to engage in theoretical 
debates.
14. A challenge to state authority through violent means is 
synonymous with a challenge to the ruling coalition itself, 
which is the principal reason why political violence creates a 
dynamic or fluid situation for a political settlement.
15. This categorization of political settlements does not imply 
that the national, provincial, and sectoral levels are discon-
nected from one other in terms of elite bargains, contestations, 
and their effects. Moreover, because political settlements are 
historically specific, broad diversity and complexity is likely to 
be found in political settlements at different levels of the polity.
16. There are sound reasons why a large variation in subna-
tional political settlements might be expected. Kalyvas (2003) 
argued that the main driver of violence at the local and re-
gional level is not usually linked to drivers of violence at the 
national level. Master cleavages often fail to account for the 
nature of the conflict and its violence or if the violence is unre-
lated or incompletely related to the dominant discourse of the 
war. Civil wars are imperfect and fluid aggregations of multi-
ple, more or less overlapping civil wars that are smaller, diverse, 
and localized, and that entail Byzantine complexity and splin-
tering authority into “thousands of fragments and micropowers 
of local character. A great deal of the action in a civil war is 
therefore simultaneously decentralized and linked to the wider 
conflict, including violence, which can be simultaneously po-
litical and private. A fine-grained analysis is required that takes 
into account intracommunity dynamics as well as those of the 
civil war to determine when this is the case and who is allied 
with whom. The prospects for success for any SSD effort de-
pend on the identification of the main local elites, including 
armed groups, as well as an understanding of what motivated 
the violence in the first place.
17. This all results in a political settlement that is unstable 
and fluid, generates uncertainty about the “rules of the game,” 
and tends to create short-lived ruling coalitions and complex 
shifting alliances between elites at the national and subnational 
levels. Crises of political settlements need not occur only at 
the national level. One strand of research focuses on violence 
and breakdowns in political settlements at the subnational level 
(Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013).
18. Olson’s (1993) “bandit theory” offers some insights into 
how two different organizations of violence can affect devel-
opmental outcomes. In the model, a “stationary bandit” re-
fers to a leader that has eliminated rival armed groups and 
has established a monopoly of violence and has established a 
disciplined chain of command over its armed groups. Because 
stationary bandits are relatively secure in power, they have in-
centives to limit confiscation of property, avoid overburden-
some taxation, and provide public goods to maximize the rate 
of economic growth because this will maximize the resources 
accruing to the leader in the long run. In short, stationary 
bandits have a long-run time horizon and an “encompassing” 
interest in promoting economic development. This contrasts 
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with a situation of “roving banditry” where there are either 
competing regional warlords or where the ruling coalition’s 
hold on power is fragile. In this case, leaders have a short-run 
time horizon and they have incentives to pillage the economy 
as fast as they can which has obvious negative effects on eco-
nomic activity. While it has been pointed out that this model 
overlooks the reality that all states are organizations which 
emerge from the internal dynamics of relationships among 
elites (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009: 17), it does suggest 
that the organization of violence matters to SSD and other 
developmental outcomes.
19. There is a great deal of literature about how ideas and in-
terests affect development, how ideas can alter power balances, 
and even how the powerful can alter their interests. See, for 
example, Rodrik (2014).
20. The weaker links may also be one of the reasons why un-
foreseen government official transfers and the general rate of 
turnover is more common in the Tarai than in the hill region. 
The greater degree of turnover and politicization of transfers 
clearly affects the planning and the continuity of policy im-
plementation among the three main types of local officials: 
government agents, local development officers, and district 
planning officers.
21. The higher-level elites are the nawabs (Indian-Muslim word 
for “head of the landed nobility”) and the sardars (Persian word 
for “chief ”), who can serve as the figurehead or de facto leader 
of the wider tribe. These groups are seen as highly influen-
tial—the Baloch nawabs and sardars even more so than their 
Pashtun counterparts. These elites often maintain two resi-
dences because living conditions and the social life in their 
home districts are generally poor. Families and children of 
the elite live in the major cities of Pakistan (such as Karachi, 
Islamabad, Quetta, or DG Khan) or abroad, and they main-
tain another home in their ancestral homeland. Consequently, 
while this group has provided leadership for issues that can 
affect a whole tribe, such as war or disaster, their perpetual 
absenteeism risks them losing their land and legitimacy. These 
elites are not likely to send their children to a BESP school. 
In addition to lineage and being conversant in local customs, 
a prerequisite for entering the upper elite is a certain amount 
of “Westernization,” and therefore the children of elites typi-
cally attend one of the top Pakistani schools and then pursue a 
higher education abroad.
22. Elders are sometimes organized into tribal shuras (consulta-
tive councils), although only a few tribes have all-Wardak shu-
ras. The Pashtuns of Wardak have stronger tribal representative 
structures than do those in Badghis, although neither com-
pares with the eastern tribes (WK: IDI–14 and 18). The exis-
tence of shuras tends to magnify the influence of elders, which 
makes them more attractive partners in secondary settlements.
23. Similarly, one of the factors that contributed to the pros-
pects for elite bargains in Nepal was that the power of tradi-
tional elites were often maintained at the local level, despite 
shifts in the national political settlement and the fluid nature 
of political party contestation (see boxes 3.1 and 3.2). Almost 
everywhere the leading political figures that the field research 
team encountered, especially in the rural parts of the districts, 
had a political pedigree that had been passed on to them from 
their family. A few exceptions could be seen in Rolpa, where 
new leaders have emerged from among the ranks of the Mao-
ists, as well as in Siraha, where the Madhesi movement has 
empowered Madhesis to take leadership roles. Overall, how-
ever, there was a continuity of elites at the local level. This may 
likely facilitate the political bargaining required to allow the 
implementation of the projects, even though many of these 
were of substandard quality.
24. Based on H5–KII–SRH; H6–KII–SRH; H7–KII–SRH; 
H10–KII–SRH; H17–KII–PAL; H20–KII–PAL; H21–KII–
PAL; H1–FGD–SRH; G8–KII–SRH; and G10–KII–SRH.
25. Based on H17–KII–PAL; H25–KII–PAL; H29–KII–ROL; 
H30–KII–ROL; H32–KII–ROL; and H8–FGD–PAL.
26. Health facilities turned out to generate several privileges: 
(1) they were a source of supplies and services for the Maoist 
rebel forces (H21–KII–PAL; H29–KII–ROL; G10–KII–SRH); 
(2) health workers were found paying “levy to the Maoists” 
(H13–KII–BAR) and private medical practitioners had to 
pay donations to Maoists (ibid.); and (3) there was evidence 
that Maoists sent letters to locals asking for rice and wheat 
(H14–KII–BAR).
27. The chief district officer is the principal district administra-
tor who also serves as the head of the district security commit-
tee along with the district chief of police and the commander 
of the local military unit.
28. Informants acknowledged that there is no way to avoid this 
kind of interference, that it could only be “managed.” They in-
dicated a need for compromise or vaguely referred to solutions 
being found, without elaboration.
29. Based on KP: R09–KII–PSH; KP: R10–KII–PSH; KP: 
R13–KII–PSH; FATA: R07–KII–PSH; FATA: R05–KII–PSH; 
FATA: R11–KII–PSH; FATA: R13–KII–PSH; FATA: R12–KII–
PSH; and FATA: R24–GI–PSH.
30. Based on R18–FGD–PSH; and R19–FGD–NWA. As 
recently as November 2015, a polio district coordinator was 
gunned downed in KP’s Swabi district (Express Tribune 2015).
31. In another interview, Hafiz Gul Bahadur declared in June 
2012 that no polio campaign would take place in North Wa-
ziristan (R05–KII–PSH). A recent exception to this trend is in 
Bannu, where there were five campaigns in the bordering areas 
of Lakki Marwat, Tank (R13–KII–PSH).
32. It was reported that in FATA, even nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) (which are usually more welcome than gov-
ernment workers) cannot access areas for the polio program 
because of the fierce insurgent resistance to it. One interviewee 
claims that the polio program was considered a “taboo” topic 
(R05–KII–PSH).
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33. A failure to provide these “donations” often led to the 
disruption of construction work. Government officials in the 
Tarai were threatened, and as a result, rarely went out into the 
field. Monitoring and supervision was often conducted with 
the help of security forces. In Bardiya, during the years of con-
flict, the Maoists had even asked for up to 50 percent of the 
project cost, accusing the road user committee of colluding 
with the government to build the road so security forces could 
use it. The Maoists also demanded money from contractors 
who risked the disruption of construction work if they did 
not comply (based on G17–KII–PAL; G3–KII–SRH; R5–KII–
KTH; G13–KII–BAR; R8–KII–SRH).
34. An assessment of local governance finds that pet projects of 
political leaders were given priority and that those of ordinary 
people received attention only when they corresponded with 
the interests of the politicians (Inlogos 2009). Politicians were 
sometimes even able to influence the selection of roads under 
the Rural Access Improvement and Decentralization Project. 
In fact, 35 percent of the village development committee sec-
retaries admitted that recommendations from politicians was 
the clinching factor when making decisions about the proj-
ects (Based on G2–KII–SRH; R8–KII–SRH; R9–KII–SRH; 
R8–KII–SRH).
35. The Balochistan Education Foundation (BEF) was set up 
in 1994 by the government of Balochistan to strengthen the 
private sector provision of education and to raise the standards 
for education in the province. The government restructured 
the foundation and brought about significant reforms in its 
governance, management, and operating procedures through 
amendments to the BEF Act in 2004 and 2006.
36. Several other informants expressed similar ideas (based on 
KII–01; KII–08, 43; KII–12). The problems between the two 
parties emerged in the later stages of BESP when relevant peo-
ple in the bureaucracy and top management were transferred 
to other departments.
37. Numerous interviewees suggested that BEF and the NGOs 
were equally subject to corruption and patronage. A key in-
formant interview with a donor office (anonymized, KII–01–
PAK–BAL) gave the following information: (1) participants at a 
meeting remarked they did not want to work through NGOs as 
implementing partners due to corruption, lack of capacity, and 
difficulties in reaching out to them; (2) participants noted that 
BEF was allegedly corrupt, with one person receiving the sal-
ary of 100 people (based on hearsay); and (3) the interviewee 
was of the opinion that local NGOs do not have greater capac-
ity than local people—donors/development partners should 
work directly with communities by supporting them with new 
technologies and adding an economic element/component.
38. For instance, the increased use of the military and police to 
escort health workers enabled them to reach areas where there 
was violent political opposition to the Polio Eradication Proj-
ect, but this also made health workers more easily identifiable 
(R16–FGD–SWB).
39. See also the following interview transcripts: KII–01; KII–
02; KII–03; KII–04; KII–09; FGD–01.
40. The main points outlined in chapters 7 and 8 were de-
rived from the authors’ analysis and from suggestions received 
from a number of experts and development practitioners 
related to an earlier draft of this chapter (as noted in the 
acknowledgements).
41. This does not mean, however, that technical aspects do not 
matter. They just need to be complemented by an attempt to 
understand and adapt to the realities of the political economy, 
as is widely recognized in the political economy literature.
42. See also Harris and Wild (2013), which acknowledges this 
point.
43. See Booth and Cammack (2013), Unsworth (2015),G and 
Kelsall (2016) for a discussion of the policy implications of 
these approaches, and the latest World Development Report 
(World Bank 2017).
44. See, for example, DiJohn and Putzel 2009; Grindle 2007; 
Khan 2010; Unsworth 2010; Booth et al. 2015a; Goloo-
ba-Mutebi and Hickey 2013; Hickey 2013; World Bank 2017.
45. See World Bank (2016b).
46. This observation is not just limited to our cases—there is 
limited global evidence to suggest that aid agencies are system-
atically assessing and tailoring their approaches to the issues 
addressed here. The reasons behind this disconnect could be 
myriad, including knowledge gaps, ideological blind spots, 
and organizational cultures that prefer to avoid acknowledging 
such realities, but whatever they are, evidence suggests that we 
need to get to the root it.
47. At least three main lessons should be taken into account 
when delivering or implementing SSD. First, in practice, de-
livery is often facilitated by informal and ad hoc arrangements 
across blurred public-private boundaries (Mcloughlin and Bat-
ley 2012: 30–31). Second, informal practices and institutions 
are often pervasive and are not going away soon, whether we 
like it or not (Mohmand 2012). Third, informal institutions—
frequently framed as governance problems—should instead 
be seen as part of the solution (Moore and Unsworth 2010). 
Two notable thinkers have tried to make these insights more 
practical:
•	 Practical hybrids. Booth (2012) describes “practical hybrids” 
as institutional arrangements that combine modern bureau-
cratic standards and approaches to development with lo-
cally accepted cultures and practices. Specifically, they are 
institutional arrangements that are: (1) locally anchored in 
that they are locally driven initiatives making use of local 
resources and deriving their legitimacy from “local cultural 
repertoires” and “local views on what is important and how 
to get things done” (Booth 2012: 19); and (2) “problem 
solving,” insofar as the arrangements address problems that 
are perceived as important in the local context, build on 
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currently existing arrangements, and facilitate collective ac-
tion to address the problems.
•	 Institutional bricolage. Cleaver (2001) finds multiple cases 
of “institutional bricolage” where “people consciously and 
unconsciously draw on existing social and cultural ar-
rangements to shape institutions in response to changing 
situations.” Institutions are formed through the uneven 
“patching together” of old practices and norms with new 
arrangements. In practice, this requires the constant rene-
gotiation of norms, the reinvention of tradition, the identi-
fication of legitimate forms of authority, the facilitation of 
cross-cultural borrowing and multipurpose institutions, and 
the fostering of mutual cooperation and respect. See Cleaver 
(2012) for examples. It must be noted that bricolage is not 
always benign and can reproduce inequalities.
48. This is in line with “problem-driven” approaches to devel-
opment (Fritz, Levy, and Ort 2014).
49. There is scant practical guidance on how to deliver services 
under different political settlements (Parks and Cole 2010; 
Kelsall 2016).
50. As North et al. (2011: 1) put it, “when development pol-
icy advice threatens the logic of stability in limited access or-
ders, these societies often resist or sabotage the recommended 
measures.”
51. There are a number of approaches for how aid actors can 
support local networks and coalitions that can be drawn on to 
inform programming (O’Meally 2013). For example, Leftwich 
(2011) notes that prior or existing networks often facilitate the 
formation of developmental coalitions in unfolding situations 
of this kind. Well-educated and sometimes well-connected 
individuals regularly play an important role in directing and 
driving coalitions for reform. The internal organization of a 
coalition for reform is important, such as transparency of pro-
cedures and financial arrangements, agreement and clarity on 
roles and responsibilities, size of the coalition, potential trade-
offs between inclusiveness and effectiveness, and navigating 
between formal and informal institutions and environments. 
Coalitions can help drive the endogenous politics of develop-
mental reform by: (1) achieving a specific policy goal; (2) open-
ing up the debate on a previously taboo subject; (3) deepening 
and strengthening its internal organization and relationships 
for future purposes; and (4) increasing the capacity of constit-
uent organizations.
52. We are grateful to Professor James Putzel for the term “shot 
in the dark” in this context. This term was communicated in his 
comments on an earlier draft.
53. There are two potential reasons for this: (1) development 
practitioners are detached from how things really work on the 
ground, or (2) they were aware of these issues but were not 
comfortable with officially documenting them. Our research 
suggests the former.
54. These debates are also captured in the humanitarian liter-
ature on the issue of SSD neutrality and the trade-off between 
treating insurgents and sustaining the conflict.
55. See note 1.
56. See note 2
57. It is nonetheless recognized that the aid system is not ho-
mogenous and embodies different approaches.
58. The World Development Report (World Bank 2004) argu-
ment is that when services remain undelivered, break down, or 
are substandard, it is due to failures in the chain of accountabil-
ity that links service providers to beneficiaries. It introduced 
the now influential “accountability triangle,” which links poor 
people to service providers either through policy makers (that 
is, the “long route” of accountability) or directly (that is, the 
“short route”). It therefore claims that SSD works when the 
incentives of providers and beneficiaries are aligned (Kelsall 
2016). The second major SSD paradigm among donors is 
community-driven development, an approach that emphasizes 
community control over planning decisions and investment re-
sources (see Wong 2012; Marc et al. 2013; Bennett and D’On-
ofrio 2015). The idea behind it is that involving communities 
in local development decisions is not only the inherent right 
of every citizen but that participation can often lead to a bet-
ter use of resources, geared toward meeting community needs. 
However, there is scarce systematic evidence or analysis exam-
ining why and how community-driven development projects 
work in violence-affected contexts.

Appendixes | 135
Appendixes
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Appendix A.  
methodology and Case study Background
methodology
South Asia is home to more than 1.6 billion 
people—about 24 percent of the world’s pop-
ulation and about half of the world’s poor. 
Progress toward ending extreme poverty 
will be therefore largely influenced by prog-
ress made there. The region has experienced 
various forms of violent conflict, which have 
negatively impacted its development prog-
ress. This study focuses on service delivery in 
Afghanistan, Nepal, and Pakistan—countries 
selected to span a range of forms of violence. 
The research focuses on the health and edu-
cation sectors in Afghanistan, the health and 
rural infrastructure sectors in Nepal, and the 
health and education sectors in Pakistan. The 
research covers but is not limited to six proj-
ects in these focal sectors.
Field research sites were selected within each 
country for in-depth study and comparative 
analysis. Each of the subnational areas was 
affected by violence, but had different char-
acteristics in terms of location, forms of vi-
olence, and composition of society. Further 
information about the subnational research 
sites is available in the respective background 
country reports (World Bank and Akram 
2016; World Bank and AREU 2016; World 
Bank and SSB 2016).
gathering information
The study methodology is qualitative and 
combines multiple methods, summarized in 
box A.1. The country-based field research 
was conducted by local partners, with tech-
nical backstopping provided by the research 
task team.1 The methodology was inductive 
in that we began with broad questions and 
key gaps and iteratively narrowed the focus 
based on the empirical findings that emerged. 
This process included multistakeholder work-
shops, in-country field visits to deliberate 
with local partners, refinement of the findings 
through expert input, and literature reviews 
of emerging topics.
Regarding the interview method, we made 
every attempt to triangulate responses from 
individual interviews with information from 
focus group discussions and with primary and 
secondary data. Much of the information in 
the study regarding the views, interests, and 
behavior of armed insurgent actors are based 
on third-party intermediaries because insur-
gent groups are often extremely difficult to 
access and highly fragmented. We triangu-
lated the views of the intermediaries when 
possible. Further research could include inter-
views with insurgents.
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Box A.1. summary of Research methods
The findings were generated and triangulated using the following methods:
•	 Systematic metareview of global evidence. The review included existing knowl-
edge on social service delivery (SSD) in violence-affected contexts, political economy 
and violence conceptual frameworks, existing policy guidance on low-income and vi-
olence-affected contexts, and knowledge on delivering health and educaton in fragile 
contexts.
•	 Review of country-, sector-, and intervention-related evidence. The review 
included the full range of academic-, policy-, donor-, and project-related documenta-
tion, both internal and external to the World Bank.
•	 Semistructured key informant interviews (KIIs). Over 220 interviews were con-
ducted in Islamabad, Kabul, and Kathmandu—capital cities of the three countries 
selected—and at field sites with a range of informants, including current and former 
World Bank staff, project team leaders, sector specialists, government officials, service 
providers, subject experts, donor agencies, implementing partners, and elites and lead-
ers at various levels.
•	 Field visits and focus group discusssion (FGDs). These visits and discussions were 
conducted to triangulate and validate the findings, observe the on-the-ground power 
dynamics, enrich the findings through rolling group discussions, and ensure represen-
tation from users of the services.
•	 Systematic interview transcript analysis. Based on transcript analysis methodolo-
gies, the key informant interviews and focus group discussions were coded, clustered, 
and analyzed to draw out common findings and issues.
•	 Expert input and consultations. Sectoral, country-specific, and global experts pro-
vided comments and input at various points in the process.
•	 Multistakeholder consultations. Consultations were held with local partners, ex-
perts, and donor officials.
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Why We Chose these methods: 
Case selection and limitations
The case studies were selected based on re-
search puzzles developed from gaps in the 
literature (see background country reports). 
Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Fed-
erally Administered Tribal Areas, post-2006 
Nepal’s Hill Region and the Tarai, and the 
regions in Afghanistan were chosen based on 
variations in outcomes of service delivery;2 
the Balochistan Education Support Project 
(BESP) was chosen for being an outlier of 
progress in the province; and the period of 
large-scale violent conflict in Nepal (1996–
2006) was chosen for its counterintuitive na-
tionwide progress in social service delivery 
(SSD) during a period of political violence. 
We then attempted to discover what political 
economy dynamics and forms of violence are 
associated with—if not the cause of—such 
variations. The aim was to construct analyt-
ical narratives to suggest potential explana-
tions for the divergences because the current 
theory and practice literature could not, at 
least in our cases. Thus, the cases were chosen 
purposefully but were not necessarily meant 
to be representative of country context. For 
example, the polio campaign may not be em-
blematic of service delivery in Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa or the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas. It was a discrete activity born out of 
unique circumstances, with highly specific 
characteristics. Insights drawn from the polio 
campaign may not be readily extrapolated to 
other service delivery areas. All the regions 
chosen had experienced political violence.
Case study sites were not chosen randomly, 
and no attempt was made to set up a random-
ized controlled trial (RCT). Because political 
contexts and dynamics vary so widely across 
regions affected by large-scale political vio-
lence (Kalyvas 2003), we determined that the 
RCT method—often not feasible in fragile, 
conflict, and violence-affected areas—would 
be largely inappropriate as a method of case of 
selection. While RCTs are useful for describ-
ing what works, they are much less useful for 
drawing inferences or demonstrating causal-
ity (Basu 2014). In addition, lessons learned 
from RCTs translate poorly because contexts 
differ within and across countries (Hausmann 
2016). Finally, a more fine-grained analysis 
with a “small N” sample permits us to trace 
and explain how a combination of factors—
local political settlements, elite bargaining, 
forms and motivations of violence, and mode 
of delivery—generate divergent outcomes in 
ways that the RCT method could not (Basu 
2014; Hausmann 2016). In this sense, the 
case selection method was used to develop a 
more general theoretical framework for how 
and why these four dimensions matter to SSD 
outcomes (see Thomas 1998).
Sectors and associated projects were selected 
for several reasons. The sectors chosen in each 
country focused on basic social services that 
emphasized serving the poor. The intention 
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was not to provide systematic comparative 
analysis of sector specificities but rather to 
focus on common patterns and processes of 
pro-poor service delivery. The focal projects 
for each sector were selected based on: if the 
project spanned some of the period of violent 
conflict; if the project and sector presented in-
teresting puzzles about successes, challenges, 
or divergent outcomes; and if the World Bank 
project team was interested in the study remit, 
which would improve the changes of getting 
access to data and encourage future uptake. 
In short, the study focuses on selected sec-
tors with key projects as focal points. Note, 
however, that the report does not focus on 
attributing impacts to specific projects. It cov-
ers selected sectoral projects but is not limited 
to them or does not attempt to separate them 
from other processes in the sectors.3 In many 
cases, we did not attempt to distinguish them 
from broader sectoral or government pro-
cesses or to examine the impact of additional 
resources compared with none.
We focus on four dimensions in the analytical 
framework—local political settlements, elite 
bargaining, forms and motivations of vio-
lence, and mode of delivery—due to several 
factors. Like the case study selection, these 
dimensions were chosen as the organizing 
ideas of the study after a number of iterations 
of the research framework based on what the 
empirical material was telling us, what the 
gaps in the literature were, and how we could 
explain the puzzles in each case. As previously 
noted, this was an inductive process: we had 
developed hunches and working hypotheses 
based on the literature, and we chose study 
sites with divergent outcomes in SSD and 
examined what differed in terms of political 
economy and violence patterns. We wanted 
to develop an analytical framework that was 
focused enough to identify patterns that had 
not yet been illuminated in the literature. For 
a similarly focused approach that attempts to 
explain patterns of political order, see North, 
Wallis, and Weingast (2009) regarding lim-
ited access orders.
These four dimensions emerged as import-
ant contributors to implementation and out-
comes; and they have been underemphasized 
in the available literature. However, while we 
focus on these areas, we do not suggest that 
other issues do not matter. For example, there 
is a well-established notion that beneficiary 
participation and service provider incentives 
are central drivers of service delivery (World 
Bank 2004). Our study did not focus on 
these factors because interview and other evi-
dence did not suggest that they were decisive 
in addressing the research puzzles. However, 
we do say something about beneficiaries and 
service providers, even if they tend to be elite 
dominated, as discussed in the report.4 Our 
framework should be seen as an attempt to 
specify how politics and forms of violence 
affect more mainstream models of service 
delivery, such as the accountability triangle 
approach from the 2004 World Development 
Report (World Bank 2003) or communi-
ty-driven development.
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The puzzles and framework can be tested 
with further research. In this sense, our work 
is a starting point. Research in other contexts 
would be desirable to further test the findings. 
Nevertheless, our findings were triangulated 
with the national and global evidence base 
to increase their wider applicability.5 Further 
research could similarly incorporate the opin-
ions of beneficiaries regarding services, their 
levels of participation, and the motivation of 
providers to understand how the strategies of 
the elites take their views into account. We 
hope this work encourages further research 
into such important dynamics.
This study does not attempt to address the 
impact of SSD on broader political dynam-
ics, such as peace-building and state-build-
ing. While this an important area of research, 
we think that the link is indirect and overly 
broad to provide granular, day-to-day guid-
ance for policy makers and practitioners on 
the ground. The assumption that delivering 
social protection and basic services contrib-
utes to state-building outcomes appears with 
a striking degree of regularity in the litera-
ture, and yet empirical evidence supporting or 
undermining this link is very thin (Carpenter, 
Slater, and Mallett 2012; Haar and Ruben-
stein 2012).
The study does address the extent to which 
SSD can become a target for political vio-
lence. In this respect, we aim to understand 
why and how this occurs, and provide donors 
guidance on how to “do no harm” at various 
points in this study.
notes
1. Technical backstopping included regular two-way commu-
nications as well regular field visits from the task team to de-
bate and refine emerging findings and fill gaps. For example, 
the task team provided detailed guidance notes on the ana-
lytical framework, field research methodology, key informant 
interview questions, and background report drafts.
2. See King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) on the importance of 
variation in outcomes when designing research.
3. Note that the report also focuses on how services are de-
livered in violence-affected contexts. It does not focus on 
the relationship between SSD and state-building or state le-
gitimacy (Mcloughlin 2014); the relationship between SSD 
and peace-building (Denny, Mallett, and Mazurana 2015); or 
whether SSD contributes to changes in the political settlement 
(Barrientos and Pellissery 2012). Moreover, it is difficult to es-
tablish linear causal relationships between political economy 
and service delivery outcomes (Harris and Wild 2013: 4).
4. For example, while there were very few systematic surveys 
available on the opinions of beneficiaries, we conducted a small 
survey of marginalized groups in Nepal; and the scorecard that 
formed the puzzles on Afghanistan embedded beneficiary 
opinions in the index.
5. The findings are complementary to rather than a substitute 
for other technical analyses. The political economy analysis 
should be viewed as a complement to help solve complex de-
velopment problems (Booth, Harris, and Wild 2016).
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Appendix B.  
A diagnostic tool: steps and Question set
Chapter 8 describes the rationale and modules 
for this diagnostic tool. Its core purpose is to 
help practitioners gain a better understand-
ing of the important dimensions of political 
settlements, violence, and service delivery 
bargaining in a given context to help them 
support interventions that are more sensitive 
to these aspects. Figure B.1 summarizes the 
main diagnostic modules, followed by sample 
sets of questions. Note that this is merely a 
starting point—additional questions can be 
developed depending on the context and in-
terests of practitioners. 
figure B.1. main diagnostic modules 
Module 3: 
Draw lessons from local service delivery and bargaining
Module 2: 
Map the relevant dimensions of violence in the program areas
Module 1: 
Understand relevant political settlements, who the relevant elites are, and how they matter
Organization Ideology andobjectives
Localization
and mobility
Delivery 
strategies
Lessons in
bargaining
Developments
outside the sector
Basic features of 
national settlement
Relations between
central and 
subnational elites
Sectoral
settlement
Subnational
settlement
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module 1: guiding Questions
Basic features at the center of power
•	 Who are the key power holders in the ruling coalition? What is the relationship between the 
ruling elites and violent actors? 
•	 What mechanisms help sustain the settlement? To what degree can elites act collectively to 
deliver goods?
•	 To what extent is the settlement clientelistic/developmental, exclusionary/inclusive, or 
stable/unstable? 
•	 How do these features affect the space for delivery in the given sector? 
sectoral dimensions
•	 What is the balance of power and nature of rent-sharing agreements in the sector? What are 
the interests, incentives, and ideas of eliteswith regard to the focal sector? 
•	 What are the opportunities for rents in the sector, and how does this influence the way ser-
vice delivery resources are allocated? What are the dominant modes of delivery in the sector, 
and how does this impact on rent-sharing (for example, state-led versus contracting out, 
preventative versus curative health care delivery)?
Relationship between central and local elites
•	 What is the nature of the relationship between ruling elites at the center (often in the capital) 
and powerful elites in relevant subnational areas?
•	 What is the degree of state penetration over the subnational territory? 
•	 How does the above shape the amount of, and channels for, service delivery resources to the 
area? How does it shape the degree of autonomy of subnational elites to deliver/manage/
allocate resources? 
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subnational dimensions
•	 Who are the powerful elites (armed and unarmed) in the subnational area? 
•	 What is the nature of the subnational settlement, and how is it sustained and reproduced?
•	 What is the relationship and relative balance of power between subnational elites and armed 
elites?
•	 To what extent do key elites have ideas, interests, and incentives in favor of broader-based 
service delivery?
module 2: guiding Questions
drivers
•	 What are the key drivers of violence?
•	 How does this relate to the dynamics associated with the forms of political settlements? 
organization
•	 To what degree is violence organized so that leaders for bargaining are identifiable?
•	 To what degree are violent actors disciplined and homogenous so that bargains can be struck 
and upheld? 
ideology, objectives, and incentives
•	 What are the objectives and ideology of the armed elites? To what degree does the logic, 
scope, and mode of delivery align with such objectives?
•	 Do armed elites have a “policy” toward the services in question? Does this cascade through 
their ranks?
•	 Do armed elites have incentives to enable the service (for example, rents, need to use service, 
helps them achieve goals)?
•	 Are different modes of delivery likely to be more acceptable to armed elites? For example, 
which actors would they trust to deliver the services? Would they be more comfortable with 
decentralized delivery?
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localization and mobility
•	 To what degree are the armed elites locally anchored as opposed to more mobile/roving 
across borders? 
•	 Do armed elites need/want local support and do locals want the service?
•	 Do local elites have relative power to bargain with/constrain local insurgents?
module 3: guiding Questions
experience and strategies for delivery bargaining
•	 What are the prior lessons of front-line service delivery and bargaining in the violence-af-
fected area? Has dialogue been established with insurgents and bargains struck? Was this 
formalized?
•	 Are there opportunities for bargaining? If not, how could services be delivered in those 
areas?
•	 Given steps 1, 2, and 3, which types of bargains might be feasible? What are the likely 
trade-offs?
service delivery strategies
•	 How are services currently being delivered in the sector? What are the institutional channels 
for delivery and political economy challenges for implementation? 
•	 Do the sectors have certain policies/strategies for delivering services in violence-affected 
areas? How well are they working, and have any lessons been learned? 
•	 What is the feasibility and opportunities for making delivery more sensitive to local politics 
and violence?
developments outside the sector
•	 What is the nature of income and land distribution in the area? How might this affect service 
delivery, citizen demand, and forms of political organization? 
•	 What other projects are in the focal region (for example, roads and livelihoods)? Are there 
opportunities for multisectoral approaches?
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